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Samenvatting
Sinds de jaren tachtig zijn de wereldwijde stromen van buitenlandse directe investeringen (BDI)
sterk toegenomen. Alhoewel deze investeringsstromen aanvankelijk hoofdzakelijk ontwikkelde
landen als oorsprong en bestemming hadden, is het belang van transitie- en ontwikkelingslan-
den in de laatste jaren aanzienlijk gegroeid. Deze evolutie wordt regelmatig gerelateerd aan
de internationale fragmentatie van de productieketen en de opkomst van multinationals uit on-
twikkelingslanden. Buitenlandse directe investeringen en multinationale ondernemingen (MNOs)
hebben recent dan ook veel aandacht gekregen van beleidsmakers en academici. Economisch
onderzoek stelt dat enkel de productiefste bedrijven BDI ondernemen (Helpman et al., 2004).
MNOs worden daarom verondersteld productiever en technologisch geavanceerder te zijn dan
binnenlandse bedrijven en bijgevolg de economie van het gastland positief te beïnvloeden door
directe en indirecte effecten (Markusen, 1995). Beleidsmakers in een groot aantal landen voeren
daarom een beleid dat erop gericht is om MNOs aan te trekken.
In dit proefschrift worden de indirecte of spillover effecten van buitenlandse directe investerin-
gen bestudeerd. Spillover effecten komen tot stand door wisselwerkingen tussen buitenlandse en
binnenlandse ondernemingen, die resulteren in de overdracht van technologie en kennis van de
eerste naar de laatste groep langs verschillende kanalen. Spillover effecten zijn daarom uitermate
belangrijk in transitie- en ontwikkelingslanden, waar de instroom van technologie noodzakelijk
is voor economische groei en ontwikkeling (Hanousek et al., 2011). Er bestaat een uitgebreide
literatuur die de spillover effecten van BDI onderzoekt. In deze literatuur wordt een onderscheid
gemaakt tussen effecten die zich voordoen tussen multinationale en binnenlandse ondernemingen
die actief zijn in dezelfde sector (horizontale effecten) en in verschillende sectoren (verticale
effecten), afhankelijk van de relatieve positie van bedrijven in de productieketen. Verticale
spillover effecten worden verder ingedeeld in achterwaartse effecten, die ontstaan tussen MNOs
en binnenlandse leveranciers, en voorwaartse effecten, die optreden tussen MNOs en binnen-
landse klanten. Recente meta-studies van de literatuur geven aan dat achterwaartse spillover
effecten in het algemeen positief en statistisch significant zijn; wat horizontale en voorwaartse
effecten betreft zijn de resultaten echter niet eenduidig (Havranek en Irsova, 2011; 2013). Deze
meta-studies besluiten eveneens dat heterogeniteit op het bedrijfsniveau een zeer belangrijke
factor is. Niet alle binnenlandse bedrijven zijn in staat spillover effecten te absorberen en niet
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alle MNOs kunnen deze effecten genereren. Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de literatuur door
diverse vormen van heterogeniteit, zowel bij binnenlandse als bij buitenlandse ondernemingen,
te onderzoeken.
Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift heeft een dubbele doelstelling. In het eerste deel
van het hoofdstuk wordt de opbouw van een pan-Europese databank, de ‘Augmented Amadeus
of AUGAMA’ databank, besproken. De AUGAMA databank bevat bedrijfsinformatie over 25
Europese landen in de periode 1995-2012. De belangrijkste databron die gebruikt werd bij
het samenstellen van deze databank is de Amadeus databank van Bureau Van Dijk Electronic
Publishing (Bureau Van Dijk, 2011). De Amadeus databank bevat gedetailleerde informatie over
de financiën, industriële activiteiten en locatie van private en publieke ondernemingen doorheen
Europa. Bureau Van Dijk brengt elke maand een geactualiseerde versie van de data uit, die
gepubliceerd wordt op een DVD. Een DVD bevat echter enkel data over de laatste tien jaren en
bedrijven die de markt verlaten worden verwijderd uit de databank. Meerdere versies van de
Amadeus data worden daarom gecombineerd bij de samenstelling van de AUGAMA databank.
Deze aanpak vereist echter dat wijzigingen in de NACE industriecode van bedrijven en wijzigin-
gen in de NACE classificatie zelf verwerkt dienen te worden. Bovendien werden alle Amadeus
data verworven in de nationale munteenheid, wat een deflatie van de data en een conversie naar
Euro noodzakelijk maakt om het vergelijken van landen mogelijk te maken. Hiervoor werden
bijkomende data en input-output tabellen van Eurostat, EU-KLEMS en WIOD verzameld. Om
meer inzicht te krijgen in de dekkingsgraad en representativiteit van de AUGAMA databank
werd deze vergeleken met de Structural Business Statistics (SBS) databank van Eurostat. Deze
vergelijking onthult dat de AUGAMA data de structuur van de Europese economie over landen
en industrieën goed benaderen. In het tweede deel van het hoofdstuk wordt de Wooldridge-
Levinsohn-Petrin totale factor productiviteitsmaatstaf (WLP TFP, Wooldridge, 2009; Petrin en
Levinsohn, 2012) geschat voor de buitenlandse en binnenlandse bedrijven. Vervolgens wordt het
totale factor productiviteitspremium van buitenlandse over binnenlandse bedrijven bepaald eerst
voor alle Europese landen waarvoor de data beschikbaar zijn en voor Roemenië afzonderlijk.
Deze analyse is geïnspireerd op het werk van Bernard en Jensen (1999). Productiviteit wordt daar-
bij gerelateerd aan een dummy variabele die aangeeft of een bedrijf binnenlands of buitenlands is,
bedrijfsgrootte en tijds-, industrie- en regio-effecten. Voor de set van Europese landen wordt een
productiviteitsverschil van 48% vastgesteld, in Roemenië blijken buitenlandse ondernemingen
28% productiever te zijn dan binnenlandse ondernemingen. Het tweede hoofdstuk vormt dan ook
de basis voor de volgende hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift. Een belangrijke veronderstelling in
de spillover literatuur is namelijk dat buitenlandse ondernemingen productiever en technologisch
geavanceerder zijn dan binnenlandse ondernemingen, wat de overdracht van technologie en
kennis mogelijk maakt. Het bestaan van dit productiviteitsvoordeel wordt bevestigd in de analyse.
In het derde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift worden de maatstaven die in de empirische
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literatuur gebruikt worden om horizontale en verticale spillover effecten te meten onderzocht. Een
correcte identificatie van spillover effecten is belangrijk om een aantal redenen. Alhoewel er zeer
veel studies zijn die de effecten van BDI beschouwen, is er geen consensus over de horizontale
en voorwaartse spillover effecten die kunnen resulteren uit interacties tussen buitenlandse en
binnenlandse ondernemingen. Achterwaartse effecten daarentegen blijken robuust, positief
en statistisch significant te zijn (Havranek en Irsova, 2011; 2013). Dit resultaat is in het
bijzonder van belang in het licht van de internationale fragmentatie van de productieketen. In
het hoofdstuk wordt eerst de rol van het aggregatieniveau in de input-output tabellen, die bij het
berekenen van de maatstaven voor de voorwaartse en achterwaartse effecten gebruikt worden,
bestudeerd. Omdat data over interacties tussen ondernemingen op het bedrijfsniveau doorgaans
onbeschikbaar zijn, worden bedrijfsdata over de eigenaar van een onderneming (binnenlands of
buitenlands) gecombineerd met input-output coëfficiënten (op het industrieniveau) om spillover
variabelen te genereren (Caves, 1974 en Javorcik, 2004). Deze methode impliceert dat input-
output tabellen cruciaal zijn in het bepalen van de relatieve posities van ondernemingen in
de productieketen. Aan de hand van input-output tabellen wordt bepaald welke relaties tussen
ondernemingen als horizontaal en welke als verticaal beschouwd worden. Het aggregatieniveau in
deze tabellen legt dus vast welke transacties in de maatstaven opgenomen worden. Om de impact
van het aggregatieniveau in de input-output tabellen te evalueren worden de spillover effecten
verkregen op basis van maatstaven berekend met behulp van geaggregeerde en gedisaggregeerde
input-output tabellen vergeleken. In the hoofdstuk wordt vervolgens de impact van het al dan
niet opnemen van de diagonaal in de input-output tabellen (relaties tussen ondernemingen
die actief zijn in dezelfde sector) geanalyseerd. In de traditionele maatstaven worden deze
interacties niet opgenomen aangezien ze al vertegenwoordigd worden door de horizontale
maatstaf (Javorcik, 2004). Hier staat echter tegenover deze relaties nog steeds leverancier-klant
relaties inhouden, waardoor deze intuïtief gezien wel in de verticale maatstaven opgenomen
dienen te worden. Bovendien vertegenwoordigt de diagonaal een aanzienlijk deel van de totale
productie die verhandeld wordt in een sector. Het achterwaartse en totale spillover effect kunnen
beduidend onderschat worden als gevolg van deze twee potentiële problemen. De empirische
resultaten in hoofdstuk drie bevestigen deze hypothese. Achterwaartse spillover effecten, die in de
literatuur bestempeld worden als het meest waarschijnlijke kanaal waarlangs positieve spillovers
getransfereerd kunnen worden, zijn duidelijk positief en sterk significant. Wat horizontale en
voorwaartse effecten betreft, zijn de resultaten minder eenduidig.
Het vierde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift beschouwt de kenmerken van binnenlandse en
buitenlandse ondernemingen die bepalen welke bedrijven spillover effecten absorberen en welke
bedrijven deze effecten genereren. Het hoofdstuk bestudeert in het bijzonder de rol van de
grootte van ondernemingen, gemeten aan de hand van het aantal werknemers. Ondernemingen
worden geclassificeerd op basis van de EU-criteria waarbij vier klassen van bedrijven tot stand
xkomen: micro, klein, middelgroot en groot. Het hoofdstuk behandelt eveneens een potentiële
steekproefselectie problematiek die de literatuur kenmerkt, aangezien veel studies enkel grote
(buitenlandse) ondernemingen bestuderen. Dit hoofdstuk sluit aan bij de recente literatuur die
het belang van bedrijfsheterogeniteit onderstreept als een belangrijke determinant van spillover
effecten. Deze literatuur bouwt verder op meta-studies van Meyer en Sinani (2009) en Havranek
en Irsova (2011; 2013), waaruit het belang van het in rekening brengen van heterogeniteit in
de analyse van spillover effecten duidelijk naar voren komt. Hoewel de rol van de grootte
van binnenlandse bedrijven al onderzocht werd, is er nog geen consensus bereikt over de te
verwachten spillover effecten. Het belang van de grootte van buitenlandse bedrijven werd nog
niet onderzocht in de literatuur. In het hoofdstuk worden voor de vier klassen van buitenlandse
ondernemingen spillover variabelen berekend. Spillover effecten op alle en op vier klassen van
binnenlandse bedrijven worden bestudeerd. Het hoofdstuk bereikt twee belangrijke conclusies.
Ten eerste, de grootte van buitenlandse ondernemingen blijkt in belangrijke mate te verklaren
welke bedrijven spillover effecten genereren. Enkel middelgrote buitenlandse bedrijven, die
tussen de 50 en 250 werknemers tewerkstellen, brengen spillover effecten voort. Micro, kleine en
grote ondernemingen genereren geen effecten. Ten tweede, de grootte van binnenlandse bedrijven
is onbelangrijk in de analyse van spillover effecten. Tot slot blijkt steekproefselectie een beperkt
probleem te zijn in de literatuur. In het tweede deel van het hoofdstuk worden enkele mogelijke
verklaringen voor deze twee resultaten voorgesteld. Waarom ontstaan spillover effecten enkel
uit interacties met middelgrote buitenlandse ondernemingen? Een eerste mogelijke verklaring
is dat dit gedreven wordt door productiviteit, maar deze hypothese blijkt niet op te gaan. Het
ontbreken van spillover effecten van micro en kleine ondernemingen is waarschijnlijk te wijten
aan hun te beperkte schaal (Vacek, 2010). Grote ondernemingen blijken minder goed ingebed te
zijn in de lokale economie, wat samenwerken met binnenlandse bedrijven bemoeilijkt. Grote
bedrijven importeren (een groter deel van) hun intermediaire inputs en exporteren (een groter
deel van hun) productie. Bovendien brengen ze vaker hun “eigen productieketen” (bedrijven
waarmee ze al samenwerken) mee wanneer ze investeren in het buitenland. De grootte van
buitenlandse ondernemingen blijkt een goede maatstaf voor al deze onderliggende kanalen.
In tegenstelling daarvan is de grootte van binnenlandse bedrijven geen goede maatstaf voor
verschillende onderliggende kanalen met tegengestelde effecten. Andere maatstaven, zoals
bijvoorbeeld de absorptieve capaciteit van een onderneming, zijn hiervoor beter geschikt.
Het vijfde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift heeft een eenzelfde opbouw en doelstelling als het
vierde hoofdstuk. Waar in het vierde hoofdstuk de grootte van ondernemingen werd beschouwd,
ligt de nadruk in het vijfde hoofdstuk op productiviteit. Dit onderzoek is ingebed in de liter-
atuur die de productiviteit van ondernemingen relateert aan de wijze waarop ze buitenlandse
markten bedienen (Helpman et al., 2004 en Antràs en Helpman, 2004). Aangezien enkel de
productiefste bedrijven filialen kunnen oprichten in het buitenland, worden MNOs verondersteld
xi
productiever en technologisch geavanceerder te zijn dan binnenlandse ondernemingen, wat in
spillover effecten kan resulteren (Markusen, 1995). Er bestaat echter een aanzienlijke hetero-
geniteit tussen binnenlandse en buitenlandse ondernemingen. Dit impliceert dat een deel van
de binnenlandse bedrijven productiever is dan een deel van de MNOs. In de literatuur werd de
absorptieve capaciteit van bedrijven, gemeten aan de hand van productiviteit of technologische
geavanceerdheid, als een belangrijke determinant van spillover effecten geïdentificeerd (Crespo
en Fontoura, 2007). Slechts een beperkt aantal studies beschouwt heterogeniteit tussen MNOs als
determinant van spillover effecten. Deze studies tonen aan dat niet alle bedrijven spillovers gener-
eren (Javorcik en Spatareanu, 2011; Nicolini en Resmini, 2010). Het belang van productiviteit
werd daarbij nog niet onderzocht. Niettemin is dit een belangrijke factor om te bestuderen gezien
de veronderstelling dat de spillover effecten gedreven worden door de superieure productiviteit
van MNOs. Dit doet de vraag rijzen of MNOs zeer productief moeten zijn om spillover effecten
te kunnen teweegbrengen, of volstaat het dat MNOs productiever te zijn dan de binnenlandse
bedrijven waarmee ze interageren. In het hoofdstuk wordt eerst heterogeniteit tussen MNOs
onderzocht door deze bedrijven op te delen in vier productiviteitsklassen en voor elk van deze
klassen spillover variabelen te berekenen. Uit deze analyse blijkt dat enkele de productiefste
MNOs positieve spillover effecten genereren (met name achterwaartse effecten). Vervolgens
wordt de heterogeniteit op het vlak van productiviteit tussen binnenlandse ondernemingen (en
relatief ten opzichte van de MNOs) in de analyse geïntegreerd. Hierbij wordt voor elk bin-
nenlands bedrijf bepaald welke MNOs meer/minder productief zijn. De spillover variabelen
worden opnieuw berekend voor elke groep. Daarna wordt de decompositie nog verder uitgebreid
door de MNOs die meer/minder productief zijn op te delen in drie groepen: ten minste twee
standaardafwijkingen meer/minder productief, tussen één en twee standaardafwijkingen meer/-
minder productief en ten hoogste één standaardafwijking meer/minder productief. Deze analyse
onthult dat positieve spillover effecten ontstaan uit interacties met MNOs die productiever zijn
en in het bijzonder MNOs die twee standaardafwijkingen productiever zijn. Negatieve effecten
ontstaan uit interacties met minder productieve MNOs. Tot slot wordt rekening gehouden met de
absorptieve capaciteit van binnenlandse ondernemingen door spillover effecten op vier produc-
tiviteitsklassen te beschouwen. Uit deze test blijkt dat de productiefste binnenlandse bedrijven
(met de hoogste absorptieve capaciteit) van de grootste positieve effecten genieten terwijl de
minst productieve ondernemingen met negatieve effecten geconfronteerd worden.
In het zesde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift wordt het potentieel van binnenlandse onderne-
mingen, met gelijkaardige kenmerken als de MNOs in de economie, als een bron van spillover
effecten onderzocht. In de literatuur over BDI worden MNOs beschouwd als ‘uitzonderlijke’
ondernemingen met bedrijfsspecifieke voordelen die hen in staat stellen de concurrentie met
binnenlandse bedrijven aan te gaan (Markusen, 1995). Deze voordelen worden vaak omschreven
als immateriële vaste activa zoals een superieure technologie (Helpman et al., 2004). MNOs
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worden bijgevolg geacht technologisch geavanceerder en productiever te zijn dan binnenlandse
ondernemingen, en aldus een positieve impact op de economie te hebben via directe en indirecte
effecten. Deze veronderstelling blijkt echter niet op te gaan voor alle MNOs. Onderzoek toont
namelijk aan dat kenmerken van MNOs, zoals bijvoorbeeld hun eigendomsstructuur (Javorcik
en Spatareanu, 2008), in belangrijke mate bepalen of deze ondernemingen spillover effecten
kunnen genereren of niet. Lenaerts en Merlevede (2014) identificeren in dit kader productiviteit
als een bijzonder belangrijke determinant. Dit hoofdstuk tracht dan ook een antwoord te vinden
op de vraag of MNOs werkelijk uitzonderlijk zijn of dat het deze kenmerken zijn die bepalen
of spillover effecten al dan niet ontstaan. Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden worden
MNOs gematcht met binnenlandse ondernemingen met dezelfde kenmerken. Daarbij wordt
vooral productiviteit in rekening gebracht. MNOs worden gematcht in elk jaar met binnen-
landse bedrijven die actief zijn in de dezelfde sector aan de hand van de Mahalanobis score.
De kenmerken waarop bedrijven gematcht worden zijn enerzijds productiviteit en anderzijds
productiviteit, leeftijd en grootte. Twee verschillende maatstaven van totale factor productiviteit
(TFP) worden gebruikt: WLP TFP (Wooldridge 2009, Petrin en Levinsohn, 2012) en OP TFP
(Olley en Pakes, 1996). WLP TFP is beschikbaar voor de productie- en het merendeel van de
dienstenindustrieën, OP TFP is enkel voor de productiesectoren beschikbaar. Voor de MNOs
en de binnenlandse bedrijven die geselecteerd werden als match worden spillover variabelen
geconstrueerd. Deze variabelen worden dan afzonderlijk in de productiefunctie geïntroduceerd,
wat het vergelijken van de voortgebrachte spillover effecten mogelijk maakt. MNOs hebben
een positieve impact op de productiviteit van hun leveranciers. De resultaten voor de gematchte
binnenlandse bedrijven duiden op positieve voorwaartse en achterwaartse effecten (deze laatste
enkel als er op productiviteit gematcht wordt). Horizontale effecten zijn negatief maar minder
robuust. Deze resultaten worden gedreven door bedrijven in de dienstensectoren, aangezien er
geen effecten gevonden worden wanneer enkel de productiesectoren bestudeerd worden. Dit kan
mogelijks verklaard worden door het belang van instituties en de kenmerken van dienstensec-
toren, waardoor binnenlandse bedrijven een rol kunnen spelen (Castellani en Zanfei, 2007).
De bevindingen en conclusies geformuleerd in dit proefschrift hebben ook beleidsimplicaties.
Beleidsmakers dienen zich bewust te zijn van het feit dat niet alle MNOs positieve spillover
effecten op binnenlandse bedrijven kunnen genereren (dit hangt onder meer af van hun grootte
en productiviteit), in het bijzonder wanneer BDI specifiek aangetrokken worden omwille van de
verwachte positieve indirecte effecten. De directe effecten van BDI mogen daarbij echter ook niet
uit het oog verloren worden. Bovendien toont dit proefschrift eveneens aan dat er een belangrijke
rol is weggelegd voor binnenlandse bedrijven, zowel wat het absorberen als het genereren
van spillover effecten betreft. Maatregelen gericht op het verhogen van de productiviteit en
absorptieve capaciteit van deze bedrijven zijn daarbij belangrijk.
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1 | Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Since the 1980s, worldwide flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been on the rise.
Global inward FDI flows increased from about 54 billion USD in 1980 to over 1400 billion USD
in 2010, global outward FDI flows grew from 52 billion USD to more than 1500 billion USD
during the same period. Despite the global downturn in FDI caused by the recent financial crisis,
flows quickly recovered. At first, primarily developed countries were involved in foreign direct
investment. More recently, transition and developing countries have started to gain in importance,
first as recipient countries of FDI inflows and later also as source countries for FDI outflows.
FDI is therefore often considered as an important catalyst of worldwide economic integration.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been identified as the driving forces behind foreign
direct investment. This finding is often connected with the increasing international fragmentation
of production and the emergence of global value chains. Multinational activity and foreign direct
investment are commonly thought to advance economic growth and development through direct
and indirect effects, such as job creation, improvements in the domestic production capacity
and technology transfers (UNCTAD, 2013). That is why substantial efforts have been done to
identify the characteristics of firms that set up affiliates abroad and the determinants and effects
of foreign direct investment. The first Chapter of this dissertation therefore goes into detail on
foreign direct investment and the role of multinational enterprises. An important Section of this
Chapter is dedicated to the spillover effects of FDI in particular, as this constitutes the main topic
of this dissertation.
1.1.1 Definition and evolution of foreign direct investment
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines foreign direct
investment as “a category of investment that reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest
by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment
enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting
interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct
investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise.
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The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting power of an enterprise resident in
one economy by an investor resident in another economy is evidence of such a relationship.”1
One of the key components of this definition is the long-term relationship that is established
between the investor and the investment enterprise. This long-term relationship can result from
greenfield investment (through which new subsidiaries or investments are set up), brownfield
investment (existing facilities are acquired, upgraded and used for new activities), cross-border
mergers and acquisitions and joint-ventures (UNCTAD, 2001). The direct investor is not neces-
sarily an enterprise or group of related enterprises, but can for instance also be an individual,
a group of related individuals, a government body, a trust, or any combination of these. The
nationality of the investor is not important, it is the country of residence that determines whether
an investment is considered to be FDI or not. From this definition it is also clear that foreign
direct investment differs from portfolio investment, where investors do not pursue an active role
in the management of a firm but rather invest to spread risk or make profit. FDI is a form of
international capital flows, i.e. capital flows with a long-term perspective that exist alongside
flows with a short-term perspective. As Hanousek et al. (2011) note, FDI is less volatile and
therefore less disruptive than short-term flows.
In addition to being distinguished into inward or outward FDI, depending on the direction of
the investment, FDI is often classified into three types: horizontal, vertical or export-platform FDI
(Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). Horizontal FDI refers to investment aimed at setting up activities
abroad that are similar to the activities the firm performs at home, that occur in the same stage
of the supply chain. Vertical FDI consists of investment to establish activities abroad that are
in different stages of the supply chain (upstream or downstream). Finally, export-platform FDI
covers investment to start activities abroad that enable the investor to export to a third country
(or to an affiliate in the same country but not in the parents’ country). Although many studies
suggest that most FDI is of a horizontal nature, Alfaro and Charlton (2009) maintain that the
extent of vertical FDI is underestimated because of data limitations. Hanson et al. (2001) also
contend that vertical FDI occurs much more than theoretical work indicates.
The remainder of this Section presents three Figures that illustrate the evolution of FDI flows
and stocks through time for different regions. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of FDI inflows
(panel A) and outflows (panel B) in billions of USD from 1970 to 2012. Both FDI inflows
and outflows rose substantially between 1970 and 2010. Between 1970 and 1985 flows grew
according to a quite steady pace. From the second half of the 1980s onwards flows rapidly
1This definition was taken from the OECD Glossary of foreign direct investment - terms and definitions (available
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/fdibenchmarkdefinition). The discussion of this definition and
each of its components is also based on the information provided in the glossary.
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Figure 1.1: FDI inflows (panel A) and FDI outflows (panel B) in billions of US dollars in the
period 1970 to 2012. Source: UNCTAD (UNCTADstat).
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Panel A: FDI Inflows (in billions of USD)
World Developed economies Transition and Developing economies
1500
1750
2000
2250
Panel B: FDI Outflows (in billions of USD)
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
World Developed economies Transition and Developing economies
increased. In 1970, worldwide inflows of FDI represented a value of 13.35 billion USD, of which
9.5 billion USD was absorbed by developed economies and 3.85 billion USD by transition and
developing economies. In terms of FDI outflows, global FDI outflows represented a value of
14.15 billions USD, of which 14.10 billion USD were accounted for by developed countries.
Throughout the years, developed countries continued to dominate FDI transactions. Especially
before 1985, developed countries reach well over 70% of world total for both the inward and
the outward flows. More recently, the share of inflows and outflows of FDI absorbed and
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Figure 1.2: FDI inward stocks (panel A) and FDI outward stocks (panel B) in billions of US
dollars in the period 1980 to 2012. Source: UNCTAD (UNCTADstat).
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transmitted by developing and transition countries started to increase. As evidenced by Figure
1.1, at first mainly the inflows of FDI began to grow, which can be explained by multinationals
seeking to exploit cost differentials between developed and less developed countries by shifting
production abroad. Later, also the outflows of FDI from developing and transition economies
increased. This evolution is driven by the rise of emerging multinationals. FDI inflows into
developing and transition economies even surpass those in developed countries since 2010, and
the downfall in inflows due to the crisis is less severe in these countries than in the developed
world. Because transition and developing countries are gaining in importance and even overtake
developed economies, the United Nations described these countries as “the new FDI powerhouses”
(UNCTAD, 2011). In the aftermath of the financial crisis, in which worldwide FDI flows declined
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Figure 1.3: FDI flows (panel A) and FDI stocks (panel B) in billions of US dollars in 2012 by
region. Source: UNCTAD (UNCTADstat).
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considerably, flows started to recover in 2010 and even reached their pre-crisis level in 2011. In
2012, again there was a downturn in worldwide FDI flows, related to the economic and political
uncertainty and instability following the crisis (UNCTAD, 2013). This downturn is the largest
in the developed countries; the transition and developing countries appear to be more resilient.
In 2012, developing countries represented 52.02%, transition countries 6.47% and developed
countries 41.51% of world inflows (UNCTAD, 2013). In terms of outflows, developing and
transition economies represent 30.63% and 3.99% of the outflows, compared to the 65.38% of
outflows generated by developed countries in the same year.
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Figure 1.2 depicts the evolution of inward (panel A) and outward (panel B) FDI stocks in
billions of USD from 1980 to 2012 for the world, the developed economies and the transition
and developing economies. As detailed in Figure 1.2, both inward and outward stocks are on
the rise, especially since the second half of the 1980s (reaching a value of about 20380 billion
USD and 21130 billion USD in 2010 respectively). Developed countries are more involved than
developing and transition economies. In 2010, developed countries represented inward stocks of
13100 billion USD and outward stocks of 17241 billion USD. Although both stocks increased,
inward stocks grew more than outward stocks for developing and transition countries. Overall,
the evolution of inward and outward stocks and the composition of developed and developing
and transition countries as a percentage of world total are highly comparable with those of FDI
flows in Figure 1.1.
In Figure 1.3, FDI flows (panel A) and stocks (panel B) for the year 2012 in billions of USD
are presented for developed economies and transition and developing economies, further split up
by region. For the developed countries, America and Europe represent the largest share, both
in terms of flows and stocks. In the developing and transition economies, America and Asia
dominate. Most FDI flows appear to be directed at countries in East and South-East Asia and
Latin America and the Caribbean. Africa clearly is lagging behind. This applies both to flows
and stocks. Still, despite the global downturn in FDI in 2012, investment into the poorest regions,
including Africa and the least developed countries, was on the rise (which is associated with the
rise of emerging MNEs, see UNCTAD, 2013). The Figure again highlights that outward FDI
dominates inward FDI for the developed countries (with the exception of Oceania), whereas the
opposite occurs for the transition and developing economies.
1.1.2 Foreign direct investment as a pillar of globalisation
International capital flows, including foreign direct investment, are commonly considered as one
of the three pillars of economic globalisation. Economic globalisation refers to the integration
and increasing interdependency of national economies into the world economy through the inter-
nationalisation of markets, companies, technology and many other components (as described
in the OECD Glossary of statistical terms).2 That is why economic globalisation is commonly
measured on the basis of trade, migration, capital flows and the spread of technology.
Although globalisation is often associated with the developments in the international economy
that were taking place in the 1980s, as depicted in Figures 1.1 to 1.3 for the capital flows, the
discussion on when globalisation started is still ongoing (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2002). Some
researchers believe that globalisation is nearly as old as civilisation. A well-known example of
an early form of globalisation is the emergence of the Silk Route -connecting empires in the
2Source: Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, UN, UNCTAD, WTO,
2002 - Annex II, Glossary.
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East and West- and its resulting trade, transfer of technology and knowledge, which led to the
development of political and economic relationships between civilisations. A lot of attention
has also been devoted to the Voyages of Discovery of Columbus, Vasco Da Gama and other
explorers in the 16th and 17th centuries. In particular, the discovery of resources (e.g. gold
and silver) and the expansion of trade as a result of these explorations, and their impact on
the world economy are analysed (as discussed in the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776)). Other
studies, such as O’Rourke and Williamson (2002), claim that globalisation only really started
in the 19th century when a collapse in transportation costs and changes in trade policy induced
international commodity price convergence. Consequently, the 19th century was characterised
by a considerable increase in international trade. Throughout history, periods of globalisation
have alternated with periods of deglobalisation, which are usually characterised by economic
and political crisis and conflict. The inter-war period in the 20th century is a clear example of a
period of deglobalisation. Multinational enterprises have been playing an important role in the
globalisation and deglobalisation process for a long time. In fact, one of the first multinational
enterprises, the Dutch East India Company, was already established in the 17th century. MNEs
can benefit from globalisation, for example, through the availability of new markets, technology
and production factors, and by spreading risks. On the other hand, globalisation also implies that
firms are faced with more competition.
1.1.3 Foreign direct investment and other economic phenomena
As indicated above, foreign direct investment has starkly accelerated in the last few decades. The
impact of FDI on economic growth and development, wages and employment, and its interaction
with trade and migration have therefore received considerable attention from policy-makers and
the academic world. That is why this Section goes into detail on the relation between foreign
direct investment and other economic phenomena. Section 1.2.3 then presents a further discussion
of the home and host country effects of FDI, focusing specifically on the firm, productivity
effects and other components.
FDI and economic growth and development: Many contributions on foreign direct invest-
ment emphasise that inward FDI contributes to host country economic growth and development.
The rationale for this (expected) positive impact of FDI on growth and development builds on
several arguments. Through FDI, new markets, resources, technology and knowledge become
available, domestic firms can benefit from MNEs’ networks and learn to export, firms are faced
with more competition which stimulates them to become more efficient, demand for domestic
inputs and products goes up and workers receive training which leads to human capital improve-
ments, among other advantages (WTO, 1996; de Mello, 1997; Borensztein et al., 1998; Kokko,
2006). Studies on foreign direct investment into transition and developing economies in Europe
also highlight the importance of FDI for convergence and economic reform (Benacek et al., 2000;
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Hanousek et al., 2011). In these countries, FDI is an essential channel for technology diffusion,
the spread of knowledge and ideas, the transfer of organisational and management skills, and the
introduction of institutions and market culture.
FDI and wages/employment: Foreign direct investment is also expected to affect employ-
ment and wages, both in the home country and in the host country (WTO, 1996). In a 1996
contribution, the World Trade Organization concludes that despite the expectation that outward
FDI to less developed countries results in job losses and downward pressure on the wages in
developed countries (for unskilled labour in particular), there is no consensus on the relation
between FDI and home country employment. Furthermore, inward FDI can be positive or
negative for domestic employment. Positive effects arise when MNEs create jobs, transfer skills
to domestic employees and when inward FDI is associated with capital increases (raising labour
productivity and wages and/or employment). Negative effects arise when MNEs dominate the
domestic market. Driffield and Taylor (2000) find that FDI is associated with higher wage
inequality, as the entry of MNEs raises demand for skilled workers. Technology spillovers from
MNEs to domestic firms lead to skill upgrading in domestic firms and a growing relative demand
for skilled workers, which further reinforces this effect. In a later study, Driffield et al. (2009)
report similar results for the UK.
FDI and migration: Empirical evidence on the link between foreign direct investment
and migration points to a positive relationship that runs in both directions (Nijkamp et al.,
2011; De Simone and Manchin, 2012). Migration is expected to contribute to FDI because the
presence of migrants in a potential FDI location reduces the transaction costs that result from
the information asymmetries associated with FDI (in particular, migrants spread information
and can act as an enforcement mechanism) (Javorcik et al., 2011). On the other hand, Javorcik
et al. (2011) indicate that FDI is also expected to affect migration. FDI encourages migration
when domestic employees of an MNE are transferred to subsidiaries abroad or when working
for an MNE raises employees’ awareness of labour opportunities abroad. However, FDI can
discourage migration as well. For example, employees may not be inclined to migrate when
FDI boosts host country economic growth and MNEs offer higher wages or good employment
opportunities (Javorcik et al., 2011). In their work, De Simone and Manchin (2012) focus on the
extent to which immigration of non-EU15 workers into EU15 countries lowers the information
constraints that EU15 MNEs face when they invest in the migrants’ country of origin. They
report a positive relation between the volume of EU15 MNEs’ investment in non-EU15 countries
and these countries’ stock of migrants in the EU15. Javorcik et al. (2011) find that the presence
of migrants in the United States raises the volume of US FDI in their country of origin. This
positive relationship is stronger for migrants with a tertiary education. Docquier and Lodigiani
(2010) confirm that the migration of skilled workers (‘brain drain’) tends to raise the inflows
of FDI, especially in large countries. Finally, Buch et al. (2006) explore the relation between
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migration and FDI using German state-level data and provide evidence for agglomeration effects:
FDI is higher in states where migrants from the same home country live and in states with a large
foreign population, this applies in particular to OECD countries.
FDI and trade: Many studies consider FDI and trade as two ways, which are substitutes or
complements, to serve a foreign market. A well-known example of such a study is the work of
Helpman et al. (2004), where the entry mode of firms in the model depends on their productivity
level. Several other contributions also include both trade and foreign direct investment into their
models to explain the development of multinational firms (e.g. which firms set up affiliates, why
do firms invest rather than export; see Section 1.2.1 for more details). Trade-related factors, such
as trade policy and openness, also prove to be important determinants for FDI and FDI spillover
effects. For example, export-oriented FDI is attracted by weak import protection, market-oriented
FDI is attracted when tariffs are high (WTO, 1996). The WTO (1996) report points to a positive
relationship between FDI, home country trade and host country exports, while the relationship
with host country imports is less clear (as this depends on policy).
1.2 Multinational Enterprises and Foreign Direct Investment
1.2.1 Theories of foreign direct investment and multinationals
For many years, foreign direct investment and the development of multinational firms have been
at the hearth of economic analysis. The literature that aims to explain which firms become
multinationals, why these firms become multinationals and what distinguishes them from other
companies is extensive. Following Morgan and Katsikeas (1997) and Faeth (2009), this Section
provides a brief discussion of some of the evolutions of the theories in this field.
The first theoretical contributions on multinational enterprises and FDI are embedded in the
neoclassical trade literature and are based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The Heckscher-Ohlin
model starts from a two country, two production factors (capital and labour) and two goods
set-up (‘the two-by-two-by-two model’), in which the two goods differ in production factor
intensities and the two countries differ in their relative factor endowments. Further assumptions
that are made in the model are perfect competition on the factor and goods markets, free trade
in goods, identical technologies and identical and homothetic tastes across countries (Feenstra,
2003). In the model, the comparative advantage of a country lies in the good that is produced
using the production factors that are relatively abundant in the country. The labour-abundant
country will therefore export the labour-intensive good and the capital-abundant country the
capital-intensive good, until factor price equalisation is attained (in each country the abundant
factor gains from trade while the scarce factor loses). Alternatively, when capital can cross
borders, factor price differences can also encourage the relative capital-abundant country to move
capital to the labour-abundant country where the returns on capital are higher (Faeth, 2009).
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These first contributions were criticised for a number of reasons. Some studies, for example
Hymer (1976), pointed out that the assumption of perfect competition in these models does not
fit with the reality of market imperfections, caused by multinational firms exploiting their market
power. Other work also emphasised the role of multinationals as the driving force of international
capital flows, in that way shifting the discussion from the country-level to the firm-level. In this
regard, Teece (2006) mentions the ‘capital arbitrage theory’ where the role of an MNE is limited
to being a capital arbitrageur, shifting capital to affiliates in countries with high returns on capital.
Morgan and Katsikeas (1997) identify three types of theories that focus on the MNE: market
imperfections theories, international production theories and internalisation theories. The market
imperfection theories center on the notion that multinational enterprises have ‘monopolistic
advantages’, more specifically ownership advantages, that allow these firms to enter foreign
markets in search of new market opportunities. These advantages compensate for the costs
firms face by operating abroad (Hymer, 1976). Costs emanate from institutional differences,
uncertainty, information asymmetries, and other factors. Morgan and Katsikeas (1997) suggest
that ownership advantages arise from market imperfections on the products and factors markets,
and are reflected in technological differences and scale economies (Faeth, 2009). In addition
to the benefits that are associated with the exploitation of their monopolistic advantage, Hymer
(1976) describes a second motive for firms to undertake FDI, i.e. the opportunity to eliminate
competition by taking control of foreign firms (Teece, 2006). Other work that builds on the
concept of market imperfections to explain international investment is the ‘theory of oligopolistic
reaction’ by Knickerbocker (1973), in which firms invest because of follow-the-leader dynamics.
Alternatively, as in the ‘product life-cycle theory’ proposed by Vernon (1966) in which products
go through different stages of a life-cycle, firms decide between exporting and investing abroad
depending on costs. The second type of theories that Morgan and Katsikeas (1997) consider
comprise the international production theories. These theories indicate that firms weigh the
benefits of investing in and the differences between the home country and the host country in their
investment decision (Morgan and Katsikeas, 1997). Therefore, these theories underline ‘location’
as an important factor for FDI. The third type of theories, the internalisation theories, are also
based on market imperfections -in this case on the intermediate goods market- but concentrate on
how firms respond to these issues by internalising transactions that were previously performed
on the intermediate goods market (Buckley and Casson, 1976). Because market imperfections
result in high transactions costs, firms are inclined to internalise transactions that can be done
cheaper within the firm (thus giving rise to vertical integration) (Morgan and Katsikeas, 1997).
Buckley and Casson (1976) note that the internalisation process is driven by numerous factors,
related to the country, region, industry, and firm.
Building on these contributions, Dunning (1981) combines the concepts of ownership, loca-
tion and internalisation into the eclectic paradigm of foreign direct investment (also known as the
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OLI-framework). According to the paradigm, firms engage in FDI to capitalise on their owner-
ship, location and internalisation advantages. Similarly as in the older contributions, ownership
advantages give MNEs their competitive edge on other firms (e.g. production techniques, man-
agement and organisational processes), location advantages encourage MNEs to produce abroad
(e.g. market access, lower costs) and internalisation advantages motivate firms to internalise
production instead of licensing or entering in partnerships. Dunning (1981) further distinguished
between market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-assets-seeking FDI.
More recent theories elaborated on these theoretical studies, focusing in particular on hori-
zontal FDI or on vertical FDI. In these theories, ownership often represents knowledge capital,
location advantages are related to trade costs, country size and factor endowments (Faeth, 2009).
Krugman (1983) introduced the multinational firm into a monopolistic competition model of
trade between two countries in which the firm decides between serving the foreign market by
exporting or by producing abroad (depending on transport costs, barriers to trade and investment,
and economies of scale). In the model, firms face a trade-off between benefiting from scale
economies by concentrating production (when firms export) and producing close to the foreign
clients (when firms produce abroad) i.e. the ‘proximity-concentration theory’ for horizontal
FDI. On the other hand, the ‘factor-proportions theory’ suggests that vertical FDI is driven by
differences in factor endowments and factor prices between countries (Helpman, 1984, 1985;
Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Markusen, 1984). In these models of two countries and two
industries (one characterised by production in multiple stages with different factor intensities at
each stage, and of different products), firms of the capital-abundant country keep headquarters
services at home while the production stage is moved abroad (where labour costs are lower) (see
Helpman, 1984, 1985). A further important evolution in this field is the development of a single
comprehensive model that captures both horizontal and vertical FDI, the ‘knowledge-capital
model’ by Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997, 2004). The model incorporates the
advantages and determinants of both forms of investment such as factor prices and availability of
factor endowments (vertical), and trade/transportation costs, proximity to foreign markets and
market size (horizontal) (Markusen, 1997).
Another set of theories on multinational enterprises are the diversified foreign direct invest-
ment theories and the risk diversification theories (Faeth, 2009). The discussion on diversified
FDI was launched by Hanson et al. (2001). In a study on the motivations for US firms to invest
abroad, Hanson et al. (2001) criticised the literature for only considering horizontal and vertical
FDI and explore global outsourcing, wholesale trading, and the use of affiliates as export plat-
forms by MNEs instead. Their results show that MNEs account for host-country characteristics
when entering a foreign market: affiliates are set up as export platforms in small countries with
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low taxes (to serve the domestic market and other markets) whereas affiliates focus solely on the
domestic market in large, well-protected countries with high taxes. In addition, multinationals
appear to decide between production- and distribution-oriented FDI to serve foreign markets
through vertical FDI. The work of Hanson et al. (2001) spurred other contributions on diversified
FDI. The emergence of diversified MNEs is associated with firms setting up horizontal and verti-
cal affiliates or acquiring horizontal and vertical MNEs (Caves, 1996). However, as suggested by
Rugman (1975, 1977), this can also be associated with multinationals spreading risks i.e. the
‘risk diversification hypothesis’.
As is clear from the discussion above, there are many theoretical contributions on FDI and
MNEs. Nevertheless, Teece (2006) points out that theory has to continue evolving to account
for new evolutions, such as off-shoring and intra-firm trade. Furthermore, Radlo (2012) argues
that the traditional contributions do not necessarily apply to multinationals from emerging
economies (henceforth ‘emerging MNEs’). For example, in contrast to MNEs from developed
countries which often develop into large firms before internationalisation (Dunning, 1981),
emerging MNEs appear to internationalise in order to stimulate their growth. Research into
emerging MNEs is motivated by the observation that even though transition and developing
countries for a long time primarily were recipients of FDI, outward FDI of these countries is
on the rise. Radlo and Sass (2012) notice that outward FDI from emerging MNEs from the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia mainly targets neighbouring countries and other
Visegrád members. In another study, Radlo (2012) focuses on Polish outward FDI. He shows
that the rise in outward investment of Polish firms is related to their growing capacity and drive
to expand to other markets, in particular to Germany and Central, Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe, and increasing market power and access. Firms first secure a sufficient position in the
home country before they aim to achieve this abroad (Radlo, 2012).
1.2.2 Determinants of foreign direct investment
An important strand of research focuses on the determinants of FDI. This Section introduces
different sets of potential determinants: gravity factors, comparative advantage factors, location
factors, institutional factors and investment factors. Note that some determinants can be classified
into multiple of these categories.
Gravity factors: Many studies that look into the determinants of FDI and MNEs’ location
choices emphasise the importance of gravity-related factors, including home country GDP, host
country GDP, the distance between the home and the host country, contiguity and a common
language (see a.o. Resmini (2000); Biswas (2002); Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007); Faeth (2009);
Blonigen and Piger (2014)). The gravity model was first introduced in the field of international
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economics by Tinbergen (1962) to capture bilateral trade. The model is inspired by Newton’s
gravity laws. The basic form gravity equation of bilateral trade between country i and country j
looks as follows: Xi j +X ji = 2YwYiYj with X exports, Y GDP and Yw world GDP (in which bilateral
exports are proportional to the product of the countries’ GDPs) (Feenstra, 2003). In this setting,
GDP is often considered as an indicator of market size. In later versions, the distance between
countries is entered more explicitly. Trade flows are larger between countries of a similar size
than between countries that differ a lot in size. Nowadays, gravity equations are widely used in
the empirical literature, for example, to model migration or FDI flows (Kleinert and Toubal, 2010)
between countries, to evaluate the effectiveness of trade agreements and institutions (e.g. the
WTO), to study border effects, and in many other applications. Bevan and Estrin (2004) confirm
that gravity factors are key determinants for FDI into 11 Central and Eastern European transition
countries. Resmini (2000) points to proximity and market size and growth as determinants for
these countries. Benacek et al. (2000) reach a similar conclusion for the latter.
Comparative advantage factors: These determinants of foreign direct investment are re-
lated to factors that can influence a country’s comparative advantage (de Mello, 1997; Faeth,
2009). Relative factor endowments (capital, labour, natural resources and other endowments),
relative factor prices/rewards (capital and labour costs) and other cost and market structures
have been identified as determinants in this regard (de Mello, 1997; Biswas, 2002; Faeth, 2009;
Blonigen and Piger, 2014). For the CEE-countries, labour costs prove to be important, especially
in science-based (e.g. pharmaceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft) and scale-intensive industries
(Resmini, 2000; Benacek et al., 2000; Bevan and Estrin, 2004).
Location factors: This set of determinants is closely connected to both the gravity factors
and the comparative advantage factors. Nevertheless, several studies do stress the role of other
location-specific factors as determinants of FDI (Faeth, 2009). Examples of these factors are
infrastructure (e.g. transportation, communication and financial infrastructure; Biswas (2002),
Casi and Resmini (2010), Blonigen and Piger (2014)), the general macroeconomic performance
and growth prospects of the host country (inflation, fiscal and monetary policy, de Mello (1997);
Casi and Resmini (2010)), agglomeration effects (Resmini, 2000; Blonigen and Piger, 2014),
and competition (Resmini, 2000; Casi and Resmini, 2010). de Mello (1997) considers the degree
of monopolistic competition as an indicator of protectionism. Biswas (2002) concludes that the
quality of the infrastructure matters for US FDI. Stein and Daude (2007) find that differences in
time zones have a negative impact on the location of FDI. Interestingly, Asiedu (2002) reports
that countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) attract less FDI due to their location in comparison
with non-SSA developing countries. Furthermore, the development of infrastructure is only
a determinant of FDI into non-SSA countries. Other location-related determinants that affect
FDI inflows into the Central and Eastern European economies are the timing and form of the
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privatisation and transition process, as suggested by Benacek et al. (2000), Resmini (2000) and
Bevan and Estrin (2004). In addition, Bevan and Estrin (2004) propose EU integration -measured
through the announcement of accession prospects- as a potential determinant. The announcement
of accession prospects induces inflows when countries have successfully implemented transition
policies, as confirmed through positive evaluations, and are rewarded with faster EU membership.
This, in turn, attracts FDI and results in more economic growth and development. Bevan and
Estrin (2004) also find that negative evaluations can have the opposite effect.
Institutional factors: A lot of attention has been devoted to institutional determinants of
FDI. These determinants comprise the political and economic stability of a country (see de Mello
(1997), Resmini (2000), Faeth (2009) and Blonigen and Piger (2014) among many other contri-
butions), trade openness (de Mello, 1997; Blonigen and Piger, 2014), laws and regulation (for
instance on property rights, contractual rights, property and profit taxation) (de Mello, 1997;
Biswas, 2002), cultural distance/differences (Faeth, 2009; Blonigen and Piger, 2014), the extent
and severity of government intervention and bureaucracy (de Mello, 1997; Biswas, 2002) and
other factors. Trade openness is an important determinant of FDI for developing economies both
in SSA and non-SSA, with a larger impact in the non-SSA countries (Asiedu, 2002). Benacek
et al. (2000) provide evidence for the role of trade openness in the CEECs. Biswas (2002) con-
cludes that the regime type and duration and the stability and integrity of a country’s political and
economic climate (measured using a property rights index that captures bureaucracy, corruption
and security of contract and property rights) are the main determinants for US FDI into 44 coun-
tries. More specifically, investors prefer democracies, short durations and better protected rights.
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) estimate a gravity model in which they introduce institutions as
additional explanatory variables. Institutions are modelled by means of an institutional variables
vector which is a measure of institutional quality and institutional distance (the difference in
quality). Results suggest that institutions such as legal institutions, corruption and bureaucracy
matter for inward FDI. Higher quality institutions contribute to inward FDI, whereas institutional
distance, employment protection and weak capital concentration undermine inward FDI.
Investment factors, incentives and policy: These determinants are linked to the investment,
the incentives to invest and related policy. Features of the investment that can play a role are its
size, its form and the motives to invest (e.g. market-seeking) (Resmini, 2000; Casi and Resmini,
2010). The cost structure of the investor, the multinational firm, can also be an important factor
(de Mello, 1997). Investment incentives and policy may matter as well. Some examples are fiscal
incentives, financial incentives, the existence of favourable trade and investment agreements and
other factors (de Mello, 1997; Faeth, 2009; Blonigen and Piger, 2014). Section 1.2.4 provides a
further discussion of investment policy.
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1.2.3 Effects of foreign direct investment
The bulk of the research on foreign direct investment aims to uncover how FDI affects the home
country and the host country. Most attention has been paid to the host country effects of inward
FDI, which are commonly differentiated into direct and indirect effects. Other studies address the
home country effects of outward FDI. Since this dissertation particularly considers the indirect
or spillover effects of FDI in the host country, the other effects are only briefly discussed.
Home country effects of outward FDI: Studies on the home country effects of outward
FDI often make the distinction between the impact of outward FDI on the investing firm and
the impact on the home country in general. A prominent example of such a study is the work of
Kokko (2006). Kokko (2006) suggests that the investing firm clearly benefits from undertaking
the investment, whereas the overall impact on the home country is ambiguous (since this depends
on country characteristics, the industry involved, and other factors). Investing abroad contributes
to firm growth and competitiveness, as firms can become larger than when they would have
remained domestic firms (especially in small markets) which permits firms to spread fixed costs
over more production units (Kokko, 2006). In addition, MNEs can benefit from cross-border
factor cost and endowment differences and favourable taxation and subsidies schemes. Vahter
and Masso (2006) mention specialisation, scale economies, and the opportunity to absorb new
knowledge and technologies as benefits for the investing firm. Lipsey (2004) introduces another
potential advantage: a decrease in the investing parent firms’ exports can be compensated by
a rise in the exports of the firms’ affiliates. Outward FDI is also associated with a number of
advantages and disadvantages for the home country (Kokko, 2006). Some examples of home
country advantages are growing exports, tax revenues, more investment by MNEs, and the
introduction of foreign technologies/knowledge by MNEs, which can also be beneficial for other
domestic firms. In some cases, MNEs are also expected to keep capital- and skill-intensive jobs,
that are characterised by better employment conditions and higher wages, at home. In contrast,
outward FDI can have a negative impact on the economic structure in the home country (when
jobs disappear or mostly ‘labour-intensive’ jobs are retained, see Vahter and Masso, 2006), the
bargaining power of the government and consumer prices (because MNEs have more market
power) (Kokko, 2006). Vahter and Masso (2006) investigate whether there exist positive produc-
tivity spillover effects of the investing firm on other firms in its home country. Although results
indicate that positive spillover effects can occur, these results are not very robust. Despite these
potential disadvantages, most countries -both developed and developing economies- encourage
outward FDI (Kokko, 2006).
Host country effects of inward FDI: The host country effects of inward FDI are commonly
separated into direct and indirect or spillover effects. Most work covers the indirect effects of
FDI; some contributions assess the direct effects of inward FDI on the host economy instead.
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Direct effects: Similarly as for the home country effects of outward FDI, the direct effects of
inward FDI often are subdivided into the impact on the foreign affiliate of the MNE (i.e. the firm
receiving the foreign investment) and the impact on the other firms in the economy. Damijan
et al. (2013) discuss direct effects of FDI in ten transition countries. They argue that FDI has
a direct impact on the host economy since foreign ownership boosts total factor productivity
growth through direct technology transfers between the multinational parent and its affiliate.
Foreign-owned firms productivity growth appears to be higher than that of domestic-owned firms
in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania and Slovenia. Growth premia range from 2.5% to 9%.
These productivity growth differences are driven by small and medium productivity firms in
the Czech Republic, large and high productivity firms in Latvia and Romania (and also micro
firms in Latvia), and medium-sized and high productivity firms in Slovenia. Hanousek et al.
(2011) also focus on emerging European markets. From a meta-analysis of the literature on these
countries, they conclude that most empirical contributions suggest that foreign-owned firms are
more productive than domestic firms. This finding is explained through the new technology,
knowledge and capital the multinational parent introduces in its affiliate. Other work does not
consider the firm that becomes a foreign affiliate but rather studies the economy as a whole.
Lipsey (2004), for example, considers the impact of inward FDI on host country wages, growth
and economic structure. He finds that foreign-owned firms are more productive and pay higher
wages (often because they are bigger and more skill-intensive). The impact on average wages
is also positive. The relationship between FDI and exports is less strong but generally positive.
Hanousek et al. (2011) point out that inward FDI into the emerging economies in Europe resulted
in major structural reforms, also at the industry-level and firm-level, rapid growth in productivity
and exports and the introduction of new technologies and industries. The latter is confirmed by
Lipsey (2004), who suggests that all these features promote the integration of the country into the
world economy. However, other work points to some negative effects of inward FDI, such as the
potential monopolization of MNEs of the domestic market, MNEs exploiting their market power
and the government that looses its grip on the economy (WTO, 1996). In this regard, some of
the issues described by Vahter and Masso (2006) and Kokko (2006) also apply to host countries.
Indirect effects: The spillover effects of foreign direct investment are externalities, that
arise from linkages between the affiliates of multinational firms and domestic companies. These
linkages involve both competitive relationships and supplier-client relationships. Many studies
consider spillovers from foreign direct investment, other studies look into R&D, export or wage
spillover effects (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). There are numerous contributions on productivity
spillovers, in which a wide range of topics and issues related to these spillover effects are
explored (e.g. the role of firm heterogeneity, methodological issues, and many other topics).
Overall, the evidence on productivity and knowledge spillovers is mixed (Havranek and Irsova,
2011, 2013). A detailed discussion on FDI spillover effects is provided in Section 1.3.
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1.2.4 Investment promotion policies
Motivated by the potentially positive direct and indirect effects associated with FDI, governments
in countries all over the world implement investment promotion policies to attract multinational
firms. Investment promotion policies often are part of a broader set of investment policy measures
that concern both inward and outward investment (by foreign and domestic investors) as well as
the business and investment climate in general. Measures can be implemented to promote/facili-
tate investment or rather to restrict/impede it. Investment policy often targets specific sectors,
such as the agricultural or the financial sector (UNCTAD, 2013). Since governments can rely
on a wide range of instruments to attract foreign investment, this Section provides an overview
of the investment promotion toolbox. In addition, specific policy targets are discussed and
some examples of techniques and targets are given. Following the reports of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on investment promotion, first policies at
the (sub-)national level are presented and then policies at the international level.
Investment policy at the national or sub-national level
Two broad categories of policy measures at the (sub-)national level are discussed in more detail:
investment-specific policy measures and investment-related policy measures. The categorisation
of the various policy measures into these two categories is inspired by the UNCTAD Investment
Promotion Monitor (see UNCTAD, 2014). The Investment Promotion Monitor outlines recent
developments and trends in (inter)national policy making. The Monitor covers many different
policies, such as FDI-specific policy and measures targeting the investment climate, and lists
particular examples of countries/circumstances in which these policies are implemented. The
discussion of policy measures presented below draws on some of these examples. The final part
of this Section deals with investment promotion agencies.
Investment-specific policy measures specifically address inward investment, outward in-
vestment or both (UNCTAD, 2014). These measures very often target foreign firms, but in some
cases measures are also directed at domestic companies. Investment-specific policy commonly
affects the entry/establishment of investment and the operational treatment of investment after
establishment. Most countries adopt investment-specific policies to encourage FDI. Examples
of such policies are relaxing screening/approval requirements for the acquisition of domestic
firms (e.g. in the energy or financial sector), facilitating entering into partnerships with local
firms, opening closed sectors and State-owned firms, liberalising land acquisition and provid-
ing rent-free land, raising ownership ceilings for foreign participation in domestic firms, and
financial incentives and grants. Nevertheless, some countries decide to restrict and regulate
foreign investment, for instance, through entry/establishment restrictions, a prohibition to own
land and screening requirements (e.g. regarding the degree of control a firm has in an industry).
Finally, note that recently policies aimed at investment retention and repatriation are gaining
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in importance. This implies that countries are not only focused on attracting new investment,
but also on keeping existing investment (for example, by making it more difficult to close down
economically viable affiliates) or repatriating domestic investment abroad.
Investment-related policy measures concern the general investment and business climate,
and the legal framework in which firms operate (UNCTAD, 2014). These measures can affect
general laws and regulations, taxation and subsidies (such as corporate taxation and subsidised
loans (Faeth, 2009)), the competition regime, labour and immigration policies, environmental
policies, intellectual property and royalties. In addition, investment-related measures can also
comprise privatisations in specific industries or of State-owned firms, nationalisation and ex-
propriation policies, trade policy (changes in tariffs and non-tariff barriers), and the creation
of new free economic zones or changes in the regulations in existing zones. Similarly as for
the investment-specific policy measures, countries can use investment-related measures to pro-
mote/facilitate investment or to restrict/regulate it instead. Domestic firms also benefit from
improvements in the business climate that result from investment promotion policies (Casi and
Resmini, 2010).
A lot of countries have also set up investment promotion agencies (IPAs). In many cases,
these agencies are led and funded by the government and also have branches at the sub-national
level and overseas (UNCTAD, 2001). IPAs are involved in many different activities, such as
investor targeting, image building, registration of investment, providing services to investors,
promoting outward domestic investment and other activities. In their study on IPAs, Harding and
Javorcik (2011) group these activities into four types: investment generation (by identifying and
contacting potential investors), investor servicing, national image building and policy advocacy
(to improve the overall business/investment climate). Investor targeting is often done by region,
industry or type of investment. A survey of 101 IPAs conducted by UNCTAD in 2000 on the
targets and tools of IPAs reveals that especially investors in Western Europe, North America
and Asia are targeted, as are investors in the manufacturing industry (see UNCTAD, 2001).
Furthermore, some IPAs specifically focus on high-tech investment or labour-intensive activities.
In addition, the size of the investor and the investment and the entry mode are also important
factors. In the UNCTAD survey, investor servicing comprises both pre- and post-investment
services, including administrative, legal and other services.
Investment policy at the international level
At the international level, investment policy usually refers to international investment agreements
(IIAs) or treaties and rule-making (UNCTAD, 2014). Through international agreements and
treaties, countries commit themselves to protect and facilitate foreign investment and to grant
investors certain rights (Busse et al., 2010). An important example of IIAs are bilateral investment
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treaties or BITs, which often are concluded between a developed country and a developing or
transition country. These treaties are expected to promote additional FDI inflows from the
former into the latter (Busse et al., 2010). In addition to BITs, other agreements and treaties
affect international investment as well. In this regard, double taxation treaties (DTTs), aimed at
eradicating tax evasion and eliminating tax havens, and free trade agreements (FTAs), which
often also concern investment, should be considered too. Furthermore, international investment
policy making involves international conferences and summits where negotiations take place and
issues such as protectionism, trade and investment are debated. Finally, countries’ membership
in specific institutions (WTO, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes)
can also contribute to promote foreign direct investment.
Are investment promotion policies effective?
Because many countries are involved in investment promotion, policy-makers are also concerned
with the effectiveness of the investment promotion policies that are implemented. That is why
several studies examine whether investment promotion in fact results in increasing FDI inflows.
Head et al. (1999), for example, use data on Japanese investment in the United States. They
conclude that States with lower taxes, job-creation subsidies and foreign trade zones manage to
attract more FDI inflows. Faeth (2009) notices that tax policy can help to attract FDI when the
overall investment climate is good, but it does not compensate for a bad investment climate. Using
data on 124 countries, Harding and Javorcik (2011) investigate whether investment promotion
agencies are effective in attracting investment. Since most IPAs target specific sectors, Harding
and Javorcik (2011) opt for a difference-in-differences approach to compare FDI inflows in
targeted sectors, before and after targeting, with inflows in non-targeted sectors. Investment
promotion appears to raise FDI inflows, especially when investors are confronted with high
information asymmetries and bureaucratic red tape. However, this positive relationship between
investment promotion and FDI inflows only exists for emerging and developing countries; results
for industrialised countries are insignificant. In a subsequent study, Harding and Javorcik (2013)
also take the quality of IPAs into account. Quality is considered in two ways: by how project
inquiries from (potential) investors are handled (e.g. correctness of information, competence of
staff) and by the quality of the IPAs’ website (e.g. user-friendliness, content, available in English).
IPAs of a higher quality encourage FDI inflows. Busse et al. (2010) start from a gravity model
to study the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in attracting additional FDI.
Their findings provide support for the role of BITs in promoting FDI inflows into developing
countries. In fact, BITs even appear to counterbalance weak institutions in these countries. The
aforementioned research suggests that investment promotion can be effective, but not in all cases.
Casi and Resmini (2010) provide support for this conclusion. They further find that investment
promotion policies are only effective when the heterogeneity among the foreign investors is
accounted for and emphasise that policies have to be tailored to the needs of the host country.
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1.3 Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment
1.3.1 Definition and measurement of foreign direct investment spillovers
The indirect effects of foreign direct investment are commonly distinguished into horizontal
and vertical effects, depending on the relative positions of the foreign and domestic firms in
the supply chain. Horizontal or intra-industry spillovers capture linkages between MNEs and
domestic competitors that are active in the same industry, which thus have a similar position
in the supply chain. Vertical or inter-industry spillovers refer to linkages between MNEs and
domestic firms in different industries, that have a different function in the supply chain. These
linkages can be subdivided into backward and forward effects. Backward linkages are linkages
between foreign firms and their domestic suppliers upstream. Forward linkages refer to linkages
between multinationals and their domestic clients downstream.
In the empirical literature, the proxy variables used to capture horizontal spillover effects are
calculated following Caves (1974):
Horizontal jt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(1.1)
In equation (1.1), Yit is the output produced by firm i in industry j at time t and Fit is the share
of foreign participation in firm i at time t. Following the OECD, a firm is classified as foreign
when at least a single foreign investor holds at least 10% of the shares of that firm. Alternatively,
Fit can also be a dummy variable that equals one when a firm is foreign and zero otherwise. In
this way, Horizontal jt captures the degree of foreign presence in industry j at time t by the share
of industry j’s output produced by foreign firms. The horizontal spillover variable defined in
equation (1.1) thus equals foreign equity participation averaged over all firms in the industry and
weighted by each firm’s share in the industry output (Javorcik, 2004). This implies that the value
of the proxy grows with the output and the share of foreign equity of the foreign firms.
For the calculation of the vertical spillover variables, most empirical work uses the method-
ology proposed by Javorcik (2004). The backward spillover variable for industry j measures
foreign presence in industries c supplied by industry j at time t and is calculated as follows:
Backward jt = ∑
c if c6= j
γ jct ∗Horizontalct (1.2)
Backward jt is a weighted average of Horizontal in the sourcing industries c, where the
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weights are the coefficients γ jct that capture the share of industry j’s total intermediate supply
(output) that is supplied to each industry c. These coefficients are derived from input-output
tables for intermediate consumption (including imports of intermediate goods, typically final
uses are not taken into account). Following Javorcik (2004), inputs supplied within the same
industry are commonly excluded as these are already part of the horizontal spillover (hence
c 6= j in equation (1.2)). Nevertheless, Javorcik (2004) notes that including within-industry
intermediates does not affect the correlation between firm productivity and foreign presence for
the backward spillovers. If only a single input-output table is available and used for all years in
the sample, the input-output coefficients are not time-varying (γ jc instead of γ jct ; Javorcik (2004)
for example uses the input-output table of year 1996). However, since time-varying input-output
tables are used throughout this dissertation, γ jct is more appropriate. Backward serves as a proxy
for the (degree of the) potential linkages between MNEs and their local suppliers. The proxy
variables for the forward linkages for industry j are constructed in a similar way:
Forward jt = ∑
r if r 6= j
δ jrt ∗Horizontalrt (1.3)
In this case, the coefficients δ jrt in equation (1.3) correspond to the share of industry j’s
inputs purchased from industries r at time t (compared to the total inputs sourced by industry
j). Inputs sourced within the same industry are excluded (r 6= j). The forward spillover is a
proxy for potential linkages between multinational firms and local clients since it is measured
as the weighted share of inputs that are used in an industry and that were produced by foreign
suppliers. Javorcik (2004) excludes goods produced for exports. Note that the spillover variables
presented in equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) vary over time and by industry. A few studies on
FDI spillover effects do not rely on industry-level spillover variables. Vacek (2010), for example,
defines proxies at the firm-level. Other contributions use the rate of foreign firms in the region
instead of input-output tables to model vertical relationships (Havranek and Irsova, 2011).
Input-output tables
From the definitions of the spillover variables in equations (1.1) to (1.3) it is clear that, in addition
to data on the ownership of firms, input-output tables are required. These input-output tables
are used to establish supplier-client relationships between firms since firm-level information on
linkages between companies often is not available. Input-output tables can be obtained from
many different sources. Commonly, input-output tables are obtained from the national statistical
office of the country of interest or from Eurostat, the OECD, the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) or other sources.3 The OECD offers input-output tables with a sector classification
3An overview of some sources of input-output tables is provided on the website of the International Input-Output
Association (http://www.iioa.org/io-data/io-data.html).
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of 37 sectors for 48 countries. WIOD provides world input-output tables, for 40 countries and
including a rest-of-the-world model, and national input-output tables. The input-output tables
are available for years 1995-2011 and cover 35 industries. Eurostat provides supply tables, use
tables and input-output tables with various industry classifications (e.g. NACE 2-digit revision
1.1 and revision 2) for many countries and years.
Input-output tables have a long history in economic analysis. The first input-output models
date back to François Quesnay (Tableau économique), Léon Walras (in ‘Elements of Pure
Economics’ on general equilibrium theory) and, in particular, Wassily Leontief (Miller et al.,
1989). Leontief introduced the matrix representation to illustrate inter-industry relationships,
interdependencies, within an economy (linking the output of one industry to the inputs of another
and thus modelling the economy as a circular flow). In an input-output table, a row represents
the output realised by an industry (that is used in another sector as input or produced for final
use), a column shows the inputs used by an industry and from which industry these are sourced.
Nowadays, input-output tables are used in many fields and for many types of analyses, such as
the field of industrial organisation, productivity analysis, research into global value chains and
off-shoring and environmental analysis. Input-output tables are so widely used because they are
an excellent tool to model interdependencies and inter-industry relations.
Input-output tables are compiled from supply tables and use tables (European Commission,
2008).4 Supply and use tables are product-by-industry tables. Supply tables represent the
supply of goods and services by domestic production and imports. Use tables show the use
of goods and services for intermediate consumption and final use (i.e. consumption, gross
capital formation and exports) as well as how the components of value added (fixed capital
consumption, compensation of employees, net taxes on production, net operating surplus) are
generated by domestic industries. The transformation of supply and use tables into input-output
tables is based on a number of assumptions and adjustments (see European Commission, 2008).
Depending on the assumptions made, the input-output tables will have a product-by-product
or an industry-by-industry classification. Product-by-product input-output tables show the
technological relationships between products and homogeneous units of production. These tables
are obtained by using the ‘product technology assumption’ (each product is produced in its own
way) or the ‘industry technology assumption’ (each industry has its own way of production).
Industry-by-industry input-output tables represent inter-industry relations, the use of products in
production for each industry. For these input-output tables, the ‘fixed industry sales structure
assumption’ (each industry has its own sales structure) or the ‘fixed product sales structure
assumption’ (each product has its own sales structure) are used. These input-output tables are
4Eurostat provides a manual detailing the transformation procedure of supply and use tables into symmetric
input-output tables (with information on the transformations, the assumptions made and other issues), see European
Commission (2008).
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expected to better represent statistical sources than product-by-product input-output tables. The
latter, however, are preferred by Eurostat for ESA 1995 (i.e. the European System of Accounts)
because they are expected to be more homogeneous in terms of production activities and cost
structures than the industry-by-industry input-output tables.
R&D Spillovers
This Section presents a brief overview of the literature on R&D spillovers. Although this
dissertation mainly investigates the spillover effects of foreign direct investment, there are many
areas in which FDI spillovers and R&D spillovers are closely related. Like FDI, R&D is found
to contribute to productivity growth and economic development (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie, 2001). Griliches (1979) identifies two types of R&D spillovers: rent spillovers
and knowledge spillovers. The former arise from the fact that the advantages of trading new
or improved goods are divided between suppliers and clients, depending on the elasticity of
demand and the market structure. An example of this type of spillovers is given by Verspagen
(1997a), who explains rent spillovers by means of advances in the computer industry. The latter,
knowledge spillovers from R&D, are true externalities and can further be distinguished into
idea-creating and imitation-enhancing spillover effects (Los and Verspagen, 2007). One of the
clear similarities of the R&D literature to the FDI literature is how the impact of spillover effects
on productivity growth is analysed. Following Griliches and Mairesse (1984), R&D is introduced
in a Cobb-Douglas production function of unit i (which can be a firm, industry, and so on) at
time t as detailed in equation (1.4) (i.e. as modelled by Los and Verspagen, 2007).
Qit = A(IR)
η
it K
α
it L
β
it R
γ
it (1.4)
In equation (1.4), Q represents value added, K capital stock, L employment and A is a scale
variable. R stands for R&D investments and IR for indirect R&D or R&D spillovers. Verspagen
(1997a) further divides the latter into domestic and foreign indirect R&D. Griliches (1979) points
to several difficulties that are associated with the production function approach, including the
definition and measurement of output and inputs and econometric issues such as multicollinearity
and simultaneity. Similar issues also have to be addressed in the FDI spillover framework. The
industry-level variables commonly used to capture R&D spillover effects are obtained as shown
in equation (1.5) (Los and Verspagen, 2007):
IR j =∑
i
ωi jRi ∀i 6= j (1.5)
in which R denotes R&D expenditures, i spillover producing units and j spillover receiving
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units. Adopting this approach avoids multicollinearity issues that arise from using spillover
variables for each of the industries, as in Bernstein and Nadiri (1988). In contrast to the literature
on FDI spillovers, the weights ω are broadly discussed in the R&D spillover literature. Los
and Verspagen (2007) list several types of weights that have been proposed. In addition to unit
weights, the list includes weights based on transaction input and output shares; on patent and
innovation output shares; on patent information output shares; and on technological proximity.
Although unit weights are easy to use and capture both rent and knowledge spillovers, these
weights are not heterogeneous as suggested by theory. The second type of weights are obtained
from input-output tables that link trade between industries i (origin) and j (use). These input-
output tables are used to calculated weights as output coefficients (by dividing inter-industry
trade by total industry sales) or input coefficients (by dividing the money values of deliveries
from industry i to j by the money value of industry j’s output). Los and Verspagen (2007)
further indicate that these weights are particularly relevant for rent spillovers and to a lesser
extent for idea-creating knowledge spillovers. The third type of weights are based on patent and
innovation shares. In this approach, a patent input-output table is acquired by assigning patents
to an industry of origin and (at least) one industry of use. Following Scherer (1982), the weights
are then calculated in the same way as before and again mainly rent spillovers are captured.
Sterlacchini (1989) develops a similar methodology for innovations. The fourth type of weights
are based on patent information output shares. In this case, weights are output coefficients
obtained from input-output tables constructed on the basis of patent information (extracted from
documents provided by the US or European Patent Office) (see Verspagen, 1997b). The main
patent class detailed on these documents gives an indication of the producing industry while
the supplementary patent classes represent using industries. This method captures idea-creating
spillovers. Finally, the fifth type of weights that Los and Verspagen (2007) distinguish are based
on technological proximity. A prominent example of this type of weighing is the work by Jaffe
(1986), who constructs a measure of technological proximity where the research areas in which
firms are engaged are of crucial importance. The total relevant R&D activity of other firms is
gathered into a potential spillover pool for each firm. Firms doing research in areas more closely
related to the areas in which the firm does research get more weight in the spillover variable.
Note that idea-creating R&D spillovers can also be measured with patent citation indicators
(Los and Verspagen, 2007). The rationale for making use of patent citations is that cited patents
outline the current state of knowledge in a specific field and hence may also expose knowledge
gaps. For example, a first strand of literature in which patent citations are used examines the
role of geographical distance for R&D spillover effects. Using data on citations of patents
granted by the US patent office and assigned to universities and domestic firms, Jaffe et al. (1993)
show that knowledge spillovers are geographically localised (controlling for R&D activity).
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Specifically, citations to patents are more likely to come for the same location and state. This
localisation fades over time at a rather slow pace. A second example is the literature that uses
patent citations to capture knowledge flows within MNEs. These flows are linked to the rise of
global value chains with MNEs increasingly performing activities, such as R&D, abroad. In
this regard, Los and Verspagen (2007) point to two motives for MNEs to carry out R&D abroad:
asset-exploiting and asset-seeking. The second motive has also received support from Fosfuri
and Motta (1999), who demonstrate that technologically lagging firms engage in FDI to benefit
from spillovers from technologically advanced firms in a specific location when spillovers are
geographically constrained (i.e. the “technology acquisition” rationale). Almeida (1996) relies
on patent citations data to shed more light on this issue.
1.3.2 Estimation of foreign direct investment spillover effects
This Section deals with the empirical methodology that is used most often in the estimation
of FDI spillover effects (i.e. how are the spillover proxies manipulated?). More specifically,
researchers’ choice of data, specification and estimation procedures are explored in detail. To this
end, this Section draws on a number of meta-analyses of the literature in which the estimation
approach, specification, and data set of a considerable amount of contributions are compared
(see a.o. Görg and Greenaway (2004), Crespo and Fontoura (2007) and Hanousek et al. (2011)).
Recently, Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) conducted two large meta-analyses comprising
1205 estimates of horizontal spillovers (2013) and 3626 estimates of vertical effects (2011),
respectively. On the basis of these meta-analyses, a ‘best practice’ framework for FDI spillover
analysis is defined. ‘Best practice’ involves using firm-level data, a total factor productivity
measure that is corrected for endogeneity bias, estimation in differences and controls for industry
fixed-effects, industry competition and demand in downstream industries (Havranek and Irsova,
2013). All estimations reported in this dissertation are performed in this setting.
Data
Meta-analysis of the literature suggests that the type and the level of aggregation of the data can
affect the spillover effects reported (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Havranek and Irsova, 2011,
2013). Most empirical work uses firm-level panel data (about 90% of the studies according
to Havranek and Irsova, 2011). Other contributions opt for cross-sectional data or work with
more aggregated sector-level or region-level data. Görg and Strobl (2001), however, indicate
that cross-sectional data do not allow one to examine FDI spillovers over time and control for
other (time-invariant) factors that may be correlated with multinational activity (especially when
cross-sectional data are aggregated at the sector-level). Hanousek et al. (2011) also report that
the use of aggregated data rather than firm-level data to evaluate the impact of MNEs on the
productivity of domestic firms yields biased results (‘aggregation bias’), since very often these
foreign MNEs are included in the aggregates. Finally, Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) notice
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that many studies on European countries extract data from the Amadeus database by Bureau Van
Dijk to perform their analysis.
Specification
Although horizontal, backward and forward spillover effects can easily be distinguished, not all
researchers include all three spillover variables in their study. Backward spillover effects have
received most attention, whereas several studies omit the horizontal or forward spillover variables.
Spillover variables are commonly added in lags, because MNEs are not expected to have an
impact on domestic firm’ productivity immediately and also to avoid potential endogeneity issues.
Furthermore, Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) report differences in the measure of whether a
firm is domestic or foreign (share of output, employment or equity) and the firms included in the
estimations (only domestic firms or all firms). Industry competition and demand in downstream
industries are often added as control variables (Havranek and Irsova, 2011, 2013).
Estimation procedure
The estimation of FDI spillover effects involves a one-step or two-step estimation process. Most
empirical work relies on a two-step estimation procedure. In this two-step estimation procedure,
first total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated and then the estimated TFP is used as the
dependent variable in a production function set-up in which the spillover variables are introduced
as additional inputs. This two-step estimation procedure is partly represented in equation (1.7).
In contrast, other contributions perform a one-step estimation, that involves relating the spillover
variables to output, labour productivity or value-added (Havranek and Irsova, 2011, 2013). A
well-known example of a study that opts for a one-step estimation procedure is Javorcik (2004)
(model represented in equation (1.6)).
lnYi jrt = α+β1lnKi jrt +β2lnLi jrt +β3lnMi jrt +β4Fi jrt +β5Horizontal jt
+β6Backward jt +β7Forward jt +αt +αr +α j + εi jrt
(1.6)
In the model shown in equation (1.6), the dependent variable Yi jrt equals real output of firm i
in sector j and region r at time t. The explanatory variables consist of the horizontal, backward
and forward spillover variables, Fi jrt (share of firm i’s equity that foreign investors own) and
the traditional components of a production function (capital Ki jrt , labour Li jrt and materials Mi jrt).
In the two-step estimation procedure, the first step involves the estimation of total factor
productivity (TFP). Because of the potential endogeneity between the input choices of the firm
and its productivity, estimating production functions with OLS or fixed-effects (FE) yields biased
estimates (Hanousek et al., 2011). To address this issue, many studies use the semi-parametric
methodologies developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) or
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Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF). Alternatively, an unbiased estimate of TFP can also be obtained
by using the dynamic panel data method of Blundell and Bond (1998) (DPD) (which is based
on GMM) or by selecting a translog or log-log model. Despite these considerations and the
alternative estimation procedures available, Havranek and Irsova (2011) find that about 10% of
the estimations in their meta-analysis rely on OLS. In this dissertation, the OP methodology
is used as the baseline case in the majority of the Chapters and TFP estimated with the ACF
methodology is used as a robustness check. In Chapters two and six, total factor productivity is
also obtained following the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (following Petrin and
Levinsohn (2012) and Wooldridge (2009), which was only recently introduced in the literature).
Since the discussion on the most appropriate methodology to estimate TFP is still ongoing, in
each Chapter the robustness of the results to changes in the TFP measure is verified. More details
on the different estimation procedures described here are presented in the next Section.
lnProductivityi jt = eh0Horizontal jt +e
b
0Backward jt +e
f
0Forward jt +αControlsi jt +ui jt (1.7)
After an unbiased estimate of total factor productivity is obtained, the second step of the
estimation procedure involves relating this TFP measure to a set of FDI spillover variables and a
set of control variables, as shown in equation (1.7). Havranek and Irsova (2011) suggest that
equation (1.7) is often estimated using firm-fixed effects, in differences or with GMM. Most
work also adds time and industry fixed effects.
Estimation of total factor productivity
This Section is dedicated to the estimation of total factor productivity (TFP) (following Ornaghi
and Van Beveren, 2011 and the discussion of the CompNet database in European Central Bank,
2014). The estimation of TFP usually starts from a Cobb-Douglas production function. In the
Cobb-Douglas production function of firm i at time t shown in equation (1.8), physical output Y ,
capital K, labour L and materials M are observed but the Hicksian neutral efficiency level A (i.e.
‘total factor productivity’) is not (Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2011).
Yit = AitK
βk
it L
βl
it M
βm
it (1.8)
By taking the logs of equation (1.8), the linearised Cobb-Douglas production function in
equation (1.9) is attained:
yit = β0 +βkkit +βllit +βmmit +ωit +µit (1.9)
28 Introduction
In this equation, ln(Ait) equals β0 +ωit +µit . β0 is a measure of the mean-efficiency level
across firms and time, ωit +µit represents unobservable firm-specific deviations from the mean.
µit in the second component is an i.i.d. error term that captures measurement errors and unex-
pected shocks which affect the output produced by the firm but not its input choices. Importantly,
ωit represents factors that are observed by the firm and therefore likely to have an impact on
its choice of inputs, such as the firm’s productivity level. ωit is not observed by the researcher.
Equation (1.9) can be estimated using OLS if the input choices of a firm are independent of the
unobserved productivity level. This assumption, however, is not likely to hold as firms commonly
base their input choices on their productivity level (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). This results
in a simultaneity bias and biased coefficients (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995; Hanousek et al.,
2011). More specifically, the labour and materials coefficients will be biased upwards, the capital
coefficient will be biased downwards (European Central Bank, 2014).
To tackle this endogeneity bias, Olley and Pakes (1996) developed a semi-parametric es-
timation procedure which consists of two steps. The idea behind this estimation procedure is
that observed input choices are introduced to proxy for unobserved productivity. Olley and
Pakes (1996) select investment as a proxy. In their model, Olley and Pakes (1996) assume
that investment of firm i is a monotonically increasing function f of the firm’s capital inputs
k and its productivity ωit : iit = f (kit ,ωit).5 This implies that the function f can be inverted to
arrive at an expression for productivity as a function of the other variables: ωit = f−1(iit ,kit).
In addition, Olley and Pakes (1996) also assume that capital is a fixed input that is determined
in period t− 1 (as opposed to labour and materials, the variable inputs) and can therefore be
expressed as Kit = (1−δ )Kit−1 + Iit−1 with I new capital investments and δ the depreciation
rate. Substituting the equation for ωit into equation (1.9) results in:
yit = β0 +βkkit +βllit +βmmit + f−1(iit ,kit)+µit (1.10)
Olley and Pakes (1996) further assume that the unknown function f−1 can be approximated
by a third-order polynomial in iit and kit . This gives equation (1.11) where φ(iit ,kit) = β0 +
βkkit + f−1(iit ,kit). In the equation, µit is orthogonal to lit , mit and kit .
yit = βllit +βmmit +φ(iit ,kit)+µit (1.11)
Equation (1.11) can then be estimated by OLS to obtain the labour (β̂l) and materials (β̂m)
coefficients. This completes the first step of the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure.
5Olley and Pakes (1996) also consider age as a state variable (not included here).
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In the second step, the capital coefficient is identified. For this second step productivity ωit is
assumed to follow a first-order Markov process (Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2011), as shown
in equation (1.12). This assumption implies that productivity at time t is not correlated to the
change in productivity between t and t−1 (European Central Bank, 2014).
ωit = E(ωit |ωit−1)+ εit (1.12)
εit in equation (1.12) is an unexpected shock. Because capital Kit is assumed to only depend
on past investment and not current investment, as indicated above, εit is orthogonal to capi-
tal. This defines the moment condition required for the identification of the capital coefficient
(Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2011). By introducing the estimated labour β̂l and materials β̂m
coefficients into equation (1.11), φ(iit ,kit) is obtained as φˆ(iit ,kit) = yit− β̂llit− β̂mmit .
This implies that ω̂it can be predicted as ω̂it = φˆ(iit ,kit)− β˙kkit (for a given capital coefficient
β˙k) (European Central Bank, 2014). E(ωit |ωit−1) in equation (1.12) is approximated by the
predicted values from (1.13) (this approximation is labelled E(ωit |ω̂it−1) henceforth).
ω̂it = γ0 + γ1ω̂it−1 + γ2ωit−1ω̂it−1
2
+ γ3ω̂it−1
3
+ εit (1.13)
Using all this information, the estimated capital coefficient is then set to minimise the sum of
squared residuals: minβ˙k ∑t(yit− βˆllit− βˆmmit− β˙kkit−)2 . Standard errors are obtained from a
bootstrapping procedure.
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) note that the assumption of strict monotonicity in capital and
productivity of the investment equation does not hold for firms with zero or negative investment
values. They therefore make use of material inputs demand as a proxy for productivity rather
than investment. Similarly as for the investment equation in the Olley and Pakes (1996) model,
the material inputs equation mit = h(kit ,ωit) is considered to be strictly increasing in productivity.
Because of this assumption, productivity can factored out and written as ωit = h−1(mit ,kit). This
then yields equation (1.14) (European Central Bank, 2014):
yit = βllit + φ˘(mit ,kit)+µit (1.14)
where φ˘(mit ,kit) equals β0+βkkit +βmmit + f−1(mit ,kit). Whereas the labour coefficient can
still be obtained in the first step, the materials coefficient has to be identified in the second step.
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To obtain the materials coefficient, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that εit is orthogonal to
kit (as in Olley and Pakes, 1996) and that εit is orthogonal to mit−1. Overall, the Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) methodology is very similar to the Olley and Pakes (1996) method.
The semi-parametric approaches developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) are challenged by Ackerberg et al. (2008). Ackerberg et al. (2008) argue that
the labour coefficient cannot be identified in the first step of the estimation procedure because
it is collinear with the polynomial in the proxy variable (investment or materials) and capital
(Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2011). This collinearity arises because i) labour is selected before
materials (meaning that mit = h(kit ,ωit , lit)), or ii) labour and materials are chosen at the same
time after productivity has been observed (then labour also depends on capital and productivity,
in the same way as materials do) (European Central Bank, 2014). In both cases, the labour
coefficient cannot be retrieved in the first step of the procedure. Instead, in the Ackerberg et al.
(2008) methodology, all input coefficients are identified in the second step. Labour is assumed to
be chosen after capital but before materials. As a result, materials will also depend on labour:
mit = pit = h−1(kit ,ωit , lit) (Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2011). Taking a similar approach as in
the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodologies then gives (1.15):
yit = β0 +βkkit +βllit +h−1(pit ,kit , lit)+µit (1.15)
which can be rewritten as: yit = φ(pit ,kit , lit)+µit . This equation can be estimated to obtain
an estimate of φ(pit), which can then be introduced to identify the input coefficients.
Wooldridge (2009) introduces a methodology that allows the implementation of the Olley
and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodologies in a GMM framework. The
two-step procedures are translated into two equations that can be estimated in a single step
(Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2011). The Wooldridge (2009) method is more efficient than the
Ackerberg et al. (2008) procedure because it accounts for potential contemporaneous correlation
across errors of the two steps and for heteroskedasticity or serial correlation (European Central
Bank, 2014). Bootstrapping is no longer required to obtain standard errors. The two equations
used in the Wooldridge (2009) method are represented in equations (1.16) and (1.17).
yit = βllit +βmmit +β0 +βkkit +h−1(mit ,kit)+µit (1.16)
yit = βllit +βmmit +β0 +βkkit + j(h−1(kit−1,mit−1))+ εit +µit (1.17)
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To get to these equations, Wooldridge (2009) relies on several assumptions. First, µit is
assumed to be independent of current and past values of the input choices. Second, given
equation (1.12) (i.e. productivity follows a first-order Markov process), lagged values of labour
and materials are used in the estimation of the capital coefficient (European Central Bank, 2014).
This implies that εit has to be independent of the current and lagged values of capital and the
lagged values of the other inputs. Based on these assumptions ωit is equal to E(ωit |ωit−1)+εit =
j(h−1(kit−1,mit−1))+ εit . Equations (1.16) and (1.17) can be estimated by GMM. Alternatively,
Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) propose to estimate (1.17) using pooled IV instrumenting lt .
1.3.3 Channels of foreign direct investment spillovers
The channels through which FDI spillover effects are transmitted from foreign to domestic firms
are widely discussed in the literature (see Görg and Greenaway (2004), Crespo and Fontoura
(2007) and Hanousek et al. (2011)). Görg and Greenaway (2004) distinguish between four
channels of technology transmission: demonstration/imitation, acquisition of human capital
(labour mobility), competition and export spillovers. Crespo and Fontoura (2007) add a fifth
channel to this list: backward and forward linkages with domestic firms.
The first channel, demonstration (by foreign firms) and imitation (by domestic firms) of
technology, implies that domestic firms adopt a new technology after having observed that MNEs
successfully use this technology (Wang and Blomström, 1992). Through demonstration/imitation,
the costs and risks associated with the adoption of new technologies are reduced. For this channel,
the complexity of the processes and the similarity of the products demonstrated/imitated matter
to a great extent, since some of these are much easier to imitate than others (Barrios and Strobl,
2002). Nevertheless, Glass and Saggi (1998) point out that MNEs can be aware of this channel
and aim to prevent technology leakage.
The second channel of technology transmission is labour mobility and the acquisition of
human capital. This channel can affect domestic firms both in a positive or in a negative way.
In the first case, domestic firms are able to hire workers who were previously employed by a
multinational firm. These workers often have received training from the MNE and are informed
about its strategies, technologies, production techniques and other processes. This knowledge
can be transferred to other employees and implemented to improve the competitiveness of the
domestic company (Fosfuri et al., 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002). Alternatively, these workers
become self-employed. The second case, the negative impact on domestic firms, occurs when
multinationals offer higher wages and thus can employ the best local workers which are then no
longer available for domestic companies (Blalock and Gertler, 2008).
The third channel consists of exports (Aitken et al., 1997; Greenaway et al., 2004). Similarly
as in the adoption of new technologies, starting to export involves high risks and costs. These costs
emerge from market research, setting up distribution networks, cultural differences, laws and
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regulations and other issues. By learning to export from MNEs, which already have experience
in this area, domestic firms may be capable to mitigate some of these costs. Multinationals are
therefore expected to enhance domestic firms’ export capacity.
The fourth channel of technology transmission results from increased competition (through
foreign entry on the market). Increased competition pushes domestic firms to become more pro-
ductive. This can be achieved by introducing new technologies to upgrade industrial, managerial
and other processes or by using existing resources more efficiently (Wang and Blomström, 1992;
Markusen and Venables, 1999; Glass and Saggi, 2002). Increased competition, however, can also
lower domestic firms’ productivity. These negative effects can be attributed to unfair competition
by MNEs, falling market shares (‘market-stealing’ by MNEs) and producing on a less efficient
scale at higher costs (Harrison, 1994; Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
The final channel is backward and forward linkages with domestic firms. Backward
linkages between MNEs and their domestic suppliers upstream can be beneficial for the latter,
as the demand for their products goes up. In addition, foreign firms can also require a specific
quality standard and help the supplier to achieve this (e.g. by sending experts, training employees,
sharing technology and management techniques). Forward linkages between MNEs and their
domestic clients downstream can be positive, when these clients enjoy inputs of a higher quality
or at lower costs (Markusen and Venables, 1999). These linkages can also be negative, for
example when MNEs offer inputs that are less compatible with the requirements of their clients.
1.3.4 Determinants of foreign direct investment spillovers
Numerous factors have been identified as important determinants that affect the existence, sign
and magnitude of FDI spillover effects. This Section presents an overview of the most frequently
discussed determinants (see a.o. Görg and Greenaway (2004); Crespo and Fontoura (2007);
Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013)). Note that the factors that determine whether or not a firm
will invest are likely to also affect whether or not spillover effects are detected.
A first set of determinants of foreign direct investment spillovers consist of the characteris-
tics of the home country and host country, as well as the relationship between both countries
(or regions). In this regard, a lot of attention is paid to the absorptive capacity of countries,
which is often defined as a technology gap between home and host country. However, theoretical
work on the role of the technology gap provides mixed results. Findlay (1978), for example,
suggests that a large technology gap gives rise to larger spillover effects (as there is more to
learn), whereas Glass and Saggi (1998) claim that a large technology gap rather points to a
more limited absorptive capacity and thus smaller spillover effects. There is a lot of empirical
work on this issue as well. Although the empirical evidence is rather mixed, overall it appears
to suggest that a sufficiently large absorptive capacity is required (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007;
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Havranek and Irsova, 2011). Closely related to these features are the level of development of the
countries involved, relative backwardness (the distance between countries in terms of develop-
ment) and contagion (the extent to which activities of MNEs spread through the host economy)
(Borensztein et al., 1998; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). The level
of development of both countries matters for two reasons according to Crespo and Fontoura
(2007). First, MNEs may be less inclined to set up linkages with domestic suppliers when the
development gap between the countries is considerable (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). Second, the
labour mobility channel is less effective when the development gap is larger because workers
do not necessarily transfer back to domestic employers when the wages offered by MNEs and
local firms strongly differ. In this regard, also the education level in a country matters. Havranek
and Irsova (2013) detect a positive relationship between the level of human capital in the host
country and horizontal spillover effects. Two further determinants are the geographical and the
cultural distance between countries (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). These determinants interact
with transportation costs, the transmission channels, absorptive capacity, the development of
local networks and local sourcing and other factors (Girma and Wakelin, 2001; Rodriguez-Clare,
1996). Distance has a positive impact on vertical spillover effects (Havranek and Irsova, 2011).
Other country-level determinants are intellectual property rights and trade policy (Crespo and
Fontoura, 2007). Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) indicate that countries that are more open to
trade and with better protection of intellectual property rights see smaller horizontal spillover
effects, whereas the former result in larger vertical spillover effects. Vertical spillover effects also
appear to be bigger in countries that are financially less developed (Havranek and Irsova, 2011).
The second set of determinants comprises firm-level and industry-level determinants. In
the literature, a lot of attention is paid to domestic firm characteristics and how they determine
the spillover effects that occur. In particular, the absorptive capacity of domestic firms and their
distance to the technology frontier (represented by the MNEs), measured as a technological
gap (see a.o. Narula and Marin (2003), Kokko (1994, 1996)). Unfortunately, both theoretical
predictions and empirical results provide a mixed picture of spillover effects (similarly as at
the country-level). Havranek and Irsova (2013) do report that horizontal spillover effects are
positive when the technology gap is not too wide. Crespo and Fontoura (2007) also emphasise
the importance of a firm’s export capacity and size. For exporting firms, the domestic market
is less important and these firms often already face competition and are therefore less affected
by MNE activity (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999). Alternatively, exporting firms can also have
a higher absorptive capacity and are more able to counteract competition effects (Schoors and
van der Tol, 2002). Firm size is important since small firms are less able to compete and produce
on a sufficient scale to imitate, thus larger spillover effects are expected for larger firms (Aitken
and Harrison, 1999). Still, Girma and Wakelin (2001) find positive spillovers only for small
and medium-sized firms. Furthermore, especially firms operating in the manufacturing industry
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appear to benefit from vertical spillover effects (Havranek and Irsova, 2011). Foreign firm
characteristics are discussed as well. In particular, the degree/structure of foreign ownership
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008), the nationality of the foreign investor (Javorcik and Spatareanu,
2011; Havranek and Irsova, 2011), employees’ training and contracts (Fosfuri et al., 2001), the
orientation of the MNE (domestic or other markets), the intensiveness of local sourcing and the
competition faced (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) find larger
spillover effects transmitted by joint-ventures than by firms with more foreign involvement.
Other determinants are related to foreign investment characteristics. These determinants
are very closely linked to or even overlap with the foreign firm characteristics discussed above.
Examples of these determinants are the entry mode (which matches with the ownership structure),
the motivation to undertake the investment (technology transfer or exploitation), and the value
of the technology transferred (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). In partially foreign-owned firms,
for instance, less advanced technology is shared but these firms are better embedded in the host
economy. Merlevede et al. (2014) analyse how spillover effects depend on the time since foreign
entry of majority and minority foreign-owned firms in Romania. Whereas the spillover effects
that emerge from minority-owned firms are small and transient, majority foreign-owned firms
have a large impact on domestic competitors and suppliers. Upon entry, majority-owned firms
diminish domestic competitors’ productivity but the long-term effects are positive. Spillover
effects to domestic suppliers are positive but short-lived.
1.4 Contributions and Results
The analysis of foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises has a long history in
economic research and comprises many theoretical and empirical contributions on a wide range
of topics. More recently, the number of studies on FDI further increased in a fast pace, thus
reflecting the upsurge in FDI and the development of MNEs since the second half of the 1980s.
An important strand of the literature in this field concerns the spillover effects of FDI. These
spillover effects are externalities that emerge from intra-industry and inter-industry linkages
between multinational enterprises and domestic firms. MNEs are expected to contribute to
domestic firms’ productivity through the transfer of technology and knowledge at large. FDI
spillover effects are therefore particularly important in transition and developing countries, which
often require technology inflows for development and growth (Hanousek et al., 2011). Never-
theless, several recent surveys of the literature cast doubt on the existence of spillover effects.
Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) conclude that backward spillover effects are generally signifi-
cant and positive, whereas the evidence on forward and horizontal spillover effects is ambiguous.
Spillover effects can be insignificant or negative for a number of reasons, for example because of
competition effects or when MNEs adopt measures to prevent technology leakage. Importantly,
firm heterogeneity has been identified as an important determinant in this literature. Numerous
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studies emphasise that not all domestic firms are able to absorb spillover effects and not all
MNEs are capable of inducing spillover effects. This work clearly demonstrates that the analysis
of FDI spillover effects should be sufficiently detailed and that heterogeneity should be taken into
account. In this dissertation, different forms of firm heterogeneity are explored and domestic and
foreign firm heterogeneity are combined into a single framework. The demand side and supply
side of spillover effects are thus considered simultaneously. In the literature, heterogeneity among
MNEs is studied much less than domestic firm heterogeneity and often heterogeneity is exam-
ined in only one dimension. This dissertation therefore offers a clear contribution to the literature.
In addition to the first Chapter, this dissertation comprises five Chapters. The second Chapter
of this dissertation introduces a large pan-European data set and presents an analysis of the TFP
premium of foreign over domestic firms. The Chapter demonstrates that foreign firms outperform
domestic firms and hence it establishes the scope for spillover effects. As the creation of the
pan-European data set was a rather time-intensive project that was only completed recently, the
other Chapters of this dissertation all draw on a ‘pilot’ data set for Romania that covers the
years 1996-2005. This pilot data set is used to analyse FDI spillover effects. In the literature,
several other contributions have also focused on Romania, pointing out the excellent coverage
of the data available in the Amadeus database on the country (Altomonte and Colantone, 2008;
Merlevede et al., 2014). Furthermore, the period 1996-2005 also coincides with a substantial
increase in FDI inflows into the country. Because of these features, Romania is an interesting
case in the study of spillover effects. The third Chapter is devoted to the measurement of spillover
effects. Chapter four focuses on heterogeneity in terms of firm size. In Chapter five productivity
heterogeneity is discussed. Chapter six analyses the potential of domestic firms with similar
characteristics as the MNEs in the sample as a source of spillover effects. The issues discussed in
this dissertation are also important from a policy-perspective. Investment policy can be adapted
to attract those MNEs that are expected to have a positive impact on the host economy. To this
end, a correct identification of spillover effects and the characteristics that determine a firm’s
ability to transmit spillovers is essential. Furthermore, governments also have to consider the
impact that domestic firms can have through their interactions with other firms. More details on
the specific contributions of each Chapter are presented below.
Chapter 2 - Foreign Firms in Europe - An Analysis of the Foreign TFP Premium
The second Chapter of this dissertation documents the development of a large pan-European
data set (‘the Augmented Amadeus or AUGAMA database’) that comprises firm-level data for
the majority of the European countries during the period 1995-2012. The main data source
that was used to construct the AUGAMA data set is the Amadeus database by Bureau Van
Dijk Electronic Publishing (Bureau Van Dijk, 2011). Each firm in the AMADEUS database is
identified by an unique identification number and for each firm an industry classification code is
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available. Bureau Van Dijk releases a new issue of the data every month. A single issue, however,
only includes data on the last ten years and on the most recent ownership structure of firms.
Furthermore, it does not allow one to track firms that exit as these are simply dropped from the
database. That is why multiple issues of the database are combined to create the AUGAMA data
set. This implies that firms’ NACE 4-digit industry code can change over time. In addition, the
NACE classification coding itself was changed from revision 1.1 to revision 2 in the more recent
issues of the database. Both of these concerns were addressed in the creation of the AUGAMA
database. For each country, the Amadeus data were downloaded in units of national currency. All
data therefore had to be deflated and converted to Euro to allow cross-country comparisons (using
output, capital and intermediate input deflators constructed from EU-KLEMS, Eurostat and
WIOD data and input-output tables). To shed more light on the coverage and representativeness
of the AUGAMA database, the data set is compared with Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics
database. This comparison reveals that the AUGAMA database adequately approximates the
structure of the European economy across countries and industries. The first part of this Chapter
is also intended to serve as a reference for future work using this data set.
The second part of the Chapter investigates the total factor productivity premium of foreign
over domestic firms using the AUGAMA data. TFP is estimated using the Petrin and Levinsohn
(2012) implementation of the GMM-approach proposed by Wooldridge (2009). A comparison of
the productivity distributions of the foreign and domestic firms across Europe clearly illustrates
that foreign firms are more productive than domestic firms. To pin down the foreign productivity
premium more precisely, a further analysis inspired by Bernard and Jensen (1999) is performed.
In the analysis, TFP and other firm performance indicators are regressed on a foreign ownership
dummy, firm size, and time, industry and region fixed effects. On average, the foreign firms’
productivity premium amounts to 48% across Europe. This is mainly driven by firms in the
services industries rather than firms in manufacturing (premia of 56% and 32% respectively). In
addition, the foreign productivity premium is larger for majority than for minority foreign-owned
firms and for smaller size classes. A similar analysis is then performed for the case of Romania
(using the ‘pilot’ data set). In Romania, the foreign TFP premium amounts to 28%. This is
an important result that motivates the research presented in the remainder of this dissertation.
Productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms are often attributed to the firm-
specific assets that foreign firms have, such as superior technology (Markusen, 1995). Because
foreign firms outperform domestic companies, these firms are expected to contribute to the host
country’s economic growth and development through direct and indirect effects (Borensztein
et al., 1998). As Hanousek et al. (2011) point out, spillover effects involve technology transfers
from foreign to domestic firms and are therefore of great importance for transition economies.
Chapters three to six of this dissertation further explore the spillover effects of FDI for the case of
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Romania. The Chapters evaluate whether the ‘scope for spillovers’ that results from the foreign
productivity premium is translated into spillover effects to domestic firms.
Chapter 3 - Supply Chain Fragmentation, IO-Tables and Spillovers from FDI
The third Chapter of this dissertation deals with the spillover variables that are used in most
empirical work on FDI spillover effects. The Chapter concentrates on the concepts behind these
spillover measures -what do these variables aim to capture- and whether or not these measures
can be improved on accordingly. A correct identification of spillover effects is important for a
number of reasons. As indicated above, FDI has been on the rise in the last few decades involving
more and more countries worldwide, which instigated a considerable amount of theoretical and
empirical studies on its impact. Still, recent literature surveys by Crespo and Fontoura (2007),
Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) conclude that the evidence on
spillover effects is ambiguous. However, backward linkages between MNEs and their domes-
tic suppliers upstream have been identified as the main channel for positive spillover effects
(Havranek and Irsova, 2011). This finding has often been associated with the increasing interna-
tional fragmentation of production and the emergence of global value chains. This implies that a
correct classification of linkages between firms as supplier-client or competitive relationships
affects whether spillover effects can be captured to their full extent. These notions are also
relevant from a policy-perspective. In order to be effective, investment promotion policies should
be tailored towards the country’s needs (Casi and Resmini, 2010). When supply chain linkages
prove to be the most effective way to boost domestic firms’ productivity and economic growth,
countries can modify their investment policy to particularly attract MNEs that are likely to source
inputs from domestic suppliers.
The contributions of this Chapter to the literature are twofold. First, because firm-level
data on linkages between firms are generally unavailable, many empirical studies make use
of industry-level spillover measures (following Caves, 1974 and Javorcik, 2004). To this end,
firm-level data on the ownership of a firm are combined with industry-level weights, which are
constructed from input-output tables. On the basis of these input-output tables, foreign and
domestic firms are linked through the supply chain and the relative position of these firms is
determined. This implies that the level of industry aggregation in the input-output tables affects
the classification of firms into horizontal and vertical relationships. This classification, in turn,
determines which linkages are included in the horizontal spillover variable and which in the
backward and forward spillover variables. The level of industry aggregation in the input-output
tables is therefore expected to have an important impact on the estimated spillover effects. To
evaluate in which way and to what extent the level of aggregation affects estimation results,
spillover variables are calculated using input-output tables at different aggregation levels. Second,
the traditional vertical spillover measures proposed by Javorcik (2004) do not comprise within-
38 Introduction
industry intermediate supply and use, i.e. the diagonal elements of the input-output tables. The
rationale for excluding within-industry intermediate supply and use from these measures is that
these relationships occur within the same industry and hence should already be accounted for
by the horizontal spillover measure. This approach contradicts with the observation that these
relations actually still are supplier-client relationships. These relations thus have to be introduced
in the vertical spillover variables if one wants to fully capture backward and forward linkages. In
fact, diagonal elements are non-negligible: for example in the 2011 WIOD input-output table
for the Euro-zone diagonal elements on average represent about 20%/25% of total industry
inputs sourced/outputs produced. Chapter three confirms that working with more disaggregated
input-output tables and including intermediate supply and use allow a better identification of
backward spillover effects. Backward effects turn out to be positive and robust, whereas the
results on the other spillover effects are less convincing.
Chapter 4 - Foreign Firms’ Size and FDI Spillovers
The fourth Chapter of this dissertation introduces foreign and domestic firm size heterogeneity in
the analysis of foreign direct investment spillover effects. In the Chapter, the ability to absorb/-
generate spillover effects from domestic and foreign firms of different sizes is compared. To
this end, firms are classified into four classes on the basis of the EU size-class definition (micro,
small, medium and large). The Chapter also looks into the potential sample selection issues
that may arise because most work on FDI spillovers only considers large (foreign) firms. By
focusing on firm heterogeneity, this Chapter fits well into the recent literature in which many
studies put emphasis on firm heterogeneity as a determinant of spillover effects. This research is
fuelled by literature reviews such as Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Havranek and Irsova (2011,
2013). Several of these reviews suggest that the overall empirical evidence on spillovers is
mixed but that the existence, sign and magnitude of spillover effects clearly depend on specific
firm-level, industry-level, and other characteristics. Even though different forms of heterogeneity
have been examined further in the literature, firm size has not received a lot of attention. This
Chapter therefore aims to shed more light on the importance of firm size heterogeneity in the
spillover framework. There is some related literature that covers domestic firm size, but no
consensus has been reached on the relation between size and spillover effects. The Chapter
is the first to consider foreign firm size as a determinant of spillover effects. As a first test in
Chapter four, foreign firms are categorised into four size classes for which spillover variables are
calculated. Then, spillover effects of MNEs in each class on the full sample of domestic firms
and on four classes of domestic firms are compared. Interestingly, the smallest and the largest
foreign firms do not generate spillover effects. Only medium-sized foreign firms affect domestic
firms’ productivity through horizontal and vertical linkages. The results also suggest that the size
of domestic firms is unimportant in explaining spillover effects. Chapter four further provides
evidence that sample selection is not a major issue in the spillover literature.
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In the last part of Chapter four, a number of potential explanations for the two main findings
reported in the first part of the Chapter are proposed. With regard to the first finding, i.e. spillover
effects only emerge from medium-size foreign firms, the results for the smaller MNEs are likely
to be driven by scale effects (Vacek, 2010). Furthermore, two mechanisms are identified that
potentially explain why large firms do not generate spillover effects. The first mechanism is
that large MNEs may import (a larger share of) their intermediates and export (a larger share
of) their output. The second mechanism entails that large MNEs are more likely to bring their
own supply chain (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Kuo and Li, 2003). The empirical results lend
support to these two hypotheses. In addition, given that the productivity distributions of the four
size classes of foreign firms do not differ much, the relative level of technological superiority
across these classes is not driving the results. Larger firms are thus less integrated into the host
economy and less likely to set up linkages with domestic companies. Foreign firm size therefore
proves to function as a good proxy for the intensity of the linkages between MNEs and domestic
firms. The second main result of the Chapter is that the size of domestic firms does not matter
much. This result can be explained by the observation that domestic firm size captures different
underlying channels with competing effects. An example is the technology of a firm, for which
the absorptive capability of the firm is a more suitable proxy.
Chapter 5 - FDI Spillovers and Multinational Firm Heterogeneity
The fifth Chapter of this dissertation offers a thorough analysis of foreign and domestic firm
productivity heterogeneity in the FDI spillover effects framework. More specifically, the Chapter
aims to address how the productivity level of firms determines which MNEs generate spillovers
and which domestic firms benefit from these effects. This research is embedded in theoretical
work that relates the productivity level of firms to their mode of entry into a foreign market, such
as Helpman et al. (2004) and Antràs and Helpman (2004). In these models, the most productive
firms set up affiliates abroad whereas less productive firms serve the foreign market through
exports. Because only the most productive firms become MNEs, these firms are generally
expected to be more productive than their domestic counterparts, which may result in technology
transmission and spillover effects from the former to the latter (Markusen, 1995). Nevertheless, a
closer look at the productivity distributions of the foreign and domestic firms in the data set used
reveals that the most productive domestic companies outperform the least productive MNEs. This
result can be explained by the substantial heterogeneity that exists among domestic and among
multinational firms. Domestic firm heterogeneity is widely studied in the FDI spillover literature.
In particular, the absorptive capacity of domestic firms, which is commonly measured by its
technology or productivity level, has been identified as an important determinant of spillover
effects (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). On the other hand, heterogeneity among MNEs has received
less attention. The contributions that do focus on this type of heterogeneity, however, report that
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not all MNEs are a source of (positive) spillover effects. On the contrary, firms’ potential to
transmit spillovers appears to depend on specific characteristics such as their country of origin
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011) and the technology in their sector (Nicolini and Resmini, 2010).
This raises the question whether the productivity level of MNEs also determines from which
firms spillovers emerge. One may expect that spillover effects are more likely to be driven by the
more productive foreign firms. Furthermore, the interaction between the productivity level of the
MNEs and the domestic firms also has to be considered. Do MNEs need to be highly productive
in order to generate spillover effects to the domestic firms they interact with or does it suffice to
be more productive than these competitors/suppliers?
To shed more light on these issues, the empirical analysis in Chapter five first explores foreign
firm productivity heterogeneity. Foreign firms are classified into four quartiles on the basis of
their initial productivity level. This exercise reveals that positive spillover effects emanate
only from the most productive firms, which indicates that MNEs need to have a sufficient
productivity to affect domestic firms’ productivity. Spillover effects from low productivity MNEs
are insignificant. As a second step, domestic firm productivity heterogeneity is introduced into
the analysis. For each domestic firm, spillover effects that arise from more productive MNEs are
compared with those from less productive MNEs. Positive spillover effects are associated with
the former, whereas negative effects emerge from the latter. When the ‘more’ and ‘less’ spillover
variables are decomposed further, especially firms that are a lot more and a lot less productive
(more than two standard deviations) appear to drive these effects. As a final step, the sample
of domestic firms is split up into four productivity classes in order to capture domestic firms’
potential to tap into spillover effects (i.e. their absorptive capacity). Domestic firms with higher
productivity levels benefit more from positive backward effects. Supplying less productive MNEs
results in negative spillover effects. Low productivity domestic and foreign firms generally lead
to a more negative impact. The evidence presented in Chapter five thus clearly shows that the
productivity level of domestic and foreign firms are important determinants of spillover effects.
Chapter 6 - Are MNEs Special? Productivity Spillovers from Matched Domestic Firms
The final Chapter of this dissertation examines the potential of domestic firms as a source of
productivity spillovers. The literature on FDI spillovers draws on the assumption that foreign
firms are ‘special’ firms with firm-specific advantages that allow them to compete successfully
with their domestic counterparts (Markusen, 1995). These firm-specific advantages are often
described as intangible assets that are reflected in superior production technology and a produc-
tivity advantage (Helpman et al., 2004). That is why foreign presence is expected to result in
spillover effects to domestic firms. Nevertheless, several contributions in the literature show that
there is considerable firm-level heterogeneity which implies that not all MNEs have the ability to
generate spillover effects. In fact, this ability is found to depend on the characteristics of these
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MNEs, e.g. their origin (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011). In this regard, the productivity level of
MNEs has been identified by Lenaerts and Merlevede (2014) as a particularly important deter-
minant. This evidence raises the question whether domestic firms with similar characteristics,
and especially with a similar productivity level, can act as a source of productivity spillovers.
This Chapter also draws on comparative research on domestic and foreign firms’ performance. A
number of studies in this field suggest that foreign firms do not necessarily outperform domestic
firms (Narula and Marin, 2003; Harris, 2009). Other work has related performance gaps to the
‘multinational’ status of a firm, arguing that foreign MNEs outperform domestic firms in general
but not domestic MNEs (Bellak, 2004; Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2000). Castellani and Zanfei
(2007) point out that domestic firms may have the advantage over foreign MNEs because they
are better embedded in the economy and do not face cultural and linguistic barriers.
The empirical analysis in the Chapter consists of three steps. First, domestic firms with a
similar productivity level as the foreign MNEs in the sample are identified. This identification
is done using a matching procedure in which foreign and domestic firms that operate in the
same industry are matched on their productivity level using the Mahalanobis score (in each year
of the sample period). Two measures of total factor productivity (TFP) are used: Olley and
Pakes (1996) TFP and Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin (WLP) TFP (Petrin and Levinsohn, 2012;
Wooldridge, 2009). Whereas the former is only available for the manufacturing industries in the
sample, the latter is available for the majority of the services industries as well. Alternatively,
matching can also be performed on productivity, firm age and firm size (accounting for the results
in Merlevede et al. (2014) and Chapter four in this dissertation). In the second step, spillover
variables for the MNEs and for the set of “matched domestic firms” are calculated. These
matched domestic spillover variables are obtained by replacing each MNE by its domestic match
in the construction of the measures. Finally, the spillover variables are introduced as additional
inputs in a production function framework. This empirical approach allows a clear comparison of
the spillover effects generated by MNEs and domestic firms. The estimation results for the FDI
spillover effects correspond to what was reported in the previous Chapters. When only firms in
the manufacturing industries are matched, regardless of the productivity measure, no statistically
significant spillover effects from matched domestic firms are detected. In contrast, when the
services industries are included in the analysis, negative horizontal and positive backward and
forward spillover effects from matched domestic firms are found. Productivity as such appears
to be relevant especially for the backward linkage channel. The conclusions of this Chapter also
have policy implications. Many countries implement investment promotion policies to attract
MNEs. Nevertheless, policy aimed at the promotion of domestic firms, which can also contribute
to the productivity growth of other domestic companies through supplier-client linkages, or both
types of firms can be effective as well (Castellani and Zanfei, 2007).
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2 | Foreign Firms in Europe - An
Analysis of the Foreign TFP
Premium1
Abstract
The prime rationale to expect spillover effects from foreign firms to domestic firms is the superior
technology and productivity level of the former (Markusen, 1995). In this paper, we put this
rationale to the test. We draw on a large firm-level database for 25 European countries to analyse
productivity differences between foreign firms and domestic firms across Europe. On the basis
of an analysis inspired by Bernard and Jensen (1999), we find that the foreign total factor
productivity premium is on average about 48% in the countries covered. We further document
the process of building this large firm-level database -the Augmented Amadeus database- for
25 European countries. We show that this database adequately approximates the structure of
the European economy across countries and industries as portrayed by the Eurostat Structural
Business Statistics data.
Keywords: multinationals, firm performance, total factor productivity, firm-level data
JEL classification: F23
2.1 Introduction
This paper serves a double purpose. First, the paper documents in detail the build and representa-
tiveness of a large pan-European firm-level data set, the “Augmented Amadeus or AUGAMA
data set”, with the aim to serve as a reference for future work. Second, this paper also presents
a first application that uses this large database. More specifically, the paper shows that foreign
firms bring superior technology when they invest abroad across a large set of European countries.
This result sets the stage for the following Chapters in this dissertation, in which the spillover
effects from foreign to domestic firms are analysed in more depth. The rationale for spillover
1This Chapter is the result of joint work with Prof. dr. Bruno Merlevede, Victoria Purice and Matthijs de Zwaan.
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effects is that foreign firms are more productive and technologically advanced than their domestic
counterparts (Markusen, 1995). Foreign firms should bring something special or new to the
domestic economy for positive spillover effects to be able to materialise. In this Chapter, we
consider total factor productivity (TFP) as a summary measure that captures the latter and
demonstrate that foreign firms indeed outperform domestic firms in terms of TFP.
The creation of the large pan-European firm-level data set proved to be a meticulous and
time-consuming process involving multiple rounds of checks, double-checks, retrieving addi-
tional data sources, ... Consequently, this Chapter was chronologically the last to be written as
a part of this dissertation, because the final version of the data set was only finished recently.
The other contributions in the next Chapters are therefore based on a ‘pilot’ data set for Romania.2
Attracting foreign firms or multinational enterprises (MNEs) is high on the priority list of
many policy-makers, both in developed and in developing countries. Policy-makers are focused
on promoting foreign investment because these firms are expected to contribute to the develop-
ment and economic growth of the host country through direct effects (such as job creation and
the inflow of capital) and indirect or spillover effects. Theoretical work suggests that only the
most productive domestic firms will engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) (see Helpman
et al. (2004) for horizontal and Antràs and Helpman (2004) for vertical investment), because only
the most productive firms are able to cover the costs associated with this investment. However,
where foreign technology is easily copied or property rights are weak, foreign investors may
choose to avoid leakage costs on state-of-the-art technology by restricting technology transfer
to technology that is only marginally superior to technology found in the host country (Glass
and Saggi, 1998). Similarly, foreign firms with extensive local participation have less control
over their proprietary knowledge. These firms might also be reluctant to bring in state-of-the-art
technology. For the case of Romania, however, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) find smaller
negative horizontal spillover effects for partially than for wholly foreign-owned firms. Because
domestic firms can more easily adopt less sophisticated technology, to which they have better
access in the partially foreign-owned case, the impact of negative competition effects is reduced.
As indicated above, in this paper we evaluate foreign firms’ TFP premium over domestic
firms for a large set of European countries.3 We provide empirical evidence that the TFP pre-
mium of foreign over domestic firms on average amounts to 48% over the countries considered.
This paper also substantially documents the building of our “Augmented Amadeus” (AUGAMA)
2The focus on Romania has the additional benefit that we have access to a set of detailed input-output tables, an
important additional data source for the study of spillover effects.
3Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovak
Republic. For Great-Britain, Denmark, and Ireland we do have data, but information on intermediate input use,
needed to estimate TFP, is not available.
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data set that is used in the application described above. Our raw data come from the Amadeus
database issued by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. We document our “augmentation”
that helps to overcome some of the drawbacks -from an academic point of view- related to the
way Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing issues the database.4 The advantage of our database
is that it covers most European countries in a single database, which allows for cross-country
research at the firm-level while maintaining representativeness that is comparable to other recent
efforts (see for example CompNet (European Central Bank, 2014)). Furthermore, our approach
improves the data with respect to exit and entry patterns, thus allowing for the analysis of market
dynamics.5 This paper is therefore also intended to serve as a background for future use of the
AUGAMA database.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 documents the construction of the AUGAMA
database. In Section 2.3, summary statistics for the data are presented. Section 2.5 discusses the
estimation of total factor productivity and in Section 2.6 the total factor productivity premium of
foreign firms over domestic firms is analysed. Section 2.7 concludes this paper.
2.2 Database
2.2.1 The Amadeus database - basic data source
Our firm-level data are taken from the Amadeus database provided by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic
Publishing (Bureau Van Dijk, 2011). The Amadeus database is a pan-European database that
comprises financial information on public and private companies. Bureau Van Dijk Electronic
Publishing gathers data from different local data providers and assembles them in a comparable
format into a single database. Additionally, Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing assembles
further information from firms’ annual reports, media coverage, and other sources. It is not clear
whether this is done for all firms and countries, but a bias towards large and listed firms seems
likely. The Amadeus database is available in different flavours depending on the application of
some thresholds for firms to be included. Our data originate from the ‘full’ version where no
thresholds are applied and all available firms are included in the database. The database contains
both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts. We focus on firms that report unconsolidated
accounts, this involves discarding less than 1% of the firms.
The Amadeus database provides the balance sheet and the profit and loss account of firms,
establishment or plant-level information is not available. Financial information is aggregated
4This was jointly done by B. Merlevede, K. Lenaerts, V. Purice, and M. de Zwaan who are all collaborators at
the Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University.
5This is not the case for all countries, because not in all countries there is a legal obligation to file and disclose
annual accounts.
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up to a format that is comparable across European countries. Bearing in mind cross-country
differences (in Europe) in terms of accounting formats, detailed items that potentially are
available for specific countries are not included in Amadeus (e.g. the social balance sheet in
Belgium). In addition to the financial information the database also provides us with information
on the firm’s main activity, its location, its date of incorporation, its ownership structure, and its
affiliate structure (if the firm has any). The database further provides us with an unique firm-ID
that allows to link firms across different versions (cf. infra). A firm-ID consists of 2-digit country
initials followed by a number which is typically a VAT-number or a registration number.
2.2.2 Augmenting Amadeus using multiple issues
Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing regularly updates the Amadeus database. Aside from the
continuously updated online version, a physical DVD/BLURAY of the database is released at
monthly frequency. We use a series of DVDs to create our data set. We use the following issues
of the DVDs: 60, 72, 84, 96, 108, 119, 132, 144, 156, 168, 180, 192, 204 (September issue of
years 1998-2010) and issues 124, 210, 220 and 228. By making use of a “time series” of DVDs
we overcome a number of issues that arise from the use of only a single issue of the Amadeus
database. One may identify at least three limitations of a single issue of the database.
The first limitation is that a single issue only includes the last ten available years of financial
information for an individual firm. We start from all financial information that is available from
the most recent issue of the database (i.e. issue 220). We then work our way back to earlier years
using information from previous versions, starting with the second most recent version and so
on.6 For any given financial item and calendar year our rule is to prefer information from an
issue as recent as possible. This procedure allows us to obtain a maximal time span of 18 years
for an individual firm (i.e. years 1995-2012).7
Second, firms that go out of business are fairly rapidly dropped from the Amadeus database.8
Our time series approach allows us to better track exit and entry over the period covered. We
define the year of exit as ‘sample exit’, i.e. the last year a firm reports basic financial information
without showing up in later years in the database. We take potential changes in firm-IDs into
account by applying the ID changes listed on Bureau Van Dijk’s dedicated website to earlier
versions of the database. Additionally, we checked the help files of individual issues of Amadeus
6The most recent issue is version 220 in the current version of our data set. However, we used version 228 to fill
out missing financial information for the year 2012 for firms not yet reporting the balance sheet and the profit and
loss account information in the 220 issue.
7The average time span that is used for estimating total factor productivity (TFP) is 6.1 years, in the end we have
18,732,383 observations available for 3,649,965 firms.
8In recent versions of the database, a larger set of firms exiting the market more than two or three years earlier
seems to be available for some countries.
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to control for systematic changes in firm-IDs.9 The updating of firm-IDs from earlier versions
avoids that we treat changes in firm-IDs as exit.
Third, Bureau Van Dijk updates individual ownership links between legal entities rather than
the full ownership structure of firms. The ownership information in a specific issue therefore
often consists of a number of ownership links. A single issue of the database only contains the
most recent information on ownership links and therefore does not allow to track changes in
ownership structure.10 We are primarily interested in using the ownership information to separate
foreign firms from domestic firms and to keep track of (European) multinational networks (see
Merlevede and Purice, 2014). Our “time series” approach remedies this limitation as it allows
us to construct a time series of foreign ownership. We focus on direct shareholder links to
determine whether a firm is foreign-owned at any point in time or not.11 Because Bureau Van
Dijk updates individual ownership links rather than the ownership structure, each ownership
link has a reference date which may differ up to a couple of years. Because ownership link
information is updated irregularly, there is also no ownership information for all firm-owner-year
combinations. We assign the ownership information of a given issue of Amadeus (that sums to
100% in the vast majority of cases) to the year of the issue (we employ September issues).12
In line with the commonly applied definition (e.g. by the OECD or the IMF) we require that
at least 10% of shares should be owned by a single foreign investor for a firm to be considered
foreign.13 Furthermore, foreign owners are owners with a known nationality that differs from
the host country nationality. If the country of origin is not known we consider these owners as
domestic.14
9For example, in Belgium the firm-ID is based on the VAT-number. Recently, the administration added an
additional digit (a zero) in front of the existing 9-digit VAT-numbers. For data retrieved from older issues we added
the additional zero ‘manually’ that was introduced in the official VAT-number to the ID to have a comparable ID
across different issues. For Romania we detected an even more drastic change from the Chamber of Commerce
number to the VAT-number as a basis for a firm’s ID.
10More recent versions do contain some history on ownership links, but not all the way back to the late 1990s.
11For part of the firms an ultimate owner is also recorded, but this is often only the case for larger firms. Quite
often ultimate owners are also individuals. For example, Lakshmi Mittal or the Mittal family is recorded as ultimate
owner of Mittal steel affiliates in Europe.
12As an alternative approach we created a data set at the firm-owner-year-level for Romania with the available
information on ownership links from Amadeus. We then filled out missing firm-owner-year-entries under restriction
that the full ownership structure cannot exceed 100%. In case of time gaps between entries for the same owner-firm
combination but with a different share-size we assume that changes show up immediately in the database. We then
fill out the gaps with the older information. In the end, this more elaborated but very cumbersome procedure does
reveal only marginal differences. We therefore apply the more straightforward procedure of assigning all ownership
information (i.e. the ownership structure) to the year of the issue from which the information is retrieved.
13A firm where only 5% of shares are owned by one or more foreigners is considered a domestic firm. We observe
29,208 ownership changes from foreign to domestic (or vice versa), 57% of these are single ownership changes (i.e.
foreign investment or divestment). If we add the double ownership changes we arrive at 86% of the total changes.
14For example, for some countries there is not for all micro firms ownership information available.
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2.2.3 Industry classification
The raw Amadeus data provide us with a primary 4-digit code in the European NACE classifica-
tion of activities. NACE stands for “Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans
les Communautés Européennes”. Our time series approach to the database implies that we have
annual industry codes for firms. We deal with potential variation in industry codes by creating
different versions of our industry classification used in the data. If a firm reports the same code
in the first and last year of information, we use that code throughout the entire time period. For
firms where only the fourth or the third (and fourth) digit are different between the first and last
year’s code we use the code of the last year. If a code is clearly an outlier in the firm’s time series,
that code-year is ignored. For the remaining firms that show more ‘bumpy’ patterns (this is only
a limited number of cases) we consider three alternatives. First we simply use the most recent
code, second we use the most frequent code, and third we use the most recent code but allow
for ‘structural breaks’. A structural break is defined as a firm reporting two different codes with
one break and the less frequent code appearing in at least three versions (years) of the raw data.
The first alternative serves as our basis, while the others are available for robustness tests. As
indicated before, this issue refers to a limited number of cases.
Our firms are classified according to revision 1.1 of the NACE nomenclature. Revision 2 of
the classification became the standard classification near the end of our sample period. Because
most of the firm-level information and most of our other data (cf. infra) refer to NACE revision
1.1, we opted to convert the industry codes of young firms at the end of the sample for which we
only observe a NACE revision 2 code to revision 1.1 codes (because they are only included in the
later issues of the database). For older firms we have a revision 1.1 code from the earlier versions.
To do the conversion we use a conversion table obtained from Eurostat. In the conversion
table most old codes match in multiple new codes (and vice versa). We deal with this issue
in two alternative ways. One way is deterministic in the sense that we start from the available
one-to-one matches and exclude these from multiple matches where these codes are mentioned.
Transforming this into an iterative procedure results in a large number of one-to-one matches.
For the remaining many-to-many matches we obtain a single match by preferring manufacturing
over agriculture and services. Our second approach randomly matches a revision 2 code with one
of the possible revision 1.1 matches from the conversion table. Random matching is performed
firm by firm, not industry by industry. The deterministic approach serves as our basis, while the
randomisation is available as robustness check. Note that for the vast majority of firms we have
an original NACE revision 1.1 code from the Amadeus database.
Although a 4-digit code is available, we mostly rely on 2-digit industry classifications for
practical implementation (TFP estimations for example). In the Appendix a list of the industries
used is provided (Table 2.13).
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2.2.4 Deflation and Currency
The data retrieved from Amadeus are downloaded in units of national currency. In order to be
able to make cross-country comparisons, these data are converted to Euro. Because our price
deflators refer to national currency, we first deflate the downloads in national currency to obtain
unit equivalents and then convert them to Euro using 2005 exchange rates.15 By making use
of the 2005 exchange rate we avoid that exchange rate movements would drive cross-country
comparisons (see Gal, 2013). For Euro-zone countries earlier data in the old national currency
are converted using the Euro conversion rate. For countries adopting the Euro more recently (e.g.
Slovenia) financial information dating before Euro adoption was converted to Euro by Bureau
Van Dijk using the current exchange rate. These data points were converted by multiplying them
with the ratio of the Euro-conversion rate and the current exchange rate.
Our main data source for output deflators is the EU-KLEMS database. These deflators have
been incorporated and updated by Eurostat. We use EU-KLEMS data up to year 2005 and then
continue with Eurostat data. For the last three years of our sample NACE revision (rev.) 1.1
price deflators are no longer available (as are NACE rev. 2 price deflators for the earlier years).
We therefore apply the percentage change of a corresponding NACE rev. 2 series to the later
years of the NACE rev. 1.1 series (both revisions do report similar broad categories such as e.g.
food processing). We define our capital deflator as the average of the following five NACE rev.
1.1 industries: machinery and equipment (29); office machinery and computing (30); electrical
machinery and apparatus (31); motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and other transport
equipment (35) (see Javorcik, 2004). We calculate an intermediate input deflator combining
output deflators and country-time16-industry-specific intermediate input use weighting schemes
from input-output tables. We obtain most input-output tables from Eurostat. For some countries
Eurostat does not (yet) provide input-output tables, we then use input-output tables from the
World Input-Output Database which are slightly more aggregated in terms of industries (Eurostat
tables are at NACE 2-digit level) (Timmer, 2012). Value added is double deflated, i.e. real value
added is calculated as output deflated with an output deflator minus intermediate use deflated
with the calculated intermediate input deflator.17 Note that making use of industry-level deflators
has some implications regarding the estimation of TFP, which are discussed in the Section 2.2.5.
2.2.5 Variable definitions
In this paper we focus on productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms. We define
labour productivity as operating revenues divided by the number of employees and estimate a
15For comparison with Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database, data in national currency were
converted to Euro with annual exchange rates rather than 2005 fixed exchange rates.
16For most countries we have IO-tables for 1995, 2000, and 2005
17The list of countries without detailed prices and IO-tables comprises Croatia, Russia and Ukraine.
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measure of total factor productivity TFP. We prefer total factor productivity to labour productivity
as the latter does not control for intermediate inputs usage and capital intensity differences across
firms (Gal, 2013). For our analysis we define the following variables. Output Y is measured
as operating revenues, real output y is obtained by deflating Y by producer price indices of the
appropriate NACE industry (cf. supra). Value added VA is defined as output minus intermediate
use M, i.e. operating revenues minus material costs (from the Amadeus database)18 Real value
added va is double deflated and defined as real output y minus real material costs m. The latter
are defined as material costs deflated by the intermediate input deflator defined above. Labour
L is the number of employees. Capital K is measured by tangible fixed assets, real capital k is
obtained by deflating K by the capital deflator defined above. The age of a firm is calculated on
the basis of its date of incorporation. We have information on the number of months the accounts
refer to. We convert flow variables (operating revenues, material costs, and thus value added) to a
twelve month equivalent as far as the number of months is not below 6 and not above 24, outside
these boundaries variables are set to missing. End-of-period variables such as tangible fixed
assets and the number of employees are unchanged. The number of non-12 months accounts is
very small and generally below 1% for each country-industry-year cell.
The strength of our AUGAMA data set is that it provides information on firms from many
countries and industries for a reasonably long period of time. These are important features as the
CompNet Task Force notes that ‘‘firm-level analysis in Europe is hampered by a lack of sufficient
and comparable data across countries” (European Central Bank, 2014, p4). Nevertheless, the
above variable definitions result in some caveats that one needs to bear in mind when performing
an empirical analysis. Regarding the measurement of real output, we have no data on output
quantities but can only observe output expressed in terms of revenues. As indicated above,
output is deflated with industry-level price deflators as we do not have firm-level price deflators.
This implies that we are only able to consider TFPR and not TFPQ (total factor productivity
in revenues rather than quantities). Syverson (2011) notes that this approach is satisfactory
when differences in product quality are entirely expressed in prices. However, this approach
is problematic when differences in prices reflect differences in market power, as this implies
that measured productivity differences within an industry embody the state of the output market
rather than the efficiency/productivity of firms (Syverson, 2011). In addition to measurement
issues related to output, we are also faced with some issues relating the data on inputs. We only
have information on the total number of employees, total hours worked is not available. There
is also no information on further characteristics of employees (i.e. low-skilled or high-skilled),
18Amadeus does contain value added figures for some countries that are either obtained directly from the
data-provider or are calculated using an accounting definition, but gauging from the manual, it differs across
countries.
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which implies that different types of workers cannot be considered.19 Estimated productivity
levels should therefore be interpreted as including labour quality and capacity utilisation (Gal,
2013). The Amadeus database further provides data on the total stock of tangible fixed assets (not
more detailed). Changes in (capital) capacity utilisation can thus not be accounted for. Klette and
Griliches (1996) and Ornaghi (2008) demonstrate that the use of industry-level price deflators
to deflate output and inputs results in a downward bias in the scale estimates and thus points to
substantial decreasing returns to scale. The issues discussed above are faced by many empirical
studies using total factor productivity estimates (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Syverson, 2011).
2.2.6 Correction for outliers
As a first step, the data are cleaned for negative values of the number of employees, tangible
fixed assets, operating revenue, sales, material costs, and value added (which is defined as the
difference between turnover and material costs). In a second step, we calculate growth rates of
the aforementioned variables. We then replace observations associated with growth rates below
(above) the 1st (99th) percentile with missing values. These corrections were also done in the
construction of the CompNet database (European Central Bank, 2014).
2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Representativeness
In this Section we discuss our data set (shorthand AUGAMA, henceforth) in terms of coverage
and representativeness. Our main comparison set is the Structural Business Statistics (SBS)
database of Eurostat.20 SBS data in NACE revision 1.1 are available for the period 2002-2007
(2003-2007 for some countries). We use this period to infer the representativeness of our data
set. We consider firms in mining, manufacturing, and services (financial services industries
are excluded though), i.e. NACE 2-digit codes 10 to 74, excluding 64 to 67. Table 2.13 in the
Appendix lists all the 2-digit industries included in our data set. In order to get a first broad
overview of the data Figure 2.1 simply plots the number of firms over time.21 The SBS data count
more than 20 million firms in Europe (some countries do not report numbers in 2002, hence the
19Total wage costs are reported, and in principle available as a quality adjusted labour input. This variable is
filled out somewhat less frequently, however, and more importantly it will be prone to cross-country differences in
the regulatory framework (e.g. social security contributions). Therefore it is likely to be a good reflection of actual
labour costs, but cross-country comparison in terms of ‘quality’ is not recommendable. Further, it is not always
clear from the Amadeus manual whether the definition of costs of employees is the exact same across countries (e.g.
whether bonuses or even social security contributions are included). For this reason, we restrict ourselves to the
number of employees as labour input.
20We think of the SBS data as providing the population of firms but do note that SBS are retrieved from surveys
with incomplete coverage of the population of firms for some countries (Belgium and Estonia), which can explain
ratios even above 100% (European Central Bank, 2014). Furthermore, it is not always clear whether SBS data
consider only companies or a larger set of business entities which also includes sole proprietors.
21The countries included are AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, NO,
PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, and SK.
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Figure 2.1: Number of firms in Europe in the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) and
Augmented Amadeus (AUGAMA) databases (period 1995-2011). For the AUGAMA data, all
active firms and all firms for which WLP TFP is available are displayed.
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Figure 2.2: Number of firms in Europe for which employment data are available and number of
firms in Europe for which WLP TFP data are available in the Augmented Amadeus (AUGAMA)
database (period 1995-2011).
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‘jump’). For our AUGAMA data set we see a gradual increase in the number of active firms from
about five to fifteen million firms from 1995 tot 2011. In 2007 our data set covers 55% of SBS
firms, up from 45% in 2003. These numbers drop considerably if we count the number of firms
for which we are able to calculate WLP TFP (i.e. TFP based on the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin
estimator, see Wooldridge, 2009 and Petrin and Levinsohn, 2012). From Figure 2.2 one can infer
that the number of firms for which we are able to estimate TFP also steadily increases to more
than 1.5 million observations (from 5% (2003) to 6.9% (2007) of the number of SBS firms). The
number of firms that at least reports employment is considerably higher, but still only 12.7% of
the total number of SBS firms in 2007.
Table 2.1 shows some further numbers in terms of representativeness in columns two to five.
The entries in Table 2.1 are based on the AUGAMA data set that is corrected for outliers follow-
ing the procedure described above. The percentages shown are averaged over industry-time cells
by country. A country-industry-time cell in this case is defined by the host country, a broad NACE
category (SBS does not report finer detail, see Table 2.13), and the year of observation. Based
on the information from AUGAMA, a firm is assigned to a cell. After assigning firms to cells
we calculate cell aggregates (total number of firms, employees, total turnover, and total labour
costs) and create the ratio with the corresponding aggregate from the SBS data. The numbers in
Table 2.1 are obtained by averaging over industry-time cells by country. Note that calculations
are based on all firms that report the indicated variable and that ‘coverage’ in this respect may
differ between countries, but also within countries across variables. Table 2.1 then reveals that
coverage in terms of the number of firms ranges from a low of 5.2% for The Netherlands to a
high of 86.9% in Estonia. On average over countries we observe a quarter of SBS firms. The
coverage in terms of total employment, labour costs, and turnover is remarkably higher and
indicates that our data set typically will include the larger firms in an economy. Averaged over
countries, our AUGAMA data set accounts for about 60% of employment and turnover and 53%
of wage costs. The last four columns of Table 2.1 reveal that our data set is somewhat biased
towards manufacturing firms in comparison to what is reported in the SBS statistics, but one can
also infer that the discrepancy falls within reasonable margins. Table 2.2 shows the distribution
of firm size according to SBS data and AUGAMA data. A comparison reveals that AUGAMA is
generally biased towards larger firms (especially firms with between 20 and 249 employees). In
most countries the bias increases when we focus on firms for which TFP is available, but not to a
large extent.22
In cross-country distribution terms, the large dispersion in representativeness in terms of
22For AT, BE, DE, and LV we record large changes. In Belgium, for example, this is due to the fact that most
smaller firms filing an abridged account are not obliged to report material costs.
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Figure 2.3: Firm distribution across countries - Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS)
and Augmented Amadeus (AUGAMA) in year 2007 (impact of using a 20 employee cut-off).
Note: the difference between a country’s share in the number of firms in SBS in comparison with AUGAMA is
plotted against the change in a country’ share in AUGAMA when a 20 employee cut-off is used.
Figure 2.4: Number of firms in Europe when the 20 employee cut-off is applied in the Eurostat
Structural Business Statistics (SBS) and Augmented Amadeus (AUGAMA) datatbases (period
2002-2007). For AUGAMA, only firms with WLP TFP available are considered. The ratio of
the number of firms in AUGAMA and SBS is displayed on the secondaty axis on the right.
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the number of firms found in Table 2.1, and, to a lesser extent in terms of the number of
employees, turnover and wage costs, is mainly due to differences in the coverage of small
firms. In the application below, we therefore focus on a sample of firms with on average more
than 20 employees (similarly as in Gal, 2013 and in the CompNet database (European Central
Bank, 2014)). Figure 2.3 plots the difference between a country’s share in the number of firms
according to SBS data and its share in the number of firms according to AUGAMA data in 2007
against the resulting change in the share in the number of firms according to AUGAMA data
when a cut-off of at least 20 employees (on average by firm) is applied to the data. There is a
clear relation between a country’s share falling short of the SBS share and an increase in its
share when applying the cut-off. This brings the cross-country distribution closer to the observed
distribution according to the SBS data. Figure 2.4 shows the number of firms with more than 20
employees for SBS and the number of firms with more than 20 employees and TFP available for
AUGAMA.23 By 2007 our TFP-sample accounts for a quarter of the number of firms with more
than 20 employees. Tables 2.14 and 2.15 in Appendix list the annual number of observations in
the TFP sample for all firms and foreign firms separately.
2.4 EUMULNET - A European multinational network database
Aside from our ‘regular’ panel of European firms, AUGAMA, we have created a separate data set
on the European multinational network as retrieved from Amadeus (EUMULNET henceforth).
EUMULNET contains parent-affiliate combinations for which we have information both on
the parent and its affiliate from Amadeus. For every firm, Amadeus contains information on
whether or not the firm has any affiliates. For firms with affiliates, Amadeus provides the list
of affiliate names and a limited amount of further information. Crucially for our purposes,
affiliates that are available as separate entries in Amadeus are identified by their unique ID-
number. For these affiliates we therefore are able to retrieve the full information set from its
own entry in Amadeus rather than relying on the limited information provided through the
parent’s entry in the database. We limit our sample to parent-affiliate combinations for which
both firms are listed in Amadeus with full information. For affiliates not listed in Amadeus, we
do have information on their existence and country of operation, but the latter is not always
filled out. There are two potentially useful variables in the parent’s entry in the database that
list operating revenue of and employment at the affiliate. However, this information is not
always filled out24 and with respect to the timing it is unclear what the calendar year is, since
the variable refers to the latest available year. Therefore this information is not as useful for
further analysis compared to the full entry information. That is why we focus on parent-affiliate
23Because one of the variables for TFP-calculation is missing for all firms, DK, GB and IE are not included in the
Figure. GR and LT are included but only have a very small sample of firms, either limited in the time dimension
(GR) or limited in coverage (LT).
24This information became available only in later versions of the database
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Table 2.3: Total number of parent-affiliate links over time. Only parent-affiliate links where the
parent owns at least 50% of the affiliate at some point in time are considered. Column (1) shows
all links that fulfil these requirements. Column (2) presents the number of these links for which
TFP is available and column (3) shows links for which TFP is available with an affiliate abroad.
Parent-affiliate links with
All parent- double TFP double TFP
affiliate links of which abroad
(1) (2) (3)
1997 21,850 3,252 448
1998 48,933 8,408 1,525
1999 97,221 17,278 2,895
2000 152,871 27,537 3,881
2001 263,448 36,495 4,805
2002 378,426 43,967 6,720
2003 399,377 44,451 7,206
2004 583,294 52,470 8,175
2005 635,588 54,747 8,198
2006 645,047 58,420 8,859
2007 695,671 57,218 9,148
2008 808,682 55,280 9,770
2009 887,207 60,226 10,998
2010 905,841 57,922 10,847
2011 980,569 66,034 10,527
combinations where both firms are listed in Amadeus. This also implies that the resulting data
set is limited to the the European network of the parent should it also own non-European affiliates.
To create our parent-affiliate data set we use the following procedure. First, we extract parent-
affiliate ID-number combinations (plus the actual share owned by the parent in the affiliate) from
every issue of the database.25 This creates a time-series of parent-affiliate links. We then restrict
our attention to those combinations where the parent owns at least 50% of the affiliate at some
point in time. In this parent-affiliate-year data set we then fill out the AUGAMA information
both on the parent and affiliate side. For earlier/later years when the link does not exist, we do fill
out information from AUGAMA (when available) for parent and/or affiliate.26 Our final data set
forms a traditional panel data set of affiliates with full information on the parent attached to each
affiliate-year entry (duplicating parent-year information when the parent has multiple affiliates).
25We limit ourselves to European ID-numbers. For some affiliates there is a non-European ID-number that refers
to other Bureau Van Dijk products. This however applies to a very small number of firms. We also do not consider
affiliates in Russia and Ukraine at this point.
26Occasionally a link is not reported in the year t issue of the database, while it is in the t−1 and t +1 issues, we
then assume the link to exist in t as well.
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Table 2.3 lists the annual number of links of more than 50% between a parent and its affiliate
that both have an Bureau Van Dijk ID-number. From column (1) one can infer that the number
of links we retrieve considerably increases over time, which is influenced by increased coverage
over time. For about 8.5% of these links we are able to obtain a TFP measure (cf. infra) for both
parent and affiliate. When we consider the evolution over time of this subset of links in column
(2), we still observe an increase in links, but from 2002 onwards, and even more so from 2004
onwards, the number of links is more stable. From 2002 onwards between 15 and 19% of these
links is between a parent and affiliate in a different European country (see column (3)).
Table 2.4 focuses on the cross-country distribution for the year 2007. The four last rows of
the Table show values for countries for which we are unable to compute total factor productivity
because some variable is missing for all firms.27 The first column lists the number of parents
with a given nationality in the data set. Note that this number is affected by coverage as well, but
to a more limited extent because these numbers do not require any financial information to be
provided by the firm (cf. Germany, The Netherlands). Most parents can be found in the UK and
the Netherlands, followed by Germany and France. The second column shows the number of
affiliates owned by these parents (irrespective of the host country). Across countries parents own
between 1.4 and 2.9 affiliates on average. When we restrict ourselves to those parent-affiliate
combinations for which TFP is available on both sides of the link we retain 57,218 observations
in 2007, about 16% of the total is located abroad.28 The last three columns of Table 2.4 focus
on the number of affiliates present in the country indicated by the row heading. The correlation
with the number of affiliates owned by parent firms from the country is fairly large (abstracting
from the requirement of TFP availability), indicating that a lot of these affiliates are typically
domestically-owned. Obviously the share of foreign-owned affiliates is 16% like the share of
affiliates owned abroad before.
Finally, Table 2.5 considers the distribution of affiliates per parent for the sample without
TFP restrictions (column (1) in Table 2.4) for the year 2007. The general conclusion from
this Table is that a small number of parents owns a disproportionally large share of affiliates.
Columns (1) and (2) reveal that 65% of parents owns a single affiliate, while another 18% owns
two affiliates. In total 95% of parents owns five or less affiliates. Columns (3) and (4) reveal
27For Greek firms we were able to obtain total factor productivity, but only for a limited number of firms for a
limited number of years (late 1990s, early 2000s). UK firms do report value added but not material costs.
28These numbers should be interpreted with care as they are partly driven by differences in both pure coverage and
data quality (i.e. reporting variables necessary to obtain TFP) across countries. For example, for The Netherlands
and Germany we only retain 1% and 5% of reported links because of poor reporting of financial information. This
also accounts for the fact that a large share of the affiliates is located abroad, i.e. in a country with better reporting
of financial information.
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Table 2.4: Cross-country breakdown of parents and affiliates for the year 2007. Column (1)
show the number of parents in each country, with columns (2)-(4) providing information about
their affiliates and the parent-affiliate links (when TFP is available, affiliate located abroad or
not). Columns (5)-(7) hold information on the number of affiliates in each country and the
parent-affiliate links (when TFP is available, domestically-owned or foreign-owned).
#parent-affiliate links #parent-affiliate in country
#parents #affiliates double TFP double TFP #affiliates double TFP double TFP
owned abroad in country foreign-owned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AT 7,404 16,191 732 433 16,487 505 206
BE 20,411 35,629 2,598 798 32,306 2,521 721
BG 4,560 13,314 1,141 3 13,575 1,198 60
CZ 554 775 278 45 1,950 666 433
DE 48,250 121,156 5,729 1,933 122,678 4,467 671
EE 866 1,251 178 2 1,931 405 229
ES 26,301 54,854 11,560 808 57,511 12,129 1,377
FI 4,304 10,493 2,713 524 9,901 2,312 123
FR 44,800 106,721 11,148 1,606 104,847 11,079 1,537
HR 529 917 480 15 1,228 587 122
HU 590 885 280 46 1,966 581 347
IT 11,650 31,258 10,266 1,476 29,322 9,643 853
LV 166 243 5 1 633 15 11
NL 99,384 177,906 1,314 1,000 172,572 463 149
NO 22,483 41,900 2,972 98 43,943 3,131 257
PL 2,288 4,213 366 15 7,564 1,030 679
PT 3,625 7,865 1,590 123 8,886 1,945 478
RO 3,192 4,543 1,619 3 7,153 2,272 656
SE 30,654 62,783 2,186 180 57,939 2,151 145
SI 73 124 50 32 96 36 18
SK 40 78 13 7 300 82 76
GB 108,410 261,478 252,478
GR 1,346 2,554 2,986
IE 5,997 12,966 12,577
LT 297 416 448
that parents owning affiliates in a foreign country are exceptional: 92.7% of parents does not
engage in cross-border investment. 5% of parents owns a single foreign affiliate, 2.3% owns
two or more foreign affiliates. In columns (5) to (8) we consider the number of affiliates rather
than the number of parents. The 65% of parents with a single affiliate account for 30% of the
total number of affiliates. 32% of affiliates is owned by parents that own more than five affiliates.
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Table 2.5: Distribution of the number of affiliates per parent for the year 2007 (without TFP
restrictions). Columns (1)-(4) show the number of parents who own a certain number of affiliates
(domestic or abroad), columns (5)-(8) show the number of affiliates owned (by domestic or
foreign parents, also considering the number of (other) affiliates this parent owns).
#parents with total #affiliates owned
X affiliates X foreign affiliates all foreign
X (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 311,231 64.7% 23,963 4.99% 311,231 30.4% 13,586 16.6%
2 85,019 17.9% 5,161 1.07% 170,038 16.6% 8,424 10.3%
3 33,846 7.1% 2,075 0.43% 101,538 9.9% 6,244 7.6%
4 16,869 3.5% 1,104 0.23% 67,476 6.6% 4,698 5.7%
5 9,557 2.0% 689 0.14% 47,785 4.7% 3,887 4.7%
6 5,857 1.2% 388 0.08% 35,142 3.4% 3,113 3.8%
7 3,864 0.8% 298 0.06% 27,048 2.6% 2,661 3.3%
8 2,701 0.5% 199 0.04% 21,608 2.1% 2,020 2.5%
9 1,921 0.4% 152 0.03% 17,289 1.7% 1,649 2.0%
10 1,513 0.3% 138 0.03% 15,130 1.5% 1,604 2.0%
>10 8,123 1.6% 907 0.19% 208,387 20.4% 34,064 41.6%
0 - 445,427 92.70% - -
total 480,501 480,501 1,022,672 81,950
Foreign affiliates typically belong to multi-affiliate parents. More than 80% of foreign affiliates
are owned by parents that have at least two affiliates, 55% of foreign affiliates are owned by
parents that have six or more affiliates.
2.5 Total Factor Productivity
2.5.1 Estimation framework
This Section is devoted to the estimation of total factor productivity (TFP). As the input choices
of firms are likely to be based on their productivity, the estimation of total factor productivity
will be biased if the endogeneity of inputs is not addressed (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). A
number of alternative estimation procedures have been suggested in order to tackle this issue.
The most popular alternatives are the semi-parametric approaches developed by Olley and Pakes
(1996) (OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP), in which a proxy is introduced to handle
the endogeneity bias. Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment as a proxy. Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) argue that investment is lumpy and does not react smoothly to productivity shocks and
propose to use material inputs as a proxy instead. In a more recent contribution, Ackerberg
et al. (2008) (ACF) present an alternative semi-parametric procedure that deals with potential
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collinearity issues in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Wooldridge
(2009) shows a method to implement OP/LP in a GMM framework with several advantages over
ACF: i) estimators are more efficient; ii) the first stage of the algorithm contains identifying
information for the parameters on the variable inputs, and iii) fully robust standard errors are
easy to obtain. In short, Wooldridge (2009) derives two equations with the same dependent
variable (output) and fixed and variable inputs as explanatory variables. The difference between
both equations is the approximation of unobserved productivity which provides a different set of
instruments for identification of the production function parameters. We use the implementation
of Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) of this methodology (referred to as WLP TFP henceforth).
2.5.2 Estimation and coefficients
The production function to be estimated in its logarithmic form is given in (2.1) with ωit the
unobserved productivity shock known to the firm but not to the researcher and va double deflated
value added (cf. supra). The sum of the constant term, β0, and ωit captures Hicks-neutral TFP.
εit is a standard i.i.d. error term incorporating unanticipated shocks and measurement error. As
indicated above, we use the GMM-approach advocated by Wooldridge (2009) as implemented
by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012). The trade-off we face is between allowing βl and βk to vary
maximally across countries and industries and retaining enough data points to estimate βl and βk.
lnvait = β0 +βllnlit +βklnkit +ωit + εit (2.1)
We start off by estimating equation (2.1) by country-industry pair where we use all available
data points over time (1995-2011). Industries are defined as 19 ‘broad’ NACE aggregates
capturing one or more NACE 2-digit categories (listed in Table 2.13). Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7
show box plots of the coefficients by country and by industry respectively. In each Figure, the
vertical line within a box indicates the median and the edges of the box represent the first and
third quartile. The whiskers of a box indicate values that fall within 3/2 times the interquartile
range of the first and third quartiles. They capture the minimum and maximum, not taking
outliers into consideration. All values that fall outside of this range, indicated by dots, represent
outliers. As one can infer from the box plots in Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7, for multiple countries
we obtain capital and labour coefficients that fall outside the unit interval. Moreover, for a lot
of country-industry pairs the capital coefficient is not significant at conventional levels, even if
it falls in the unit interval (this is also the case in CompNet (European Central Bank, 2014)).
Gal (2013) deals with this issue by not calculating TFP if the capital or labour coefficient falls
outside the unit interval (i.e. values of the TFP variable are left empty).
We therefore proceed by estimating production functions by industry, but aggregating coun-
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Figure 2.5: Capital and labour elasticities for the old EU15+ countries (obtained from WLP
TFP estimations by country-industry pair in period 1995-2011). Countries are indicated on the
vertical axis, the (values of the) capital and labour elasticities are shown on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.6: Capital and labour elasticities for the CEEC10+ countries (obtained from WLP
TFP estimations by country-industry pair in period 1995-2011). Countries are indicated on the
vertical axis, the (values of the) capital and labour elasticities are shown on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.7: Capital and labour elasticities for 19 broad NACE categories (obtained from WLP
TFP estimations by country-industry pair in period 1995-2011). Industries are indicated on the
vertical axis, the (values of the) capital and labour elasticities are shown on the horizontal axis.
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tries. When estimating equation (2.1), we restrict βl and βk to be similar across countries but do
allow β0 to become country-specific (capturing for example country-specific technology levels
or management skills). We do so because, notwithstanding that we make a strong assumption29,
this results in sensible estimates for the capital and labour coefficients which are shown in Figure
2.8 and allows us to obtain TFP for the largest possible set of firms. Furthermore, specifically for
the multinational (foreign) firms in our data set (12% of observations) the European production
function might be relevant as the ‘local’ production function. Our analysis in the next Section is
therefore based on TFP estimates obtained using the estimation results behind Figure 2.8.
Note that for some of the broad industries in Figure 2.8, the estimated coefficients of capital
and labour do not sum to one (i.e. constant returns to scale) but rather to a value that is less than
one (i.e. decreasing returns to scale). This observation has been made in many empirical studies
that use TFP estimations. As indicated above, Klette and Griliches (1996) and Ornaghi (2008)
show that often decreasing returns to scale are found because industry-level deflators are used
instead of firm-level deflators. In another study, Lizal and Galušcˇák (2012) point to measurement
errors in capital. They find that the estimated capital coefficient almost doubles in size when
measurement errors are controlled for, thus even resulting in increasing returns to scale in some
industries. Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) indicate that researchers have to keep in mind that
29Differences in labour market institutions and relative prices do exist for example.
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Figure 2.8: Capital and labour elasticities for Europe-wide production functions by 19 broad
NACE categories (obtained from WLP TFP estimations by industry -aggregating countries but
including country dummies- in period 1995-2011). Industries are indicated on the vertical axis,
the (values of the) capital and labour elasticities are shown on the horizontal axis.
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TFP is estimated rather than observed and hence they argue that more attention should be paid to
these estimated elasticities. They further discuss the implications of this issue with regards to the
TFP estimator that is chosen in an empirical application.30 To account for the fact that TFP is
an estimate, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Dumont et al. (2005) develop methodologies to
account for the additional variance that arises when TFP is first estimated and then introduced as
the dependent variable in a second step equation.
2.6 TFP and the Foreign Ownership Premium
In this Section we evaluate the ownership premium of foreign firms. Specifically, we perform
two analyses. In Section 2.6.1 we focus on the full sample of European firms. However, because
the remaining Chapters in this dissertation are based on a pilot data set for Romania that covers
the period 1996-2005, we also investigate the foreign ownership premium for this specific
sub-sample in Section 2.6.2.31
30In the remaining Chapters of this dissertation, this issue is addressed by testing the robustness of results for
different TFP estimators.
31Chronologically, the following Chapters in this dissertation were written before this Chapter.
74 Foreign Firms in Europe and the Foreign TFP Premium
2.6.1 Europe-wide analysis
To take a first look at the productivity levels of the foreign and domestic firms across Europe, we
plot the distributions of their TFP-levels in Figure 2.9a.32 We find that the distribution for foreign
firms is clearly to the right of that for domestic firms. Figures 2.9b and 2.9c show the productivity
distributions for domestic and foreign firms in the manufacturing and the services industries
respectively. In both cases, the productivity distribution for the foreign firms is to the right of
that of the domestic companies. For firms in services industries, the distance between both
distributions seems larger (cf. infra). The analysis of three ‘macro’-regions33 leads to a similar
conclusion: foreign firms appear to be more productive than domestic firms in the Northern,
Southern, and Eastern countries, as evidenced by Figures 2.10a, 2.10b and 2.10c. Finally, Figures
2.11a and 2.11b respectively illustrate the productivity distributions for the domestic firms in
the three macro-regions and for the foreign firms in these three regions. For domestic firms, we
find a clear ranking with firms in the North outperforming firms in the South and firms in the
South outperforming firms in the East. With respect to foreign firms in Figure 2.11b, however,
the distribution for South is closer to the distribution for North. Foreign firms in the East do
seem to be considerably less productive on average.
In order to get further insight into the magnitude of foreign firms’ premium in terms of TFP
(and several other performance indicators), we perform an empirical exercise along the lines of
Bernard and Jensen (1999). The analysis is fairly straightforward and consists of retrieving the
foreign premium from estimating a regression of the following form:
lnXi jrt = α+βForeigni jrt +δLi jrt−1 + γt + γ j + γr + εi jrt (2.2)
In equation (2.2), we regress the level of the performance indicator (X) on a dummy for
foreign ownership (Foreign), the lagged size of the firm (L, measured as the natural log of the
number of employees), and a set of time t, industry j, and region r dummies34.
In Table 2.6 we consider the full sample of foreign and domestic firms for which we are
32The period considered is 2002-2007, i.e. we exclude both the earlier years where coverage is more unbalanced
across countries and the later years to eliminate potential crisis effects. Only firms with on average at least 20
employees are considered. This leaves us with 1,345,454 observations that are used in the Figure. 166,969 of these
observations come from foreign firms, i.e. 12,4% of observations.
33North is AT, BE, DE, (DK,) FI, FR, (GB,) NL, SE; South is ES, (GR, IE,) IT, PT; and East is BG, CZ, EE,
HR, HU, (LT,) LV, PL, RO, SI, SK. For countries between brackets TFP is not available for the period considered.
425,539 observations are from North; 516,432 from South; and 373,783 from East.
34Industries are defined as the 19 ‘broad’ NACE aggregates as found in the EUKLEMS database. We use NUTS
level 2 region dummies. The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical
system for dividing up the economic territory of the EU.
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Figure 2.9: WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Europe in all industries
(top panel), the manufacturing industries (middle panel) and the services industries (bottom
panel) in period 2002-2007 (only firms with at least 20 employees are considered).MAKE 4PANEL FIGURE???
ALL NORTH
EAST SOUTH
(a) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Europe across all industries.manufacturing services
(b) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Europe in the manufacturing industries.
(c) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Europe in the services industries.
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Figure 2.10: WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in three macro-regions:
North (top panel), South (middle panel) and East (bottom panel) (period 2002-2007, only firms
with at least 20 employees are considered).NORTH
(a) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in North (countries included: AT, BE, DE,
FI, FR, NL and SE).SOUTH
(b) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in South (countries included: ES, IT and PT).EAST
(c) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in East (countries included: BG, CZ, EE,
HR, HU, LV, PL, RO, SI and SK).
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Figure 2.11: WLP TFP distributions for domestic firms (top panel) and foreign firms (bottom
panel) in Europe in the three macro-regions in period 2002-2007 (only firms with at least 20
employees are considered).
(a) WLP TFP distributions for domestic firms for three macro-regions (North, South and East).
(b) WLP TFP distributions for foreign firms for three macro-regions (North, South and East).
able to obtain TFP measures. We further trim the data set for extreme values of WLP TFP by
removing values below (above) the first (99th) percentile in each country-industry-size-year cell
(to preserve the sample distribution in these dimensions). Table 2.6 contains the estimated values
for β in equation (2.2). The first column presents premia for WLP TFP for different sub-samples
as indicated by the row headings, the third column presents premia for value added per worker
as a comparison check. Columns (2) and (4) contain the number of observations used in the
estimation. Premia are always significant at the 1% level. Controlling for size, time, industry,
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Table 2.6: The TFP premium of foreign over domestic firms based on the EU-wide sample and
different sub-samples (period 1995-2011). Premia for WLP TFP and value added per worker (VA
pw). Sub-samples are obtained by considering manufacturing and services industries separately,
by splitting up the sample period in three shorter periods, by distinguishing between majority
and minority foreign-owned firms and by considering four size classes of firms.
ln WLP TFP #obs ln VA pw #obs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trimmed 0.480 13,023,107 0.503 13,026,194
non-trimmed 0.555 13,238,694 0.573 13,238,694
manufacturing 0.324 3,020,906 0.345 3,021,943
services 0.557 7,919,363 0.584 7,920,568
before 2003 0.490 3,507,385 0.518 3,507,991
2003-2007 0.483 4,714,522 0.511 4,714,983
after 2007 0.469 4,801,200 0.484 4,803,220
majority foreign-owned firms 0.510 13,064,783 0.538 13,069,327
minority foreign-owned firms 0.335 13,064,783 0.365 13,069,327
micro firms (L<=10) 0.532 8,505,507 0.566 8,488,588
small firms (10<L<=50) 0.441 3,462,642 0.458 3,467,654
medium firms (50< L <=250) 0.335 871,972 0.367 879,794
large firms (L>250) 0.329 182,986 0.368 190,158
Note: the foreign premium is statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases in columns (1) and (3). In
the trimmed sample, values of WLP TFP below (above) the 1th (99th) percentile in each country-industry-
size-year cell are removed.
and region, we find that foreign firms’ level of TFP is 48% higher in Europe. This number is
confirmed for value added per worker in column (3) where we find a 50% premium. For the non-
trimmed sample these premia are about 7%-points higher. When we consider manufacturing and
services industries separately we find, in line with Figures 2.9b and 2.9c above, that the premium
is considerably larger for services industries. The premium seems fairly stable over time with
potentially a slight tendency to decrease, but given changes in sample constellation (cf. Tables
2.14 and 2.15 in the Appendix), one should not read too much in this decrease. As indicated
above the criterion to classify a firm as foreign is a single foreign owner controlling at least 10%
of shares. When we split foreign firms in a group that is majority foreign-owned (more than
50%) and a group which is minority foreign-owned (more than 10% of the shares, but less than
50%)35, we find that both groups outperform domestic firms, but that majority foreign-owned
35Of the 313,677 foreign firms (after trimming) 51,523 firms are minority foreign-owned, while 262,154 firms
are majority foreign-owned.
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firms also clearly outperform minority foreign-owned firms. Majority foreign-owned firms are
51% more productive than domestic firms, whereas minority foreign-owned firms are 33% more
productive. Finally, we consider four size categories inspired by the EU’s definition of micro
(employing less than 10 employees, L<=10), small (between 10 and 50 employees), medium
(between 50 and 250 employees), and large (more than 250 employees) firms. The productivity
premium decreases by size class. It is well over 50% for micro firms, about 45% for small firms,
and about 33% for medium and large firms.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 report foreign TFP premia by country and by industry respectively.36
For each country in Table 2.7 we consider four different samples of firms: i) all firms; ii) firms
with more than 20 employees (which improves the representativeness of our data); iii) firms
with more than 20 employees for the period 2003-2007 (which gives us a stable number of
firms, also no crisis effects); and iv) firms in manufacturing with more than 20 employees for
the period 2003-2007. We examine the fourth sample of firms because the TFP estimation
algorithm is probably more tailored towards manufacturing firms.37 In Table 2.8, foreign TFP
premia are evaluated by industry (for 19 broad industries). That is why only three samples of
firms are introduced: i) all firms; ii) firms with more than 20 employees; and iii) firms with
more than 20 employees for the period 2003-2007. In both Tables, numbers in rows below the
coefficients refer to the number of firm-year observations used in the estimation. In Table 2.7,
which as indicated above shows differences across countries, we detect the largest premia for
countries in Eastern Europe (on the right-hand side in the Table). For the old EU15 Members
States, the largest premia are found for Portugal, Spain, and Italy. For all countries TFP premia
decrease as the sample becomes more restrictive. The larger premia are still typically found
in Eastern Europe, though for a country such as Slovenia the premium is close to that of the
Western European countries. When we take a closer look at differences across detailed industries
in Table 2.8, we find that premia in manufacturing industries range from 12.7% to 34.7% for
the most restrictive sample. Except for the mining industry (industries 10-14) and the hotel and
restaurant sector (industry 55), the premia in all other industries are considerably higher than
those in manufacturing.
Table 2.9 considers other performance indicators than productivity. For ease of comparison
the first two lines repeat the results of Table 2.6 for WLP TFP and value added per worker. All
performance indicators have been trimmed in a similar way as indicated for TFP above. The
36There is some related literature in which TFP or exporter premia for specific countries are examined, such as
Yasar and Paul (2007) for Turkey and Castellani and Giovannetti (2010) for Italy. These studies generally confirm
that foreign firms are more productive than domestic counterparts. In many cases, quantiles regressions are used or
additional variables are added (as in Castellani and Giovannetti (2010)), which makes it difficult to compare the
premia obtained with our results.
37Services do account for large parts of value added in all countries.
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Table 2.9: The premium of foreign over domestic firms for several other performance indicators.
Columns (1) and (2) refer to results obtained from a sample covering all firms across all industries
in period 1995-2011. Columns (3) and (4) hold results on manufacturing firms with at least 20
employees in period 2003-2007.
1995-2011 2003-2007
premium #obs premium #obs
performance indicator (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln WLP TFP 0.480 13,023,107 0.266 358,463
ln Value Added per worker 0.503 13,026,194 0.300 361,217
ln Number of Employees* 0.691 11,426,678 0.401 352,576
ln Value Added 0.598 13,003,206 0.369 353,798
ln Capital per worker 0.231 12,992,328 0.298 360,920
ln Operating Revenue 0.565 13,003,535 0.425 353,858
ln Wage 0.326 12,961,377 0.192 361,195
ln Intangible Fixed Assets 0.262 6,247,780 0.298 265,298
ln Total Assets 0.757 12,993,792 0.475 354,003
ln Cash Flow 0.639 10,445,839 0.517 312,699
ln Profit/Loss before Tax 0.771 9,466,307 0.593 278,959
ln Profit/Loss after Tax 0.794 9,129,196 0.616 264,893
Implicit Tax Rate -2.457 12,838,221 -2.666 356,248
* specification does not contain lagged number of employees. Note that samples are trimmed
for extreme values of the respective indicators by removing the values below (above) the 1th
(99th) percentile in each country-industry-size-year cell. The foreign premium is statistically
significant at the 1% level in all cases in columns (1) and (3).
results reported in column (1) cover a sample of all firms and industries in period 1995-2011; the
results in column (3) are obtained from an analysis using only manufacturing firms that employ
at least 20 employees in period 2003-2007. We first focus on the results for the full sample of
firms. Aside from being about 50% more productive on average, foreign firms create 60% more
value added, have 56% more operating revenues, and generate a 64% larger cash flow. They
do so by employing about 70% more employees than domestic firms, using 23% more capital
per employee, 26% more intangibles (based on sub-sample of firms reporting strictly positive
intangibles). Foreign firms’ total assets are on average 75% larger. All this results in profits
that are slightly less than 80% larger (based on sub-sample of firms reporting strictly positive
profits). Their implicit tax rate, calculated as profits before tax minus profits after tax divided by
profits before tax, is on average 2.5%-points smaller than domestic firms’ average implicit tax
rate. Similar trends are discovered when the sample is restricted to manufacturing firms with at
least 20 employees in period 2003-2007, as is clear from the estimates in column (3).
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Table 2.10: The TFP premium of foreign over domestic firms. These results are obtained
using the Romanian pilot data set that covers the period 1996-2005. WLP TFP is used as the
productivity measure unless indicated otherwise. Sub-samples are obtained by splitting up the
sample period in two shorter periods and by considering four size classes of firms.
premium #obs
firms with at least 5 employees (L>=5) 0.273 118,366
firms with at least 5 employees (L>=5) - OP TFP 0.122 138,916
firms with at least 5 employees (L>=5) - ACF TFP 0.239 117,654
trimmed 0.277 186,153
non-trimmed 0.331 190,606
before 2001 0.300 68,893
after 2000 0.245 117,260
micro firms (L<=10) 0.308 105,233
small firms (10<L<=50) 0.277 53,022
medium firms (50<L<=250) 0.256 18,750
large firms (L>250) 0.192 9,148
Note: the foreign premium is statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases in columns (1)
and (3). In the trimmed sample, values of WLP TFP below (above) the 1th (99th) percentile
in each country-industry-size-year cell are removed.
2.6.2 Evidence from the Romanian pilot data set
Because the remaining Chapters in this dissertation focus on the spillover effects of foreign
direct investment in Romania, in this Section the TFP premium of foreign over domestic firms
in the country is examined. In line with the analysis performed above we start, as a first step,
by plotting for Romania the productivity distributions of foreign and domestic firms over all
industries, in the manufacturing industries and in the services industries in Figures 2.12a, 2.12b
and 2.12c respectively. All three Figures clearly show that the productivity distribution based on
the WLP TFP measure of the foreign firms lies to the right of that of the domestic companies.
The former thus appear to be more productive than the latter.
We then continue by analysing the foreign premium following a similar procedure inspired
by Bernard and Jensen (1999) as described above. Further results reported in this Section are
thus no longer obtained from the full database but rather are based on a ‘pilot data set’ that was
created for the Romanian subset of firms in Amadeus covering the period 1996-2005. This data
set is used in the other Chapters of this dissertation as well. We focused on Romania because
this subset is i) characterized by a good coverage in all respects of the data and therefore has
already been used in a number of publications (see e.g. Altomonte and Colantone, 2008; Javorcik
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Figure 2.12: WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Romania in all industries
(top panel), the manufacturing industries (middle panel) and the services industries (bottom
panel) in period 1995-2011.
manuafcturing
(a) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Romania across all industries.
(b) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Romania in the manufacturing industries.services
(c) WLP TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in Romania in the services industries.
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Table 2.11: The TFP premium of foreign over domestic firms in Romania. These results are
obtained using the Romanian pilot data set that covers the period 1996-2005. Cross-industry
differences by NACE 2-digit industries for different sub-samples (all firms and firms that employ
at least 20 employees (indicated by L>20)) are reported.
all firms firms with L>20 all firms firms with L>20
industry (1) (2) industry (1) (2)
15 0.310*** 0.276*** 27 0.296*** 0.205***
48,973 30,410 1,526 1,125
17 0.392*** 0.351*** 28 0.214*** 0.246***
8,564 5,776 17,538 11,415
18 0.347*** 0.313*** 29 0.279*** 0.247***
18,869 13,571 5,367 3,919
19 0.410*** 0.384*** 30 0.132* 0.082
6,417 5,104 1,606 798
20 0.031 0.053** 31 0.360*** 0.309***
18,810 10,595 2,875 1,940
21 0.459*** 0.504*** 32 0.274*** 0.309**
2,247 1,632 713 466
22 0.176*** 0.131*** 33 0.308*** 0.091
11,638 6,289 3,344 1,428
23 0.633 0.710 34 0.166*** 0.183***
121 114 1,676 1,317
24 0.420*** 0.410*** 35 0.018 0.221**
5,107 3,392 1,410 1,137
25 0.376*** 0.395*** 36 0.304*** 0.301***
8,009 4,630 14,042 8,746
26 0.294*** 0.332***
7,256 4,521
Note: the numbers in rows below the estimated coefficients refer to the number of firm-year ob-
servations used in the estimation. Only manufacturing industries are considered. ***/**/* denotes
significance at 1/5/10 percent.
and Spatareanu, 2008, 2011 and Merlevede et al., 2014), ii) Romania opened up to foreign
investment only in the mid 1990s (implying that the initial influx of FDI is captured by the data);
iii) Romania is a transition/developing economy with an a priori large scope for spillovers.
Table 2.10 reports different samples of foreign and domestic firms for which we are able to
obtain TFP measures.38 Specifically, we present three measures of TFP: OP and ACF TFP as the
base cases for the following Chapters and the more recent WLP TFP for comparison reasons (we
38Production functions were estimated by NACE revision 1.1 2-digit industry where possible. Smaller industries
were added to other industries (e.g. tobacco to food, as is the case in NACE revision 2).
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Table 2.12: The premium of foreign over domestic firms for selected other performance indica-
tors in Romania. These results are obtained using the Romanian pilot data set that covers the
period 1996-2005.
premium #obs
ln Value Added per worker 0.483 235,830
ln Number of Employees* 0.861 232,029
ln Value Added 0.628 240,636
ln Capital per worker 0.593 232,428
ln Operating Revenue 0.468 253,652
ln Intangible Fixed Assets 0.408 43,771
Note: the foreign premium is statistically significant at the 1%
level for all indicators. * specification does not contain lagged
number of employees.
did not yet obtain WLP TFP for the other Chapters at the time of those analyses). The data set is
also trimmed for extreme values of the dependent variable by removing values below (above) the
first (99th) percentile in each industry-size-year cell. Table 2.10 contains the estimated values
for β in equation (2.2). We start with a sample of Romanian manufacturing firms with more than
five employees on average which is the base sample for the dependent variable in the Chapters
3 to 6. The premium is positive and statistically significant for all three productivity measures.
It ranges from 12.2% for OP TFP (which is a revenue based TFP measure) to 27.3% for WLP
TFP (value added based TFP measure as is ACF TFP). Further rows of Table 2.10 confirm the
tendencies we found for the European sample above. The non-trimmed sample shows a larger
premium, and for larger size classes we find that the average TFP premium decreases. For the
earlier period (i.e. prior to 2001), we detect a larger premium which may be explained by the fact
that most domestic firms were still adapting to market circumstances after the fall of communism
in the early 1990s.
Table 2.11 presents the foreign TFP premium by industry. For almost every NACE 2-digit
industry we detect a significant TFP premium for foreign firms in Table 2.11. With respect
to other performance indicators, for which the results are reported in Table 2.12, we find that
real operating revenue, real value added, and real value added per worker are between 47% and
63% larger for foreign firms. Foreign firms employ on average almost double the number of
employees of domestic firms and equip these workers with 60% more capital per head. Foreign
firms have on average also about 40% more intangible assets (based on a set of firms reporting a
strictly positive number). Note that we only consider these performance indicators and not the
full set used in Table 2.9 because the other indicators were not included in the pilot data set when
it was compiled (as this data set was constructed with a different outlook). All these numbers
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suggest there is ample scope for spillover effects from foreign to domestic firms in Romania.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper documents the build of a promising firm-level database, the Augmented Amadeus or
AUGAMA database, with a comprehensive coverage for Europe. We show that the AUGAMA
database reasonably approximates the structure across countries and industries that we infer
from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database. Our database covers the years
1995-2012. The coverage for the years before 2002 is generally lower (not for all countries
though) and not for all firms information for 2012 is already available. The representativeness is
typically better when the sample is restricted by excluding micro and small firms with less than
20 employees on average.
As an empirical application, we use the AUGAMA data set to calculate foreign firms’ pro-
ductivity premium over domestic firms. To this end, we follow Bernard and Jensen (1999) who
estimate (productivity) premia for exporters using a regression analysis. We find that across
Europe on average foreign firms are 48% more productive than domestic firms. This is mainly
driven by services sectors where foreign firms are on average about 56% more productive,
whereas the difference amounts to 32% in manufacturing industries. Majority foreign-owned
firms (>50% of the shares are foreign-owned) outperform minority foreign-owned firms, who
in turn still outperform domestic firms. We find the premium to be smaller in larger firm-size
categories.
When we repeat this analysis for the case of Romania, these patterns are confirmed. We find
a foreign TFP premium of precisely 48% for the subset of Romanian firms in AUGAMA. Based
on a pilot data set that is limited to the earlier years of the sample and only contains manufac-
turing firms, we find the bonus to be estimated at about 28%. For various other performance
indicators we obtain similar results with foreign firms significantly outperforming domestic firms.
These results clearly indicate that there is scope for spillover effects from foreign to domestic
companies (in Romania). The rationale for spillover effects from foreign direct investment is
that foreign firms have firm-specific advantages that enable them to outperform their domestic
counterparts when they enter new markets (Markusen, 1995). The evidence presented in this
paper lends support to this hypothesis. This paper therefore also sets the stage for the remaining
Chapters in this dissertation, in which spillover effects are further explored.
Appendix
Table 2.13: List of the NACE 2-digit industries included in the data.
broad
category
NACE
2-digit
Description
C Mining and quarrying
C 10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
C 11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities
incidental to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying
C 12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores
C 13 Mining of metal ores
C 14 Other mining and quarrying
D Manufacturing
DA 15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
DA 16 Manufacture of tobacco products
DB 17 Manufacture of textiles
DB 18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
DC 19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags,
saddlery, harness and footwear
DD 20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except fur-
niture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
DE 21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
DE 22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
DF 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
DG 24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
DH 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
DI 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
DJ 27 Manufacture of basic metals
DJ 28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment
DK 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL 30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
DL 31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
DL 32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment
and apparatus
DL 33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches and clocks
DM 34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
DM 35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
DN 36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
DN 37 Recycling
Table continued on the next page
Table 2.13: List of the NACE 2-digit industries included in the data (Continued).
broad
category
NACE
2-digit
Description
E Electricity, gas and water supply
E 40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
E 41 Collection, purification and distribution of water
F Construction
F 45 Construction
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods
G 50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles;
retail sale of automotive fuel
G 51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles
and motorcycles
G 52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair
of personal and household goods
H Hotels and restaurants
H 55 Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
I 60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
I 61 Water transport
I 62 Air transport
I 63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of
travel agencies
I 64 Post and telecommunications
K Real estate, renting and business activities
K 70 Real estate activities
K 71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of
personal and household goods
K 72 Computer and related activities
K 73 Research and development
K 74 Other business activities
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3 | Supply Chain Fragmentation,
Input-Output Tables and
Spillovers from Foreign Direct
Investment1
Abstract
The literature on the impact of multinationals on domestic firms’ productivity points to sup-
ply chain linkages with multinational firms as the main channel for positive spillover effects.
Local and multinational firms’ relative positions in the supply chain are typically determined
through the use of input-output tables. For a panel of Romanian firms, we show that the level
of industry aggregation in these tables and the applied spillover definitions bear an important
impact on results. We find that the total impact of foreign presence -irrespective of the channel-
is considerably larger when detailed IO-tables are used. When more aggregated tables are used,
one is likely to misclassify a considerable number of supplier-client activity as within-industry
competitive activity. In this respect we further propose to include within-industry supply and
use in the measures of supplier-client activity. This results in a further increase of the backward
spillover, whereas the horizontal within-industry spillover disappears.
Keywords: input-output tables, foreign direct investment, spillover effects
JEL Classification: F2
3.1 Introduction
The last few decades have been characterised by a fragmentation of the production chain with
firms specialising in specific stages of the chain. This process has often been linked with a shift
in foreign direct investment (FDI) towards developing and transition economies (see e.g. UNIDO
(2005), Rajan (2005), and Hanousek et al. (2011)). At the same time, the interest of researchers
1This Chapter is the result of joint work with Prof. dr. Bruno Merlevede. Another version of this Chapter is
available as Ghent University Working Paper 2012/822.
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Figure 3.1: Horizontal, backward and forward spillovers in the supply chain.
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and policy-makers in FDI as a source of technology transfer has been rising. Expecting a positive
impact on the local economy, governments in many developing (and developed) countries have
implemented a range of policies to attract foreign investment. Multinational enterprises (MNEs)
are not only expected to bring resources, technology, and jobs with them, but they are also
expected to generate indirect effects or FDI spillovers. The idea behind these spillover effects is
that multinationals intentionally or unintentionally transfer technology and knowledge in a broad
sense (e.g. managerial know-how) to domestic firms that become more productive as a result.
There is a large body of empirical research that analyses these FDI spillovers as additional in-
puts explaining total factor productivity (TFP) in a production function framework. Spillovers are
considered to be either of a horizontal or a vertical nature. Horizontal spillovers occur between
firms in similar stages in the supply chain, i.e. in competitive relationships. Vertical spillovers,
on the other hand, are spillovers that arise between firms in supplier-customer relationships,
i.e. in different stages of the supply chain. In this case, the literature differentiates between
backward spillovers, linkages between multinationals and their local suppliers, and forward
spillovers, linkages between multinationals and their domestic customers. Figure 3.1 illustrates
these different spillovers in the supply chain.
Spillovers can be transmitted through a number of channels. In an early study, Teece (1977)
identifies two channels: technology demonstration or imitation and labour mobility. Through
demonstration or imitation, domestic firms are stimulated to adopt a specific technology after
observing a foreign competitor using this technology. However, MNEs may anticipate this and
3.1 Introduction 97
choose not to bring their state-of-the-art technology when investing abroad (Glass and Saggi,
1998). The second channel, labour mobility, allows local firms to benefit from the knowledge
of employees that were previously employed by MNEs. It may also entail a brain drain of
local talent when MNEs attract the best domestic workers (Blalock and Gertler, 2008). In
addition to these channels, Crespo and Fontoura (2007) point to three other channels of spillover
transmission: exports, competition and backward and forward linkages. The first channel refers
to the benefits that domestic firms can reap by following in the footsteps of foreign exporters.
Increased competition pushes domestic firms to become more productive but it can also result
in market-stealing effects (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). The final channel refers to technology
transmission through vertical linkages between multinationals and local firms. The idea behind
backward spillovers is that MNEs provide assistance to their domestic suppliers, which in turn
deliver inputs of a higher quality or at lower cost. Nevertheless, work by Rodriguez-Clare (1996)
reveals that this type of linkages can also be detrimental, for example when the quality of the
inputs supplied does not suffice. Forward spillovers can be positive when the inputs supplied by
MNEs are of a higher quality or negative when these inputs are less compatible.2 From this brief
overview one can infer that spillovers can be positive or negative, depending on the different
channels and effects at play.
Horizontal spillovers have received widespread attention at least since Caves (1974). Verti-
cal spillovers were first introduced by McAleese and McDonald (1978) and Lall (1980), after
which the discussion about them languished for nearly two decades before theoretical work
by Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1999) and empirical work by Javor-
cik (2004) revived the interest (see also Schoors and van der Tol, 2002). Since then, vertical
spillovers, and especially backward spillovers are regarded as a more likely channel for (positive)
productivity spillovers because MNEs have an interest in collaborating closely with their sup-
pliers. The overall empirical evidence on all FDI spillovers is mixed (see the literature surveys
by Görg and Greenaway (2004); Crespo and Fontoura (2007); Meyer and Sinani (2009); and
Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) for a detailed discussion). However, based on a meta-analysis
of 3626 estimates of vertical spillovers, Havranek and Irsova (2011) do confirm that the average
spillover to suppliers (backward) is economically significant, forward spillovers do not receive
similar support by the meta-analysis.
In most empirical work, the measure to capture the horizontal spillover potential is defined
as the share of output in a given industry that is produced by foreign firms (following Caves,
1974). Because firm-level data on linkages with foreign affiliates are usually unavailable, the
2See Crespo and Fontoura (2007) for more details on the different channels and potential effects of horizontal
and vertical spillovers.
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measures to capture the vertical spillover potential are calculated as a weighted average of foreign
presence (measured by the horizontal spillover variable) in industries upstream and downstream
of a domestic firm in a given industry (this approach follows Javorcik, 2004). The weights are
derived from input-output (IO) tables. For each industry, they reflect the share of input (output)
that is sourced from (sold to) other industries. Therefore, horizontal spillovers are labelled
intra-industry spillovers and vertical spillovers inter-industry spillovers. IO-tables are thus used
to put an explicit industry structure on the intuition in Figure 3.1. Therefore the level of industry
aggregation in the IO-tables determines which linkages are classified as vertical. Clearly, the
more aggregated the IO-tables used, the more likely some supplier-customer relationships will
be incorrectly classified as horizontal. Furthermore, following the standard in the literature,
these linkages will be excluded from the vertical spillover measures. This observation becomes
even more relevant in the light of an increasingly fragmented production chain. As a result,
working on a too aggregated level might result in an underestimation of backward spillover
effects and complicates the interpretation of horizontal spillover effects that will partly reflect
supplier-customer relationships. Recent work by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) makes a similar
point in a closely related matter: the classification of multinational firms’ investment as horizontal
or vertical. For a large sample of multinational firms, they show that due to a finer level of detail
in industry classification a lot more multinational investment should be classified as vertical
rather than horizontal.
In this paper, we analyse the impact of the level of industry aggregation on horizontal and
vertical spillovers by calculating spillover variables for different industry classifications (aggre-
gated and detailed). Furthermore, we elaborate on the standard measures for spillovers in order
to link them more closely to our intuitive understanding of the channels in Figure 3.1. We use
a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms, a series of detailed IO-tables and a series of these
tables collapsed to a higher level of industry aggregation. We find that evidence of positive and
statistically significant backward spillovers is much stronger for detailed than for aggregated
input-output tables. The impact of horizontal spillovers, on the other hand, is found to be much
larger and positive for aggregated input-output tables. These results hold for both the standard
methodology to calculate spillover variables and an alternative approach that consists of including
within-industry intermediate supply and use in the calculation of the vertical spillover variables.
The latter seems to have the biggest impact for the results based on the detailed input-output
tables, where horizontal spillovers disappear after including within-industry intermediate supply
and use. Calculating vertical spillover variables by combining aggregated IO-tables with detailed
horizontal spillover variables does not affect our conclusions. The use of detailed tables results
in larger total spillover effects.
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Other studies explore the spillover effects from FDI in Romania as well. Most of these stud-
ies, however, focus on how domestic firm heterogeneity is related to the spillovers that emerge.
Gorodnichenko et al. (2007), for example, consider firm age, firm size, absorptive capacity, the
quality of the investment (e.g. country of origin) and institutions (e.g. bureaucratic red tape).
Overall, their results point to positive backward spillovers. Nicolini and Resmini (2010) look
into the size, productivity level and level of absorptive capacity of domestic companies and also
find positive spillovers. Finally, Damijan et al. (2013) examine how firms that differ in terms
of size, absorptive capacity, technology and productivity levels are affected by multinational
activity. In this paper, we do not consider these issues but instead focus on a better understanding
of spillover measurement and its implications.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides a discussion of spillover
measurement and the role of the supply chain and industry classification in input-output tables.
In Section 3.3, the empirical approach and data are described. Section 3.4 presents estimation
results and Section 3.5 concludes by summarising our key findings.
3.2 Spillover Measurement
The methodology to calculate variables that capture FDI spillover potential draws on work by
Caves (1974) and Javorcik (2004). These measures have been used by almost all studies on
FDI spillovers. Barrios et al. (2011) is the only other work we are aware of that analyses the
construction of spillover variables and its implications for the results obtained. Our approach
differs from theirs by focusing on the role of industry aggregation. In this Section, we first present
the ‘classic’ or standard spillover definitions and discuss the impact of the level of industry
aggregation in the IO-tables in this framework. We then present a modification to these standard
definitions of spillover variables to have them better reflect our understanding of Figure 3.1.
Horizontal or intra-industry spillover variables are typically computed as follows:
Horizontal jt =
∑
i∈ j
ForeignShareit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(3.1)
where Yit is output produced by firm i in industry j in year t and ForeignShareit is the share
of foreign participation in firm i in year t. For a firm to be classified as foreign at least a single
foreign investor with at least 10% of shares is required.3 Horizontal jt then captures the degree
3To construct this variable, we calculate the share of foreign participation for each firm and set this share to zero
if it is less than 10 percent. The other values remain unchanged.
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of foreign presence in industry j at time t by the share of industry j’s output produced by foreign
companies.
The backward spillover variable for industry j measures foreign presence in industries c
supplied by industry j at time t and is typically calculated as follows:
Backward jt = ∑
c if c6= j
γ jct ∗Horizontalct (3.2)
Backward jt is a weighted average of Horizontal in the sourcing industries c, where the
weights are the input-output coefficients γ jct , i.e. the share of industry j’s total intermediate
supply that is supplied to each industry c. These coefficients are derived from input-output
tables for intermediate consumption (typically final uses are not taken into account).4 Following
Javorcik (2004), inputs supplied within the same industry are commonly omitted from the vertical
spillover variables as these inputs are already accounted for by the horizontal spillover (hence
c 6= j). Backward serves as a proxy for the potential linkages between MNEs and their local
suppliers. The forward spillover variable for industry j is constructed in a similar way:
Forward jt = ∑
r if r 6= j
δ jrt ∗Horizontalrt (3.3)
In this case, the input-output coefficients δ jrt correspond to the share of industry j’s inputs
purchased from industries r at time t. Inputs sourced within the same industry are excluded
(r 6= j). The forward spillover is a proxy for potential linkages between multinational firms and
local clients.
Spillover variables presented in equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) are calculated at the industry-
level and not at the firm-level because of the typical non-availability of firm-level data on
linkages between companies. Vacek (2010) does examine firm-level FDI spillovers through
backward and forward linkages using a smaller panel of Czech manufacturing firms for which
data were collected from a survey. He finds positive and significant backward spillovers at the
firm-level, as opposed to the industry-level (NACE 2-digit)5 where no spillover effects were
found.6 However, the use of firm-level data on linkages between companies causes endogeneity
issues when multinationals choose the best local firms as suppliers. In this case, industry-level
linkages based on input-output tables are likely the most suitable instrument as firms are less
4In the analysis of R&D spillovers, weights derived from IO-tables are used as well (e.g. Cerulli and Potì, 2009).
5Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes (revision 1.1).
6These findings are in line with the empirical results presented in Section 3.4 in this paper.
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likely to switch industries when selecting a supplier. The above mentioned definitions thus put an
explicit industry structure on the spillovers defined in Figure 3.1. Because these definitions rely
on information from input-output tables (the γs and δ s in equations (3.2) and (3.3)) and inputs
supplied within the same industry are commonly excluded, the level of industry aggregation
found in the IO-tables will determine the characterisation of linkages between foreign and
domestic firms as either horizontal or vertical.
As indicated above, the literature on FDI spillovers initially focused on horizontal spillover
effects. In a number of theoretical contributions and case studies, however, emphasis was put on
vertical linkages between MNEs and domestic firms. Markusen and Venables (1999) and Lin
and Saggi (2004), for example, develop theoretical models that capture both intra-industry com-
petition effects of MNEs on domestic producers of final goods and linkage effects to domestic
producers of intermediate goods. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) also discusses linkage effects of MNEs
and finds that these are positive when the variety of intermediates produced does not differer
much between the home and host country, when MNEs use intermediates intensively and when
the communication costs between the headquarters and production plant are high. Based on these
theoretical contributions, empirical studies aimed to capture vertical linkages between firms from
data. In this regard, Schoors and van der Tol (2002) proposed to make use of input-output data to
empirically assess backward and forward linkages in Hungary. The spillover measures introduced
by Javorcik (2004) also rely on input-output tables to model vertical linkages between firms.
This implies that the backward and forward industry-level spillover variables are introduced to
serve as proxies for the underlying firm-level relationships. Importantly, the level of industry
aggregation in the input-output tables used to calculate the spillover variables thus essentially
determines which linkages are considered horizontal or vertical (and in that way also has an
important impact on estimation results as the identification in the data results from variation
across industries). More detailed input-output tables may thus provide a better understanding of
the ‘actual’ relationships between firms. A more detailed analysis of these spillover measures
therefore seems appropriate.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the level of industry aggregation affects the classification of
spillovers in horizontal and vertical effects. The upper panel of Figure 3.2 shows a stylised
input-output table with an aggregated industry classification; the lower panel depicts a stylised
IO-table with a more disaggregated classification. In the aggregated IO-table only three industries
can be distinguished (1, 2 and 3), while in the detailed IO-table in the bottom panel, six different
industries are found (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b). When input-output tables are used to construct
backward and forward spillovers, within-industry supply and use are typically excluded (cf.
equations (3.2) and (3.3)). In practice, the coefficients on the diagonal of the input-output table
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Figure 3.2: Stylised input-output tables at varying levels of industry aggregation.
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(grey areas in Figure 3.2) are set to zero. A comparison of the two IO-tables presented in Figure
3.2 reveals that the diagonal is much slimmer in the detailed table than in the aggregated table.
This implies that a number of linkages between firms that are regarded as horizontal (representing
competitive relationships) are of a vertical nature when these linkages are studied in more detail
(representing supplier-customer relationships). These linkages will be excluded from the vertical
spillover variables if spillovers are calculated with the aggregated IO-table at hand. For example,
the relationships between firms in industries 1a and 1b will be considered as horizontal at the
aggregated level but vertical at the detailed level.
The implications of these notions are striking. Because the detailed IO-table allows for finer
sourcing and supplying patterns, more linkages will be classified as vertical than on the basis of
the aggregated IO-table. In addition, the detailed table also allows for a more accurate detection
of sourcing from and foreign presence in industries that are vertically linked in the aggregated
table. Since industry 1a cannot be distinguished from 1b in the upper IO-table when calculating
backward spillovers for industry 2 or 3, there will be an aggregated backward spillover from
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industry 1 that masks potential differences between industries 1a and 1b.7 If there is a substantial
variation in the coefficients and foreign presence between the a- and b-parts of industries, the
availability of a more detailed input-output table is likely to affect the backward and forward
spillover variables as well.
Based on the analysis of Figure 3.2, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, to disentangle
horizontal from vertical spillovers, the level of industry aggregation in the input-output tables is
of crucial importance. Second, by computing spillover effects from more aggregated input-output
tables, several linkages between firms are incorrectly classified as horizontal rather than vertical.
Consequently, using sufficiently detailed input-output tables in the analysis of FDI spillovers
is of great importance. In order to test whether the industry classification in the input-output
tables affects the size and significance of FDI spillovers and in particular the backward spillover
effects, we will compare estimation results using spillover variables based on aggregated and
detailed IO-tables. Our first test will consist of applying the methodology that is commonly
used in the field (equations (3.1)-(3.3), henceforth referred to as the zero-diagonal definition for
the vertical spillovers) to analyse the impact of the level of aggregation of the IO-tables in the
standard framework.
How important are these effects? In order to gain more insight, we look into our data on
Romania. We use IO-tables for the Romanian economy that consist of 105 industries (detailed
IO-table henceforth) which roughly correspond to the NACE 3-digit classification. Out of
these 105 industries, 61 are manufacturing industries.8 A series of input-output tables (one for
each year in the panel) and a conversion table, listing the mapping of the Romanian industry
classification into the NACE 2-digit and NACE 3-digit classification schemes, were obtained
from the Romanian Statistical Office (RSO). In order to study the impact of industry aggregation
on spillovers, we collapse the detailed IO-tables to the NACE 2-digit level (aggregated IO-table
henceforth) and calculate horizontal and vertical spillovers on the basis of both aggregated and
detailed IO-tables.
In terms of Figure 3.2, the detailed table for the year 2005 reveals for NACE 2-digit industries
15 (food), 24 (chemicals), and 26 (non-metallic mineral products) -which have nine, seven,
and eight 3-digit sub-industries respectively- that the off-diagonal elements within the same
2-digit industry account for 26, 47, and 37 percent of the within NACE 2-digit intermediate
supply. As a share of total intermediate supply, the numbers are 12.1, 6.5, and 4.3 percent. For
7Suppose industry 2(a/b) is a big supplier of industry 1b but not of 1a, and that there is a large foreign presence
in 1b but not in 1a. This type of information is likely to be largely lost in the aggregated input-output table because
both the input-output coefficient and the Horizontal-variable will refer to the entire industry 1.
8For the industries “Processing of nuclear combustibles” and “Armament and ammunition” there are no data
available, reducing the number of manufacturing industries to 59.
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sub-industries, on average about 87% of firms in the same NACE 2-digit industry belongs to a
different NACE 3-digit sub-industry. These examples clearly point to the importance of using
detailed IO-tables. Due to data availability, many researchers in the FDI spillover literature
use harmonised input-output tables provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), Eurostat, or the World Input-Output Database (WIOD, see Timmer
(2012)), which are fairly aggregated. More specifically, the dimension of the OECD IO-tables
is 48x48 industries. Out of these 48 industries, 22 are manufacturing industries. Eurostat
input-output tables typically have a 59x59 dimension (i.e. the NACE 2-digit classification). 23
out of the 59 industries are manufacturing industries. The WIOD input-output tables have a
dimension of 35x35 industries, of which 14 industries are manufacturing industries. The World
Input-Output Database comprises national and world IO-tables, which allows one to track (the
value of) the output produced by an industry in one country used as inputs in specific industries
in other countries (Dietzenbacher et al., 2013). WIOD is one out of five global multi-regional
input-output databases that are currently available (a detailed overview of these databases is
provided by Tukker and Dietzenbacher, 2013).
As indicated above, as a first test of the impact of the industry aggregation in the IO-tables on
the size and significance of FDI spillovers we construct spillover variables using the traditional
approach. This implies that within-industry intermediate supply and use are not included in
the backward and forward spillover variables (the zero-diagonal definition). However, if one
interprets vertical spillover effects as originating from supplier-client relationships and horizontal
spillover effects as results of competitive relationships, the traditional approach is characterised
by a potential underestimation of vertical linkages. Although within-industry supply and use
refer to sales and purchases within the same sector, these linkages still involve supplier-client
relationships. That is why we propose a second approach where we do include within-industry
intermediate supply and use in the calculation of backward and forward spillover variables (la-
belled the non-zero-diagonal definition of vertical spillover variables henceforth). This alternative
approach is motivated by our intuitive interpretation of spillover effects separated in those origi-
nating from supplier-client relationships and those originating from competitive relationships,
with the former offering more potential for positive spillover effects. Therefore, we measure
backward spillover variables as ∑c γ jct ∗ Horizontalct rather than ∑c if c6= j γ jct ∗ Horizontalct as
in (3.2) and, similarly, forward spillover variables as ∑r γ jrt ∗ Horizontalrt . We then combine tra-
ditional horizontal spillover variables with our alternative vertical spillover variables to evaluate
the impact of industry aggregation on FDI spillover effects. These notions may have important
implications as even in our detailed IO-tables diagonal elements are non-negligible (in 2005 on
average about 15% of intermediate supply by manufacturing industries is within the same NACE
3-digit industry).
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Figure 3.3: Box plot of backward spillover variables calculated using aggregated and detailed
input-output tables and both the zero- and non-zero-diagonal approach for the period 1996-2005.
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Figure 3.4: Box plot of horizontal spillover variables calculated using aggregated and detailed
input-output tables for the period 1996-2005.
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The box plots presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the distribution and values of various
backward and horizontal spillover variables over the sample period. The box plots draw on
industry-level data derived from the firm-level sample, covering 23 manufacturing industries
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at the aggregated level and 59 manufacturing industries at the detailed level for the period
1996-2005. In both Figures, the horizontal line within a box represents the median, the edges
of the box indicate the first and third quartile and the whiskers of a box show all values that
fall within 3/2 times the interquartile range of the first and third quartiles (thus also indicating
the minimum and maximum values when outliers are not taken into account). The dots in
the Figures present values that fall outside the range marked by the whiskers, these points are
outliers. Figure 3.3 shows backward spillover variables computed according to the zero-diagonal
definition (3.2) for both the aggregated and detailed input-output tables and based on the non-
zero-diagonal definition for the detailed input-output tables. In the Figure, the value of the
spillover variables tends to increase with the different definitions. Going from the zero-diagonal
aggregated IO-tables to the zero-diagonal detailed IO-tables implies an increase, because the
pool of non-diagonal elements rises. Subsequently making use of the non-zero-diagonal detailed
definition induces a further increase, because the non-zero-diagonal elements are accounted
for as well. Changing from aggregated to detailed coefficients also implies an increase in the
dispersion of the backward variable. Figure 3.4 shows horizontal spillover variables, computed
according to equation (3.1), for both detailed and aggregated IO-tables. As expected, detailed
input-output tables are associated with a larger dispersion than aggregated tables, but not with
larger values. Both Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the rising importance of foreign firms in the
Romanian economy over the sample period as well.
3.3 Methodology and Data
3.3.1 Methodology
Following Javorcik (2004), FDI spillovers are typically analysed in a production function frame-
work where FDI spillover variables are introduced as additional inputs in a production function.
The literature typically follows a two-step procedure where a measure of total factor productivity
(TFP) is obtained in the first step. In the second step, the TFP measure is then related to a set of
FDI spillover variables (horizontal, backward and forward) and a set of control variables.
The first step, the estimation of TFP, is complicated by endogeneity of inputs, since the
input choices of a firm are likely to be based on its productivity (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995).
Therefore, the estimation of productions functions using OLS or fixed-effects (FE) yields biased
estimates of factor shares and productivity (i.e. the labour and materials coefficients are overesti-
mated, the capital coefficient is underestimated). That is why a number of alternative estimation
methods have been developed that can be used to obtain an unbiased estimate of TFP. The most
popular methodologies are the dynamic panel data method by Blundell and Bond (1998) (DPD)
(based on GMM) and the semi-parametric approaches by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP). In the semi-parametric approaches, a proxy is introduced to
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handle the endogeneity bias. OP use investment as a proxy for productivity9, while LP opt for
material inputs.
The semi-parametric approaches estimate a linearised Cobb-Douglas production function as
shown in equation (3.4) (with output y, labour l, capital k and materials m (in logs) for firm i
at time t, productivity ωit is unobserved). To obtain an unbiased productivity measure, Olley
and Pakes (1996) start from the investment equation which relates a firm’s investment to its
productivity, age and capital inputs. The investment equation can be inverted non-parametrically
to arrive at an expression for productivity as an unknown function f of the other variables. This
expression is then substituted into the production function so that the labour coefficient βl and
the materials coefficient βm can be identified in a first stage. Note that the unknown function f
can be approximated parametrically by a polynomial in the proxy variable and capital. Then,
the capital coefficient βk is estimated using (implicitly defined) lagged productivity in a second
stage. Using all these estimated coefficients, an unbiased measure of productivity for firm i in
industry j at time t is derived as the difference between output and labour, capital and materials
multiplied by their estimated coefficients, see equation (3.5). We estimate production functions
by NACE 2-digit industry j in period 1996-2005.
yit = β0 +βllit +βkkit +βmmit +ωit + εit (3.4)
tfpi jt = yi jt− βˆl jli jt− βˆk jki jt− βˆm jmi jt (3.5)
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) follow a highly similar procedure but make use of the material
demand equation instead of the investment equation. They argue that investment is not a good
proxy because it is lumpy and it does not respond smoothly to productivity shocks (see also
Petrin et al., 2004). More recently, Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF) proposed an alternative
semi-parametric procedure to deal with potential collinearity issues in OP and LP. Specifically,
they contend that labour l is likely to be collinear with the polynomial in the proxy and capital
(which is obtained after inverting the investment and material demand equations for OP and LP,
respectively). Therefore, in the ACF procedure, labour is no longer determined in the first stage.
For more details on the OP, LP and ACF methodology, we refer to Ornaghi and Van Beveren
(2011). As the discussion on the most appropriate estimation method is still ongoing, we test
robustness of the TFP estimates with respect to alternative estimators.10 We also test robustness
9We apply the procedure from Amiti and Konings (2007) to compute investment from our data.
10Other recent efforts include TFP estimation based on firm-level quantity data (TFPQ) rather than deflated
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with respect to the functional form and replace the Cobb-Douglas specification with a translog
specification (TL) estimated by OLS.
Following the first step that involved the estimation of total factor productivity, we continue
by relating this TFP measure (of firm i in industry j at time t, in logs) to a set of FDI spillover
variables (FDI jt−1) and a set of controls (Zi jt). The spillover variables are lagged because foreign
entry is not expected to affect domestic firm productivity immediately. We specify equation (3.6)
as our basic-level model.
tfpi jt = αi +ψ1 f (FDI jt−1)+ψ2Zi jt +ξi jt (3.6)
Equation (3.6) is first-differenced and industry α j, region αr and time αt dummies are added,
which results in equation (3.7). The procedure of using first differences and then introducing
these dummy variables dates back to Haskel et al. (2007). Taking first-differences eliminates
the fixed effects and other time-invariant variables. Time, industry and region dummies are
added to capture unobserved factors driving TFP growth (e.g. the changing attractiveness of a
region throughout the sample period, see Javorcik, 2004).11 Equation (3.7) pools domestic firms
from all manufacturing industries and is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the
industry-year level because most variables are defined at the industry-level while estimation is at
the firm-level (Moulton, 1990).
∆tfpi jt = ψ
′
1∆ f (FDI jt−1)+ψ
′
2∆Zi jt +α j +αr +αt + εi jt (3.7)
The set of control variables Zi jt consists of firm age, the lagged level of firm size (measured
by real output), a Herfindahl index of industry competition, an index of downstream demand, and
industry controls for import competition, export intensity and the importance of intermediates
(measured by the share of intermediate supply in total industry output). The downstream demand
index is included because downstream foreign entry could increase demand for intermediate
products which might result in scale economies. To separate this effect, we construct demand for
intermediates following Javorcik (2004) as demand jt = ∑k a jk ∗Ykt where α jk is the IO-matrix
coefficient indicating that in order to produce one unit of good k, α jk units of good j are needed.
revenue data (TFPR). Unfortunately, we have no data on quantities. Our results should therefore be interpreted
bearing this caveat in mind.
11The inclusion of industry and region dummies is also important in our case because Romania is going through
a transformation process during the sample period. Romania’s industrial structure was distorted due to communist
preferences and obtaining a similar level of economic development across regions was also an explicit policy goal
(see Ronnås, 1984).
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Ykt stands for industry k output deflated by an industry-specific deflator. The controls for import
competition and export intensity are constructed similarly: industry imports/exports divided by
total industry supply, respectively. The data used to construct these two controls and the control
for the intermediates are taken from the IO-tables. Note that firm age and the lagged level of
firm size are introduced in levels not in differences in equation (3.7).
Although this two-step estimation procedure is used extensively in the FDI spillover liter-
ature, there are some caveats that researchers have to be aware of. Dumont et al. (2005) and
Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) stress that total factor productivity is an estimate obtained from
a Cobb-Douglas production function rather than an observable variable. In the estimation of
TFP, several assumptions and generalisations are made that potentially result in inconsistencies
and misspecification. These issues, however, are overlooked in the majority of work that uses
TFP estimates (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). Furthermore, intuitively the assumption that TFP
is unobservable to the researcher in the first equation of the two-step estimation procedure but
observable in the second equation seems to be inconsistent. With these issues in mind, Eberhardt
and Helmers (2010) suggest that more attention should be paid to the estimated elasticities of
capital, labour and materials and to the TFP measure that researchers select for their empirical
analysis. Dumont et al. (2005) take another perspective and propose a method to correct the
standard errors obtained in the estimation of the second step (i.e. in which the TFP estimate
is introduced as the dependent variable) that builds on Feenstra and Hanson (1999). Because
the ‘true’ value of productivity is not observed, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) indicate that the
estimation of TFP results in additional variance that also has to be considered in the estimation
of the second step. This implies that the standard errors in the second step have to be adjusted to
capture this additional variance. The correction procedure proposed by Feenstra and Hanson
(1999), however, can lead to negative variances. Dumont et al. (2005) therefore come up with
an alternative methodology that provides positive variances. In this paper, we take into account
that TFP is estimated by running a bootstrap procedure on our second-step estimations. This
approach further strengthens our empirical results. The results of the bootstrapping procedure
are briefly discussed after each analysis and available on request.
The methodology adopted in this paper is in line with the work of Havranek and Irsova
(2011), who define ‘best practice’ in the FDI spillover literature as a study that uses firm-level
data, computes TFP by a method that accounts for the endogeneity of input demand, estimates
the regression in differences and controls for sector fixed effects, sector competition, and demand
in downstream sectors. The adoption of this ‘best practice’ framework allows us to assess
the impact of industry aggregation in the IO-tables and the spillover variables definitions in a
transparent way, as this prevents the methodology used to affect results.
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3.3.2 Data
We use a panel of Romanian firms to analyse FDI spillover effects from firms in manufacturing
and services industries on manufacturing firms. The data span the period 1996-2005 and are
limited to firms with at least five employees on average. The set was further trimmed for outliers
by removing the top and bottom percentiles of the annual growth rates of real operating revenues,
real capital, labour, and real material inputs.12 Data are drawn from the Amadeus database by
Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. The Amadeus database holds financial and ownership in-
formation on public and private companies across Europe (Bureau Van Dijk, 2011). The subset of
Romanian firms in the Amadeus database is known for its excellent coverage (see e.g. Altomonte
and Colantone, 2008). In order to get a full overview of financials and ownership through time,
multiple DVDs published by Bureau Van Dijk are used to construct the database.13 Nominal data
are deflated with industry price-level data at NACE 2-digit level. Price-level data are extracted
from the Statistical Yearbook of the Romanian Statistical Office (RSO, 2005) and the Indus-
trial Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(WIIW, 2007). To construct real output (Y), operating revenues are deflated with industry-level
producer price indices. Labour (L) equals the number of employees. Real capital (K) is tangible
fixed assets deflated by the average of the following industry deflators: machinery and equipment
(NACE 2-digit 29), office machinery and computing (30), electrical machinery and apparatus
(31), motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) and other transport equipment (35). Real
material inputs (M) are obtained by deflating material inputs with a weighted intermediate input
deflator, where weights are based on the IO-tables. As indicated above, IO-tables in a Romanian
industry code classification (approximately NACE 3-digit) were obtained from the RSO. Since
we have a time-series of input-output tables, the input-output coefficients used in our analysis
are time-varying.
Foreign investment started to enter Romania in the late 1990s, after several privatisation and
market access reforms had been conducted (UNCTAD, 2003). Macroeconomic stabilisation, an
improved business environment and EU candidacy resulted in another sharp increase in FDI in-
flows from 2004 onwards, turning Romania into one of the main recipients of foreign investment
in South-East Europe (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD, 2005). In Romania, FDI is concentrated in the
manufacturing industries and the main investors are European countries (80% of the total FDI
stock) (Pauwels and Ionita, 2008).
12If the ‘outlier’ is the first or last observation for a specific firm and other data points are normal, the other
firm-year data are kept. If not, all observations for this firm are dropped from the data set. To exclude that the
outliers we dropped from our sample are not data errors (cf. Wagner (2012)), we re-ran our estimations using the
non-trimmed data set (with OP TFP as a dependent variable). The results obtained from this analysis are very
similar to the results reported in this paper, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
13A single issue of the database is a snapshot in terms of the ownership information and firms that exit are dropped
fairly rapidly from the database.
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Table 3.1: Overview of the number of firms, entry, exit and the penetration of foreign firms in
the sample by year (period 1996-2005).
All firms Of which foreign firms
#firms entry exit #firms entry exit penetration
1996 14390 2240 0.16
1997 15610 1054 91 2608 312 32 0.17
1998 16759 995 190 2997 327 59 0.18
1999 18040 1197 761 3451 370 169 0.19
2000 19464 1845 301 3926 472 72 0.20
2001 20891 1374 506 4443 445 118 0.21
2002 21896 1224 988 4778 332 305 0.22
2003 22561 1335 2444 4881 297 490 0.21
2004 21508 1065 562 4817 313 168 0.22
2005 20946 4651 0.22
Some summary statistics of the data are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Table 3.1 lists the
annual number of firms and the entry and exit for all firms and for the sub-sample of foreign firms.
The percentage of foreign-owned firms increases from 16% in 1996 to 22% in 2005. The 2003
exit rate is high, but this pattern is confirmed by the pattern in the Romanian Trade Register (Trade
Register data also include agriculture and services though). Table 3.2 presents summary statistics
for domestic and foreign firms. The stylised facts commonly found in the literature are confirmed
in our data set. Foreign firms are larger in terms of employment and capital, produce more output
and are more productive (across different TFP estimation techniques). Also in growth terms
foreign firms outperform domestic firms. The negative averages for the first-differenced variables
are mainly caused by the observations in the late 1990s when the Romanian economy was in a
severe recession. The different TFP estimates show high correlations (correlations vary between
0.53 and 0.87).14 We further evaluate whether the differences between domestic and foreign
firms are statistically significant. Two samples t-tests of each of the firm-level variables reveal
that in each case the null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected (at the 1% level, p-values
equal to zero). This implies that foreign firms are significantly younger, use significantly more
capital, employment and materials and generate significantly more output than domestic firms.
In addition, based on two samples t-tests of equality of means, foreign firms are also found to be
significantly more productive for each of the TFP measures and to have a significantly higher
TFP growth (at the 1% level, p-values equal to zero). Table 3.2 further shows shows summary
statistics for the industry-level control variables and the spillover variables (in the two bottom
panels of the Table). In terms of mean values, the spillover variables do not differ much between
14Note that the LP, ACF, and TL measures are value-added based, whereas the others are output based.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of the various TFP measures, the firm-level and industry-level
control variables and the industry-level spillover variables for the period 1996-2005.
Domestic firms Foreign firms
levels first diff. levels first diff.
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Firm-level variables
log real output (firm size) 13.46 2.02 -0.14 0.95 14.32 2.15 -0.05 0.99
log employment 2.80 1.42 0.03 0.53 3.46 1.61 0.05 0.59
log real capital 11.83 2.37 -0.10 1.00 12.98 2.40 -0.09 0.91
log real materials 12.80 2.27 -0.14 1.11 13.33 2.57 -0.06 1.24
firm age 6.43 3.57 5.12 3.48
Total factor productivity (TFP)
log tfp OP 1.90 0.88 -0.01 0.40 2.08 1.00 0.02 0.49
log tfp LP 6.68 1.69 -0.02 0.90 7.09 1.62 0.05 0.89
log tfp ACF 5.52 1.43 -0.04 0.88 5.86 1.39 -0.03 0.83
log tfp DPD 2.07 1.31 -0.00 0.40 2.31 1.39 0.02 0.50
log tfp FE 1.82 0.95 -0.01 0.40 2.13 1.18 0.02 0.50
log tfp TL 6.07 2.19 -0.00 0.37 6.30 2.18 0.02 0.45
Aggregated Detailed
levels first diff. levels first diff.
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Spillover variables
horizontal 0.27 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.25 0.20 0.03 0.06
backward zero-diagonal 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.03
backward non-zero-diagonal 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.04
forward zero-diagonal 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03
forward non-zero-diagonal 0.24 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.04
Industry-level controls
Herfindahl index 234.1 326.3 -15.8 271.5 419.7 674.8 -20.9 494.0
demand index (logs) 23.69 0.69 -0.14 0.33 23.39 0.67 -0.12 0.44
import competition 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.19 0.01 0.03
export intensity 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.04
intermediates 0.41 0.23 -0.00 0.04 0.43 0.25 -0.00 0.05
aggregated and detailed IO-tables. Including the non-diagonal elements does result in larger
averages and standard deviations for vertical spillover variables. For a more detailed overview of
(the changes in) the size of the spillover variables we refer to Figures 3.3 and 3.4 above. Finally,
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the bottom panel of Table 3.2 shows summary statistics of the industry controls presented for
both the aggregated and detailed industry aggregations. These controls are stable across the level
of aggregation.
3.4 Empirical Results
This Section presents results of the estimation of specification (3.7) using different definitions of
horizontal and vertical spillovers. In all Tables, OLS estimates are shown for a panel of domestic
Romanian manufacturing firms with on average more than five employees over the 1996-2005
period. Following (3.7), we relate first-differenced firm-level TFP to a set of FDI spillovers
(horizontal, backward and forward), a set of control variables and a set of dummy variables.15
The dependent variable TFP is obtained from production function estimates by NACE 2-digit
industry. Column headings indicate alternative estimation methodologies and functional forms
of the production function. We show results for TFP measures based on Cobb-Douglas speci-
fications applying the OP, LP, ACF, DPD and fixed effects (FE) estimators in columns 1-5. In
column 6, the TFP measure is obtained from a translog specification (TL) estimated by OLS.
All regressions include time, region and industry dummies. Further control variables included
are firm age, firm size, a downstream demand index, a Herfindahl index of industry competition,
import competition, export intensity and the share of intermediate supply in total industry output.
The industry-level controls are defined according to the industry-level in the IO-tables used to
calculate spillover variables.
For the sake of clarity and in order to keep the tables manageable, we do not present results for
the control variables and dummies. An analysis of the results for the control variables shows that
the estimates are highly similar over all sets of estimations. In most cases, the Herfindahl index
for industry competition is insignificant. When the index is statistically significant it is positive.
Javorcik (2004) reaches the same conclusion for Lithuania, while Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008)
find a negative relation for Romania, though for a different time period. The control for the
importance of intermediates for an industry turns out to be positive and statistically significant,
with coefficients that vary between 0.621 and 2.050. Firm size is significantly negative and
ranges between -0.017 and -0.064 which is in line with Nicolini and Resmini (2010). Firm age is
significant and positive, but the estimated coefficients are very small (0.002-0.010). None of the
remaining control variables are statistically significant.
Table 3.3 presents results using ‘standard’ spillovers definitions (3.1) to (3.3) (zero-diagonal
definition). The upper panel of the Table contains results for spillovers calculated at the aggre-
gated industry-level (NACE 2-digit); the lower panel shows spillovers calculated at the detailed
15Reintroducing firm-fixed effects in the first-differenced specification yields similar results.
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Table 3.3: Horizontal and vertical spillovers from all firms on Romanian manufacturing firms.
The vertical spillovers are calculated using the traditional zero-diagonal definition.
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.546** 1.785** 1.801** 0.516** 0.524** 0.552**
[0.245] [0.733] [0.728] [0.245] [0.242] [0.248]
backward 1.178* 1.991 2.102 1.133* 1.166* 1.050
[0.696] [1.692] [1.674] [0.679] [0.689] [0.691]
forward -1.411* -3.404 -3.372 -1.362* -1.404* -1.344*
[0.790] [2.129] [2.117] [0.786] [0.782] [0.791]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.067 0.081 0.082 0.063 0.062 0.072
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.352** 1.162** 1.175*** 0.334** 0.335** 0.354**
[0.167] [0.452] [0.448] [0.168] [0.168] [0.167]
backward 1.010*** 2.063** 2.072** 1.027*** 1.006*** 0.982***
[0.318] [0.946] [0.931] [0.314] [0.314] [0.315]
forward -0.756 -1.475 -1.440 -0.731 -0.765 -0.730
[0.565] [1.526] [1.518] [0.565] [0.564] [0.564]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.066 0.077 0.078 0.063 0.062 0.072
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees for the years 1996-2005. The
vertical spillover variables are calculated using the zero-diagonal definition. Regressions include time,
industry and region dummies; control variables included are firm age, firm size, industry competition,
downstream demand, import competition, export intensity and the importance of intermediates. Standard
errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
industry-level (Romanian classification mapped into NACE 3-digit). At the aggregated level,
we observe significant positive horizontal spillovers and marginally significant negative forward
spillovers. There is also limited evidence of significant positive backward spillover effects. From
the Table it is clear that results are not driven by a specific methodology to obtain TFP. The
bottom panel presents results for spillover variables based on the detailed input-output tables.
Switching to this more detailed industry classification has considerable implications. Forward
spillovers are still negative, but no longer statistically significant. The horizontal effects remain
positive and significant, but point estimates decrease by about 40% (e.g. from 0.546 to 0.352 for
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OP TFP). The most important impact of switching from aggregated to detailed IO-tables is on
the backward spillovers. Point estimates are somewhat smaller (drop from 1.178 to 1.010 for OP
TFP), but the effects are now highly significant (at the 1% level). Estimation results therefore
clearly vary with the industry aggregation in the IO-tables and results seem to suggest that the
use of too aggregated IO-tables tends to increase the impact of horizontal spillovers (both in
size and significance) while the importance of backward spillovers is underrated (effects are
hardly significant). This is likely to be driven by our observation in Section 3.2 that a detailed
input-output table allows for finer source and supply patterns. In the lower panel of Table 3.3,
more linkages are considered as vertical than in the upper part with spillovers based on the
aggregated IO-table. To fully account for the fact that TFP is an estimated rather than an observed
dependent variable, we bootstrapped all estimations presented in the Table. The results from
this exercise for the upper panel of the Table point to a horizontal spillover that is positive and
statistically significant for OP and ACF TFP. In none of the other cases statistically significant
spillover effects are detected. For the lower panel of the Table, statistically significant positive
horizontal effects for LP, ACF and FE TFP and positive backward effects in all cases expect LP
TFP are detected in the bootstrapping exercise. Similarly as in Table 3.3 no forward spillovers
are found. The bootstrapping exercise thus largely confirms our conclusions. We also examined
whether the estimated coefficients of each pair of aggregated and detailed results for each of the
spillovers are significantly different. This does not to apply to any of the cases at the 5% level.
Nevertheless, in the detailed panel spillovers are estimated more precisely and the total spillover
effects are larger (cf. infra).
In the FDI spillover literature, backward spillovers have received widespread attention be-
cause of the expectation that supplier-client relationships are more inclined to result in positive
spillover effects than competitive relationships (horizontal spillovers). Clearly, if one defines
backward spillovers as effects that originate from supplier-customer relationships, diagonal
elements should not be excluded from the backward calculation because these elements do refer
to intermediate supply and use. Table 3.4 then presents results for vertical spillover variables that
do include within-industry supply and use (non-zero-diagonal definition). The Table is again split
in an upper and lower panel, referring to results for spillovers based on aggregated and detailed
IO-tables respectively. Comparing the results in the upper panel of Table 3.4 with those in the
upper panel of Table 3.3 reveals a limited impact of using the non-zero-diagonal definition instead
of the standard zero-diagonal definition. The horizontal spillover coefficients are still significant,
be it at the 10% level in contrast to the 5% level as in Table 3.3. Results on the forward spillover
are comparable to those in Table 3.3. Point estimates for the horizontal spillovers tend to increase
(from 0.546 to 0.677 for OP TFP), whereas point estimates for the forward spillovers tend to
decrease in absolute value (from -1.411 to -1.276). Although including within-industry supply
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Table 3.4: Horizontal and vertical spillovers from all firms on Romanian manufacturing firms.
The vertical spillovers are calculated using the alternative non-zero-diagonal definition.
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (non-zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.677* 1.905* 1.881* 0.600 0.628 0.653*
[0.398] [1.000] [0.994] [0.392] [0.394] [0.393]
backward 0.882 2.029 2.116 0.916 0.914 0.852
[0.665] [1.926] [1.917] [0.656] [0.669] [0.664]
forward -1.276* -2.352 -2.310 -1.177* -1.233* -1.162*
[0.695] [1.844] [1.848] [0.690] [0.683] [0.695]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.066 0.080 0.081 0.062 0.062 0.072
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (non-zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.226 0.628 0.633 0.200 0.205 0.212
[0.184] [0.491] [0.486] [0.184] [0.184] [0.181]
backward 0.913*** 2.399** 2.416** 0.935*** 0.928*** 0.924***
[0.316] [0.993] [0.987] [0.314] [0.318] [0.314]
forward -0.583 -0.580 -0.549 -0.570 -0.583 -0.533
[0.422] [1.175] [1.173] [0.420] [0.417] [0.420]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.066 0.078 0.078 0.062 0.061 0.072
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees for the years 1996-2005. The
vertical spillover variables are calculated using the non-zero-diagonal definition. Regressions include time,
industry and region dummies; control variables included are firm age, firm size, industry competition,
downstream demand, import competition, export intensity and the importance of intermediates. Standard
errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
into the definition enlarges the ‘scope’ for backward spillovers, backward spillovers no longer
affect total factor productivity. Therefore including within-industry supply does not help to
resolve the differences between the upper and lower panels in Table 3.3. Interestingly, the lower
panel of Table 3.4 shows important implications of including within-industry supply and use
when spillovers are computed using our detailed IO-tables. The horizontal effect now disappears
completely. Contrary to results in the upper panel of Table 3.4 and both the upper and lower
panels of Table 3.3 (zero-diagonal definition), we do not detect any horizontal spillovers. The
estimated coefficients are still positive but become insignificant and point estimates fall by about
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70% compared to the aggregated results. Similarly to Table 3.3 we now do find positive and
highly significant backward spillovers (at the 1% level, similar in size). Therefore, even when
applying non-zero-diagonal definitions to calculate the vertical spillover variables, significant and
positive backward spillover effects are only detected when detailed IO-tables are used. Forward
spillovers again are negative but insignificant, which matches with the results on forward linkages
in the meta-analysis of Havranek and Irsova (2011). A potential explanation for this result is that
foreign affiliates in transition economies, such as Romania, primarily are engaged in end-user
consumer goods, causing forward spillovers to be low or insignificant (Damijan et al., 2013). A
similar bootstrapping exercise as for Table 3.3 is done for Table 3.4 as well. The bootstrapping
procedure does not result in any statistically significant spillover effects for the upper panel of
the Table. For the lower panel, the bootstrapping results suggests that only the positive backward
spillover effects are statistically significant (except for ACF TFP). These findings again strongly
correspond to our previous results. The estimated coefficients of aggregated and detailed spillover
effects again are not significantly different at the 5% level in any of the cases.
The estimation results presented in the bottom panel of Table 3.4 provide support for the
conclusions of Havranek and Irsova (2011): backward linkages are the main source of positive
spillovers whereas no forward spillovers are detected. For the case of Romania, Nicolini and
Resmini (2010) find both positive backward and forward spillovers (specifically for very pro-
ductive domestic firms). Damijan et al. (2013) document negative backward spillovers, which
turn positive for small firms with a high level of absorptive capacity (productivity) and low
technology. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) notice that backward spillovers are positive only
when they arise from partially foreign-owned firms (coefficient of 0.850, basic model for LP
TFP). The bottom panel of Table 3.4 provides no evidence of horizontal spillover effects. Other
work on Romania has attained similar results (e.g. Konings, 2001). Some studies do report
positive or negative horizontal spillover effects in particular cases (e.g. positive spillovers arising
from fully foreign-owned firms (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) or reaching only domestic firms
in low-tech industries (Nicolini and Resmini, 2010)).
In order to rule out that the estimation results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are driven by
multicollinearity, we further consider the correlations between the various spillover measures and
perform an additional test in which the forward spillover variables are excluded from the analysis.
Table 3.8 in the Appendix presents the correlations between the horizontal, backward and forward
spillover variables calculated at different aggregation levels and for different methodologies (i.e.
the zero-diagonal and non-zero-diagonal approach for the vertical spillover variables) for the
years 1996-2005. Note that both the correlations between the level variables and those between
the variables in lagged first differences are reported. From the Table it is clear that overall the
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correlations between the spillover variables do not appear to be very high. The correlations are
higher when the vertical spillovers variables are calculated using the non-zero-diagonal definition
instead of the zero-diagonal definition, which is to be expected. The highest correlations are
detected for the ‘aggregated non-zero-diagonal’ case. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in the Appendix report
the estimation results obtained when the analyses presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are repeated
excluding the forward spillover variables.16 Table 3.9 shows the results based on aggregated
and detailed IO-tables where the backward spillover variable is obtained using the traditional
zero-diagonal definition. The results in the Table confirm our previous findings: at the aggre-
gated level we find statistically significant positive horizontal spillover effects and insignificant
backward spillover effects. When detailed IO-tables are used, the horizontal spillover effects are
still positive and significant (with smaller coefficients) and the backward spillover effects are
positive and highly significant in most cases. The findings in Table 3.10 correspond to those in
Table 3.4. In the upper panel of the Table, none of the spillover effects is statistically significant.
In contrast, the lower panel of the Table reveals highly significant positive spillovers to domestic
suppliers. These results thus confirm our earlier conclusions.
Clearly, given the differences in averages and standard errors of the spillover variables (as
is clear from Table 3.2), point estimates should be combined with variables to compare the
actual contribution to TFP, see Merlevede et al. (2014). Figure 3.5 illustrates the contribution to
firm-level OP TFP (in levels) of the mean horizontal (HR) and backward (BK) spillover variables
for NACE 2-digit industry 15 and its NACE 3-digit sub-industries. The numbers in the Figure
are obtained as the average of the level of the horizontal and backward spillover variables over
the sample period multiplied by the estimated coefficients reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (cf.
Merlevede et al. (2014)). The estimated coefficients are taken from the top panel of Table 3.3
for the aggregated results (NACE 2-digit, left bar) and the bottom panel of Table 3.4 (NACE
3-digit, bars on the right). This approach allows us to compare the contributions of spillovers
calculated according to the classic methodology (BK zero-diagonal, aggregated) with those of
spillovers calculated according to our preferred methodology (BK non-zero-diagonal, detailed).
The Figure clearly shows that the use of aggregated IO-tables implies a horizontal spillover that
is considerably larger than the horizontal spillover found for any of the sub-industries using the
detailed IO-tables. We obtain the opposite result for the backward spillovers, i.e. the contribution
to firm-level OP TFP is larger when using the detailed rather than the aggregated IO-tables.
Overall, the total spillover effect (horizontal-backward-forward combined) is about 11% larger
(OP TFP) when using detailed IO-tables. If we only take into account significant spillover
variables, the difference augments to 67% (this is also clear from a comparison of the top panel
16We omitted the forward spillovers because these variables appear to be the most correlated with the other
spillover variables and given the conclusions of Havranek and Irsova (2011) and Damijan et al. (2013) on forward
effects.
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Figure 3.5: Contribution of the 1996-2005 mean horizontal (HR) and backward (BK) spillovers
to OP TFP of domestic firms for NACE 2-digit industry 15 “Manufacturing of food products
and beverages” and its 3-digit sub-industries.
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Note: Contributions are obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the average of the spillover variables
in 1996-2005 and capture the effect on the level of OP TFP of domestic firms over the period. Calculations are
based on the OP specification in the top panel of Table 3.3 for HR and BK zero-diagonal and the top panel of Table
3.4 for BK non-zero-diagonal for the aggregated industry. Calculations are based on the OP specification in the
bottom panel of Table 3.4 for HR and BK non-zero-diagonal and the bottom panel of Table 3.3 for BK zero-diagonal
for the detailed industries.
of Table 3.3 with the bottom panel of Table 3.4). In order to allow comparisons of aggregated
and detailed results for the same methodology, we also add the contributions of backward zero-
diagonal spillover variables based on the estimated coefficients in the bottom panel of Table 3.3
and backward non-zero-diagonal spillover variables based on the coefficients in the top panel
of Table 3.4. The patterns obtained are very similar and our conclusions are therefore not affected.
Because firm-level data typically have a detailed industry classification, while detailed input-
output tables are often unavailable, we conduct a further experiment where we apply input-output
coefficients obtained from aggregated IO-tables to horizontal variables calculated at a more
detailed industry level to obtain backward and forward spillovers (cf. Damijan et al. (2013)).
Specifically, we calculate the Horizontal-variable at the NACE 3-digit level and apply the same
NACE 2-digit input-output coefficients to each 3-digit Horizontal-variable belonging to this 2-
digit industry to obtain backward and forward spillover variables. We are now able to test whether
this approach provides a solution for the impact of the classification issue and the underestimation
of the total spillover effect discussed above. The results are presented in Table 3.5. The top panel
of the Table shows results for OP, LP and ACF TFP, the bottom panel holds results for the DPD,
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Table 3.5: Horizontal and vertical spillovers from all firms on Romanian manufacturing firms.
The vertical spillovers are calculated using aggregated input-output tables but detailed horizontal
spillover variables (for both the zero-diagonal and the non-zero-diagonal definition).
OP LP ACF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zero non-zero zero non-zero zero non-zero
horizontal 0.345** 0.312* 1.140** 0.992** 1.157** 1.014**
[0.169] [0.179] [0.461] [0.501] [0.458] [0.498]
backward -0.001 0.011 -0.525 -0.302 -0.459 -0.295
[0.251] [0.136] [0.666] [0.371] [0.664] [0.369]
forward -0.120 0.031 -0.278 0.571 -0.282 0.549
[0.236] [0.171] [0.600] [0.417] [0.595] [0.414]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 78,710 78,710 73,255 73,255
R2 0.062 0.062 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.076
DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zero non-zero zero non-zero zero non-zero
horizontal 0.329* 0.286 0.329* 0.298* 0.346** 0.307*
[0.170] [0.178] [0.170] [0.179] [0.169] [0.177]
backward 0.002 0.031 0.009 0.017 -0.038 0.019
[0.252] [0.135] [0.255] [0.136] [0.250] [0.134]
forward -0.132 0.021 -0.128 0.022 -0.141 0.032
[0.239] [0.172] [0.239] [0.172] [0.239] [0.170]
Obs. 96,728 96,728 96,728 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.067 0.067
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees for the years 1996-
2005. The vertical spillover variables are calculated using both the zero-diagonal definition
and the non-zero-diagonal definition. Aggregated input-output coefficients are combined with
detailed data. Regressions include time, industry and region dummies; control variables included
are firm age, firm size, industry competition, downstream demand, import competition, export
intensity and the importance of intermediates. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the
industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
FE and TL TFP measures. For each TFP measure, we present results for both the zero-diagonal
definition and the non-zero-diagonal definition. In none of the cases, statistically significant
vertical spillover effects are obtained. In contrast, there is evidence of significant and positive
horizontal spillovers. This implies that simply applying aggregated input-output coefficients
to the detailed horizontal variables does not allow us to detect significant vertical spillover effects.
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Our results thus suggest that one is likely to i) incorrectly identify spillover effects as hori-
zontal rather than vertical and ii) underestimate the total spillover effect when using aggregated
IO-tables to calculate vertical spillover variables. The total spillover effect -regardless statistical
significance of the impact of the spillover variables- is found to be smaller when aggregated
input-output tables are used to calculate vertical spillover effects (11% smaller in the case of OP
TFP). Taking into account only statistically significant variables, the total effect is considerably
larger when using the detailed IO-tables (67% larger in the case of OP TFP). This is due to the
fact that when using an aggregated IO-table some supplier-client relationships are included in
the horizontal spillover variable rather than in the backward spillover variable, which results
in (nearly) insignificant backward spillovers. This does not change when a non-zero-diagonal
definition is used to calculate the vertical spillover variables with aggregated IO-tables. On
the contrary, differences between the use of detailed versus aggregated IO-tables are widening.
The use of a non-zero-diagonal definition follows naturally from an intuitive reading of the
literature: the literature expects supplier-client relationships to be more likely to result in positive
spillover effects than competitive relationships. Therefore a non-zero-diagonal definition is more
appropriate than the traditional zero-diagonal approach. Comparing results for zero-diagonal
and non-zero-diagonal definitions using detailed IO-tables, we do observe that the horizontal
spillover becomes insignificant using the non-zero definition. Applying aggregated coefficients
to detailed horizontal spillovers neither appears to solve the issue. The use of sufficiently detailed
input-output tables therefore is important in the analysis of FDI spillover effects. Our findings
are particularly relevant in the light of increasing international fragmentation of production and
the importance of backward linkages as a channel for technology transmission (as evidenced by
numerous studies).
Clearly, these results raise the question whether linkages between companies should not be
identified at an even more detailed level. At the limit, it would be informative to gain a better
insight into linkages at the firm-level. Unfortunately, firm-level data on these linkages are rarely
available, especially for large firm-level panels. However, aside from availability, firm-level
linkages would also be suspect to considerable endogeneity issues because MNEs likely select
the best domestic firms as their suppliers. In search for appropriate instruments, linkages derived
from IO-tables would be a natural candidate since it is more difficult to switch industries when
choosing suppliers. Finally, note that the use of more disaggregated IO-tables may have a
drawback. Multi-product firms could be wrongly assigned to a specific industry, an issue that
becomes more important for finer industry classifications. In this case, the reverse effect could
emerge and horizontal relationships are incorrectly classified as supplier-client relationships.
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3.5 Conclusions
Notwithstanding an extensive empirical literature on the spillover effects of foreign direct in-
vestment, estimation results have been mixed. More recently a consensus seems to emerge
that especially backward spillovers work as a channel for positive spillover effects. Backward
spillovers, as well as forward spillovers are linked to the supply chain. In empirical work these
channels are operationalised through the use of input-output tables that convey technical rela-
tionships between industries. As the methodology to calculate spillover variables draws heavily
on input-output tables, it is the level of industry aggregation in these tables that determines the
categorisation of spillovers into horizontal (same stage in the supply chain) and vertical (different
stages in the supply chain) effects. This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the
relationship between the industry classification in the input-output tables and the spillover effects
that can be identified. We show that calculating spillovers from fairly aggregated input-output
tables causes linkages between foreign and domestic firms to be classified as horizontal rather
than vertical. Therefore these firms are implicitly considered to be in a competitive rather than in
a supplier-client relationship. We further present an alternative approach to calculate vertical
spillovers that is more in line with the definition of vertical spillovers occurring through supply
chain linkages between firms. Contrary to the standard approach that excludes within-industry
intermediate supply and use from vertical spillover variables because they are captured by hor-
izontal spillover variables, our preferred approach does include within-industry intermediate
supply and use in the calculation of vertical spillover variables.
For a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms we show that the evidence of positive and
statistically significant backward spillovers is much stronger for detailed than for aggregated
input-output tables. The impact of horizontal spillovers, on the other hand, is found to be much
larger and positive for aggregated input-output tables. This suggest that aggregated input-output
tables lead to a misclassification of linkages as horizontal rather than vertical. As a result,
part of the backward spillovers are captured by the horizontal variable. The use of aggregated
input-output tables also leads to a considerable underestimation of the total spillover effect. Our
alternative approach where we do include within-industry intermediate supply and use in the
calculation of vertical spillover variables (in contrast to the standard definition) does not change
this finding. We do not find evidence for backward spillovers for aggregated IO-tables, but do
so for detailed IO-tables. Horizontal spillovers are only marginally significant for aggregated
IO-tables and disappear completely when we use detailed IO-tables. Finally, calculating vertical
spillover variables through a combination of aggregated input-output coefficients and detailed
horizontal variables does not appear to affect our results and thus is not a substitute for the
lack of detailed IO-tables either. These findings are particularly relevant because international
vertical relationships beyond the boundaries of the firm are becoming more common and the
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backward spillover channel is thought to be the main channel of technology diffusion. A correct
identification of the channel is therefore of crucial importance. We conclude that it is preferable
to use sufficiently detailed input-output tables in the analysis of FDI spillover effects. If these
tables are unavailable, researchers using more aggregated tables should be aware that they are
likely to underestimate both the backward and the total spillover effect.
Appendix
The Appendix of this Chapter provides some additional analyses and other supplementary
materials. The supplementary materials consist of correlation tables, a robustness analysis in
which the forward spillover variables are dropped from the estimations, a conversion table
used to map the Romanian industry classification into the NACE 2-digit and NACE 3-digit
classification and three tables that show the estimation results for the control variables included
in the regressions in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 (see Tables 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14, respectively). The
additional analyses are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 and Figure 3.6.
As a first additional test, we aim to address the concerns raised by Barrios et al. (2011) with
regard to the calculation of spillover variables for the study of FDI spillover effects. In a recent
contribution, Barrios et al. (2011) propose to use the input-output tables from the MNEs’ home
countries to measure backward spillover variables because the new incoming technology will
resemble the technology of the home country rather than that of the host country. Although
our data do not allow us to perform this analysis in the same way as Barrios et al. (2011), we
try to accommodate this view by using the input-output coefficients of the 2005 IO-table for
the calculation of the vertical spillover variables throughout the sample period. The reasoning
behind this approach is that by 2005, the foreign involvement in most industries in Romania
was considerable (i.e. about 40% of total output was produced by foreign firms). Furthermore,
many foreign firms had already been present for a longer period in the Romania economy.
Considering these aspects, the industrial structure found in the 2005 IO-table is likely to be a
good reflection of MNE’s production technologies (see also Merlevede et al., 2014). We calculate
spillover variables according to the zero-diagonal definition using the aggregated IO-table and
the non-zero-diagonal definition using the detailed IO-table of the year 2005. The results for both
approaches are reported in Table 3.6, in the upper and lower panel respectively. These results
confirm our main findings: horizontal spillovers are positive and statically significant when
aggregated IO-tables are used whereas backward spillover effects show up when the input-output
coefficients are obtained from detailed IO-tables. Compared to the estimation results presented
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the backward spillover effects are less significant (only at the 10% level),
which may be caused by the more limited variation in the vertical spillover measures.
As a second additional test, we compare spillover effects transmitted by majority foreign-
owned firms with those from minority foreign-owned firms. This test is motivated by the work
of Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), who study the impact of the ownership structure of foreign
affiliates on FDI spillovers. For a sample of Romanian firms, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008)
document positive vertical spillover effects that arise only from partially foreign-owned firms.
Horizontal spillover effects are negative and originate from partially and wholly foreign-owned
firms. These negative effects are the largest when transmitted by the latter. Javorcik and
Spatareanu (2008) also indicate that partially foreign-owned affiliates acquire less advanced
Table 3.6: Horizontal and vertical spillovers from all firms on Romanian manufacturing firms.
The vertical spillovers are calculated using the zero-diagonal definition at the aggregated level
and the non-zero-diagonal definition at the detailed level. The input-output coefficients are taken
from the 2005 input-output table.
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.481** 1.685** 1.697** 0.452* 0.458* 0.488**
[0.240] [0.734] [0.730] [0.240] [0.238] [0.242]
backward 1.374 1.921 2.105 1.232 1.369 1.358
[0.864] [2.282] [2.283] [0.861] [0.864] [0.862]
forward -0.104 -0.757 -0.770 -0.002 -0.081 -0.075
[0.818] [2.220] [2.226] [0.807] [0.810] [0.812]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.064 0.078 0.079 0.060 0.060 0.070
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (non-zero-diagonal)
horizontal -0.033 -0.017 -0.003 -0.058 -0.054 -0.043
[0.206] [0.533] [0.529] [0.204] [0.205] [0.201]
backward 0.764* 2.725** 2.852** 0.732* 0.766* 0.826*
[0.445] [1.147] [1.157] [0.438] [0.441] [0.438]
forward 0.512 1.516 1.413 0.574 0.529 0.498
[0.530] [1.447] [1.434] [0.523] [0.524] [0.523]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.064 0.078 0.079 0.060 0.059 0.070
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees for the years 1996-2005. The
vertical spillovers are calculated using the zero-diagonal definition at the aggregated level and the non-
zero-diagonal definition at the detailed level on the basis of the input-output table for the year 2005.
Regressions include time, industry and region dummies; control variables included are firm age, firm
size, industry competition, downstream demand, import competition, export intensity and the importance
of intermediates. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes
significance at 1/5/10 percent.
technology than wholly foreign-owned firms and that this technology is more easily accessible.
This can counterbalance negative competition effects and increase the scope for horizontal
spillovers, as is apparent from their results. We estimate spillover effects from majority and
minority foreign-owned firms. Firms are classified as majority foreign-owned when the share of
foreign participation is at least 50%; firms are minority foreign-owned when the share of foreign
Table 3.7: Horizontal and vertical spillovers from majority (maj) and minority (min) foreign-
owned firms on Romanian manufacturing firms. The vertical spillovers are calculated using
the zero-diagonal definition at the aggregated level and the non-zero-diagonal definition at the
detailed level.
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (zero-diagonal)
horizontal maj 0.519** 1.777** 1.799** 0.492** 0.500** 0.529**
[0.247] [0.729] [0.729] [0.246] [0.244] [0.247]
horizontal min 0.388 1.215 1.251 0.329 0.356 0.358
[0.579] [1.786] [1.777] [0.561] [0.569] [0.568]
backward maj 0.943 1.307 1.434 0.901 0.926 0.809
[0.733] [1.747] [1.733] [0.719] [0.728] [0.729]
backward min 7.627*** 17.524*** 17.634*** 7.441*** 7.640*** 7.532***
[1.560] [4.135] [4.119] [1.556] [1.583] [1.541]
forward maj -1.310* -3.114 -3.102 -1.263 -1.304* -1.243
[0.780] [2.105] [2.096] [0.776] [0.774] [0.781]
forward min 3.530 6.131 5.708 3.583 3.370 3.583
[4.231] [10.889] [10.825] [4.207] [4.238] [4.207]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.075 0.090 0.091 0.070 0.070 0.081
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (non-zero-diagonal)
horizontal maj 0.367* 1.008** 1.003** 0.335* 0.341* 0.348*
[0.200] [0.492] [0.488] [0.199] [0.200] [0.196]
horizontal min -1.330*** -4.078*** -3.991*** -1.333*** -1.329*** -1.325***
[0.400] [1.036] [1.031] [0.401] [0.406] [0.398]
backward maj 0.762** 1.926** 1.948** 0.789** 0.779** 0.775**
[0.313] [0.967] [0.965] [0.311] [0.315] [0.310]
backward min 4.668*** 11.586*** 11.401*** 4.582*** 4.726*** 4.707***
[1.652] [3.790] [3.875] [1.692] [1.708] [1.670]
forward maj -0.956** -1.600 -1.532 -0.945** -0.954** -0.900**
[0.431] [1.096] [1.095] [0.427] [0.426] [0.427]
forward min 2.286* 8.403*** 7.997*** 2.354* 2.283* 2.294*
[1.201] [3.032] [3.022] [1.220] [1.215] [1.210]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.074 0.091 0.091 0.070 0.069 0.081
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees for the years 1996-2005. The vertical
spillovers are calculated using the zero-diagonal definition at the aggregated level and the non-zero-diagonal
definition at the detailed level. Regressions include time, industry and region dummies; control variables included
are firm age, firm size, industry competition, downstream demand, import competition, export intensity and the
importance of intermediates. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes
significance at 1/5/10 percent.
Figure 3.6: Contribution of 1996-2005 mean horizontal and backward spillovers to OP TFP of
domestic firms for NACE 2-digit industry 24 “Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products”
(based on the OP specification in Table 3.3) and its 3-digit sub-industries (based on the OP
specification in Table 3.4).
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horizontal backward
participation is less than 50% but more than 10%. Table 3.7 introduces the empirical results
of this analysis, again making the distinction between results based on aggregated and detailed
IO-tables. In the top panel of the Table, we detect positive horizontal spillovers from majority
foreign-owned firms and positive backward spillovers from minority foreign-owned firms. The
lower panel reveals significant spillover effects in nearly all cases. More specifically, majority
foreign-owned firms have a positive impact on domestic firms’ productivity through horizontal
and backward linkages and a negative impact through forward linkages. Minority foreign-owned
firms lower the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry and raise that of domestic
suppliers and clients. Our findings on the backward spillover effects correspond with those of
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008). However, we obtain positive horizontal spillovers for majority
foreign-owned firms and only see negative effects when detailed IO-tables are used.
Finally, Figure 3.6 depicts the contribution to firm-level OP TFP of the mean horizontal and
backward spillover variables for NACE 2-digit industry 24 (chemicals and chemical products)
and its seven NACE 3-digit sub-industries. These contributions are calculated in the same way
as in Figure 3.5: first the average of the level of the horizontal and backward spillover variables
is obtained and then it is multiplied by the estimated coefficients of the spillover effects. For
the aggregated results, the estimated coefficients are obtained from the top panel of Table 3.3
(NACE 2-digit, bar on the left); for the detailed results they are taken from the bottom panel
of Table 3.4 (NACE 3-digit, bars on the right). In Figure 3.6, the horizontal spillover is clearly
larger when aggregated IO-tables are used (for all sub-industries) whereas the reverse applies to
the backward spillover (for most sub-industries).
Table 3.8: Correlations between the horizontal and vertical spillover variables at the aggregated
and detailed level in period 1996-2005 (non-zero-diagonal and zero-diagonal definition).
Aggregated (NACE 2-digit): variables in levels
non-zero-diagonal zero-diagonal
horizontal backward forward backward forward
horizontal 1
backward non-zero 0.789 1
forward non-zero 0.682 0.754 1
backward zero 0.411 0.648 0.491 1
forward zero 0.164 0.341 0.558 0.467 1
Aggregated (NACE 2-digit): variables in lagged differences
non-zero-diagonal zeroo-diagonal
horizontal backward forward backward forward
horizontal 1
backward non-zero 0.585 1
forward non-zero 0.666 0.631 1
backward zero 0.070 0.541 0.029 1
forward zero 0.015 -0.012 0.297 0.227 1
Detailed (NACE 3-digit eq.): variables in levels
non-zero-diagonal zero-diagonal
horizontal backward forward backward forward
horizontal 1
backward non-zero 0.470 1
forward non-zero 0.584 0.562 1
backward zero 0.084 0.701 0.238 1
forward zero 0.212 0.297 0.709 0.309 1
Detailed (NACE 3-digit eq.): variables in lagged differences
non-zero-diagonal zero-diagonal
horizontal backward forward backward forward
horizontal 1
backward non-zero 0.424 1
forward non-zero 0.428 0.436 1
backward zero 0.106 0.729 0.109 1
forward zero -0.010 0.122 0.622 0.260 1
Table 3.9: Horizontal and backward spillovers from all firms on Romanian manufacturing firms.
The backward spillovers are calculated using the traditional zero-diagonal definition.
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.525** 1.711** 1.729** 0.496** 0.503** 0.532**
[0.237] [0.721] [0.716] [0.237] [0.235] [0.239]
backward 0.794 1.074 1.208 0.761 0.783 0.683
[0.781] [1.857] [1.834] [0.762] [0.780] [0.769]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.064 0.078 0.078 0.060 0.060 0.069
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.332** 1.114** 1.128** 0.316* 0.316* 0.336**
[0.162] [0.441] [0.437] [0.164] [0.163] [0.162]
backward 0.876** 1.779* 1.800* 0.898*** 0.872** 0.853**
[0.348] [0.986] [0.969] [0.342] [0.346] [0.343]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.065 0.076 0.076 0.061 0.060 0.070
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees for the years 1996-2005. The
backward spillover variables are calculated using the zero-diagonal definition. Regressions include
time, industry and region dummies; control variables included are firm age, firm size, industry compe-
tition, downstream demand, import competition, export intensity and the importance of intermediates.
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at
1/5/10 percent.
Table 3.10: Horizontal and backward spillovers from all firms on Romanian manufacturing
firms. The backward spillovers are calculated using the non-zero-diagonal definition.
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (non-zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.313 1.224 1.213 0.268 0.279 0.325
[0.318] [0.855] [0.847] [0.315] [0.317] [0.317]
backward 0.590 1.501 1.601 0.643 0.628 0.582
[0.638] [1.813] [1.806] [0.626] [0.644] [0.633]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.064 0.078 0.079 0.060 0.059 0.069
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (non-zero-diagonal)
horizontal 0.092 0.490 0.502 0.068 0.071 0.089
[0.166] [0.483] [0.478] [0.167] [0.167] [0.165]
backward 0.808*** 2.292** 2.315** 0.832*** 0.823*** 0.828***
[0.294] [0.901] [0.895] [0.291] [0.297] [0.290]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.065 0.078 0.078 0.061 0.060 0.070
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees for the years 1996-2005. The
backward spillover variables are calculated using the non-zero-diagonal definition. Regressions include
time, industry and region dummies; control variables included are firm age, firm size, industry competition,
downstream demand, import competition, export intensity and the importance of intermediates. Standard
errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
Table 3.11: Conversion table, provided by the Romanian Statistical Office, used for mapping
the Romanian industry classification into NACE 3-digit and NACE 2-digit coding.
IO-code Description NACE rev. 1.1 #firms
3-digit 2-digit 2005
18 Meat production and processing 15.1 15 603
19 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 15.2 15 25
20 Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables 15.3 15 123
21 Production of vegetal and animal oil and fat 15.4 15 68
22 Production of milk products 15.5 15 335
23 Production of milling products, starch and starch products 15.6 15 458
24 Manufacture of fodder 15.7 15 58
25 Processing of other food products 15.8 15 2675
26 Beverages 15.9 15 367
27 Tobacco products 16 16 17
28 Textile industry 17 17 1024
29 Textile clothing 18.2 18 2636
30 Manufacture of leather and fur clothes 18.1+18.3 18 35
31 Footwear and other leather goods 19 19 1082
32 Wood processing (excluding furniture) 20 20 1989
33 Pulp, paper and cardboard; related items 21.1+21.2 21 282
34 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 22 1016
35 Coking 23.1 23 1
36 Crude oil processing 23.2 23 27
37 Processing of nuclear combustibles 23.3 23 -
38 Basic chemical products 24.1 24 154
39 Pesticide and other agrochemical products 24.2 24 9
40 Dyes and varnishes 24.3 24 105
41 Medicines and pharmaceutical products 24.4 24 92
42 Soaps, detergents, up-keeping products, cosmetics, perfumery 24.5 24 88
43 Other chemical products 24.6 24 62
44 Synthetic and man-made fibres 24.7 24 7
45 Rubber processing 25.1 25 117
46 Plastic processing 25.2 25 742
47 Glass and glassware 26.1 26 212
48 Processing and refractory ceramics (excluding building items) 26.2 26 104
49 Ceramic boards and flags 26.3 26 14
50 Brick, tile and other building material processing 26.4 26 79
51 Cement, lime and plaster 26.5 26 16
52 Processing of concrete, cement and lime items 26.6 26 254
53 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 26.7 26 94
54 Other non-metallic mineral products 26.8 26 42
55 Metallurgy and ferroalloys processing 27.1 27 26
56 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 27.2 27 19
57 Other metallurgy products 27.3 27 18
58 Precious metals and other non-ferrous metals 27.4 27 35
59 Foundry 27.5 27 122
60 Metal structures and products 28 28 2101
Table continued on the next page
Table 3.11: Conversion table, provided by the Romanian Statistical Office, used for mapping
the Romanian industry classification into NACE 3-digit and NACE 2-digit coding. (Continued)
IO-code Description NACE rev. 1.1 #firms
3-digit 2-digit 2005
61 Manufacture of eq. for producing/using of mechanical power 29.1 29 108
62 Machinery for general use 29.2 29 172
63 Agricultural and forestry machine 29.3 29 50
64 Machine tools 29.4 29 96
65 Other machines for special use 29.5 29 175
66 Armament and ammunition 29.6 29 -
67 Labour-saving devices and domestic machinery 29.7 29 39
68 Computers and office means 30 30 132
69 Electric machinery and appliances 31 31 348
70 Radio, TV-sets and communication eq. and apparatus 32 32 84
71 Medical, precision, optical, watch-making apparatus 33 33 231
72 Means of road transport 34 34 209
73 Naval engineering and repair 35.1 35 198
74 Production/repair of railway transport means and rolling eq. 35.2 35 50
75 Aircraft engineering and repair 35.3 35 13
76 Motorcycles, bicycles and other transport means 35.4 35 7
77 Furniture 36.1 36 1438
78 Other industrial activities 36.2-36.6 36 280
Table 3.12: Overview of the control variables that were used in the estimations presented in
Table 3.3 (both panels zero-diagonal definition).
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (zero-diagonal)
demand index -0.023 -0.087 -0.088 -0.027 -0.032 -0.026
[0.059] [0.125] [0.125] [0.060] [0.060] [0.060]
import competition 0.265 0.430 0.366 0.222 0.245 0.226
[0.593] [1.311] [1.307] [0.591] [0.600] [0.593]
intermediates 0.845* 1.700 1.743 0.812* 0.846* 0.822*
[0.446] [1.154] [1.159] [0.434] [0.451] [0.450]
export intensity 0.256 0.747 0.671 0.267 0.253 0.246
[0.551] [1.527] [1.514] [0.537] [0.547] [0.544]
Herfindahl index -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
firm age 0.003*** 0.003** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
firm size -0.021*** -0.062*** -0.052*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.017***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.067 0.081 0.082 0.063 0.062 0.072
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (zero-diagonal)
demand index -0.008 -0.012 -0.014 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009
[0.035] [0.087] [0.087] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035]
import competition -0.063 0.164 0.160 -0.075 -0.060 -0.071
[0.273] [0.608] [0.611] [0.274] [0.275] [0.269]
intermediates 0.643** 1.402* 1.412* 0.621** 0.638** 0.635**
[0.289] [0.779] [0.786] [0.280] [0.293] [0.286]
export intensity 0.142 0.443 0.432 0.121 0.125 0.117
[0.317] [0.882] [0.862] [0.313] [0.316] [0.315]
Herfindahl index 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
firm age 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
firm size -0.022*** -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.018***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.066 0.077 0.078 0.063 0.062 0.072
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10
percent.
Table 3.13: Overview of the control variables that were used in the estimations presented in
Table 3.4 (both panels non-zero-diagonal definition).
OP LP ACF DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregated - NACE 2-digit (non-zero-diagonal)
demand index -0.033 -0.102 -0.103 -0.037 -0.042 -0.035
[0.060] [0.128] [0.128] [0.061] [0.061] [0.060]
import competition 0.289 0.458 0.403 0.250 0.272 0.247
[0.618] [1.345] [1.342] [0.614] [0.625] [0.616]
intermediates 0.988** 2.006* 2.050* 0.951** 0.989** 0.956**
[0.422] [1.109] [1.116] [0.410] [0.427] [0.426]
export intensity 0.195 0.749 0.684 0.226 0.203 0.202
[0.582] [1.595] [1.578] [0.569] [0.579] [0.575]
Herfindahl index -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
firm age 0.003*** 0.003** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
firm size -0.021*** -0.062*** -0.052*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.017***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.066 0.080 0.081 0.062 0.062 0.072
Detailed - Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent (non-zero-diagonal)
demand index -0.016 -0.034 -0.036 -0.017 -0.019 -0.017
[0.032] [0.081] [0.080] [0.033] [0.033] [0.032]
import competition -0.003 0.267 0.262 -0.015 -0.001 -0.014
[0.280] [0.618] [0.622] [0.280] [0.282] [0.275]
intermediates 0.702** 1.570** 1.579** 0.680** 0.697** 0.692**
[0.279] [0.741] [0.748] [0.271] [0.284] [0.277]
export intensity 0.156 0.531 0.518 0.137 0.139 0.133
[0.311] [0.864] [0.844] [0.307] [0.310] [0.308]
Herfindahl index 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
firm age 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
firm size -0.022*** -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.018***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Obs. 96,681 78,710 73,255 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.066 0.078 0.078 0.062 0.061 0.072
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10
percent.
Table 3.14: Overview of the control variables that were used in the estimations presented in
Table 3.5 (aggregated input-output tables combined with detailed horizontal spillover variables,
zero-diagonal and non-zero-diagonal definition).
OP LP ACF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zero non-zero zero non-zero zero non-zero
demand index -0.017 -0.016 -0.031 -0.018 -0.033 -0.021
[0.037] [0.037] [0.096] [0.093] [0.095] [0.092]
import competition 0.067 0.071 0.331 0.395 0.334 0.392
[0.273] [0.276] [0.612] [0.627] [0.616] [0.630]
intermediates 0.697** 0.714** 1.480* 1.505* 1.483* 1.511*
[0.294] [0.299] [0.809] [0.824] [0.813] [0.832]
export intensity 0.163 0.191 0.420 0.570 0.412 0.557
[0.321] [0.325] [0.893] [0.908] [0.872] [0.887]
Herfindahl index 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
firm age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.010***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
firm size -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.054***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 78,710 78,710 73,255 73,255
R2 0.062 0.062 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.076
DPD FE TL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zero non-zero zero non-zero zero non-zero
demand index -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017
[0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037]
import competition 0.057 0.064 0.071 0.073 0.053 0.061
[0.274] [0.276] [0.275] [0.278] [0.267] [0.271]
intermediates 0.672** 0.694** 0.691** 0.710** 0.683** 0.704**
[0.286] [0.290] [0.298] [0.303] [0.292] [0.296]
export intensity 0.141 0.174 0.145 0.173 0.130 0.166
[0.317] [0.321] [0.319] [0.324] [0.318] [0.323]
Herfindahl index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
firm age 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
firm size -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.018***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Obs. 96,728 96,728 96,728 96,728 96,728 96,728
R2 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.067 0.067
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10
percent.
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4 | Foreign Firms’ Size and FDI
Spillovers1
Abstract
The literature on the spillover effects of foreign direct investment focuses almost exclusively on
large (foreign) firms due to the a priori assumption that small firms play no role in the mechanisms
behind spillovers, or, less importantly, to data availability issues. This paper analyses the role of
foreign and domestic firms size’ in this framework. Our analysis reveals two main findings: the
largest and smallest foreign firms do not generate spillover effects, only medium-sized foreign
firms do; and the size of domestic firms is unimportant in explaining spillover effects. We further
aim to uncover the underlying mechanisms that drive these spillover effects. We find indications
that large foreign firms are less embedded in the domestic economy. Large firms are more likely
to bring their own suppliers or import intermediates; and they export larger shares of their output.
Small and micro foreign firms probably lack the scale to generate spillover effects. Whereas
foreign firms’ size adequately proxies for these mechanisms, as it captures the intensity of the
linkages between foreign and domestic firms, domestic firm size has an unclear relationship with
different underlying spillover mechanisms that may have competing effects.
Keywords: foreign direct investment, spillovers, firm size, supply chain
JEL Classification: F2
4.1 Introduction
Together with enterprise creation, the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the
cornerstones of industrial policy in most countries. Policy-makers are eager to attract multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs), not only because these firms are likely to bring resources, technology
and jobs with them but also because MNEs are expected to affect domestic firms through indirect
or spillover effects. These spillover effects involve the transfer of technology and knowledge
at large (e.g. managerial know-how) from foreign to domestic firms, which can become more
1This Chapter is the result of joint work with Prof. dr. Bruno Merlevede.
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productive as a result. As total factor productivity (TFP) is widely recognised as an important
driver of a country’s macroeconomic growth and competitiveness, these indirect effects of foreign
direct investment are of great importance.2
There is an extensive literature that relates the productivity of domestic firms to the presence
of foreign firms. The standard approach in this literature is to analyse intra-industry (horizontal)
and inter-industry (vertical) spillovers as additional inputs explaining total factor productivity in
a production function framework. Horizontal spillovers emerge from linkages between multina-
tionals and their domestic competitors with a similar role in the supply chain. Vertical spillovers,
on the other hand, arise between MNEs and domestic firms upstream or downstream in the
supply chain. In this regard, the literature distinguishes vertical spillovers that occur between
MNEs and their domestic suppliers (backward spillovers) from those that emanate from linkages
between MNEs and their downstream clients (forward spillovers). The first studies on FDI
spillovers focused on horizontal spillover effects (Caves, 1974). More recently, empirical work
on vertical spillovers has received widespread attention as vertical linkages are an intuitively
more likely channel for (positive) productivity spillover effects. This work was incited by the
seminal study of Javorcik (2004), although McAleese and McDonald (1978) and Lall (1980)
already considered supply chain linkages as a source of productivity spillovers. Several surveys
of the spillover literature have confirmed that positive productivity spillovers on domestic firms
mainly arise from backward linkages (see Crespo and Fontoura (2007) and Havranek and Irsova
(2011, 2013)). In contrast, the empirical evidence on horizontal and forward spillover effects is
much more mixed. Although the literature initially aimed to detect an average positive impact
of foreign presence, attention has also shifted towards the identification of the firm, industry,
region, and country characteristics that facilitate positive spillover effects. Recent meta-studies
by Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Havranek and Irsova (2013), for example, indicate that the sign
and magnitude of (horizontal) spillover effects systematically depend on the characteristics of
the domestic economy and the foreign investor.
Within this framework we revisit the issue of firm size. The role of the size of foreign firms is
-to the best of our knowledge- unexplored in the FDI spillover literature. This likely results from
the fact that MNEs are implicitly assumed to be large or from a lack of data on smaller firms
(which in addition typically are assumed to lack the scale to transmit positive spillover effects.)
For a large firm-level data set of Romanian firms, however, we do find a substantial number of
small foreign invested firms. This observation raises the question whether these smaller foreign
firms are capable of generating spillover effects. In the literature, the size of domestic firms has
received somewhat more attention but rather as a robustness check (see e.g. Merlevede et al.
2Burke et al. (2008) also find a net positive overall impact of foreign presence on firm survival.
4.1 Introduction 143
(2014)). Some studies, for example Sinani and Meyer (2004), do explicitly pay attention to the
role played by domestic firms’ size in the analysis of spillover effects.
In this paper, that consists of two main parts, we contribute to the literature by modelling
FDI spillover effects as a function of both domestic and foreign firms’ size. To this end, we
construct spillover variables from four size categories of foreign firms and consider spillover
effects on all domestic firms and on four size categories of domestic firms. This analysis allows
us to shed more light on the role of the size of foreign and domestic firms and to determine
whether firm size serves (well) as a proxy for underlying channels that may be important in the
spillover framework. Our analysis reveals two main conclusions: i) the largest and smallest
foreign firms do not seem to generate spillover effects, only medium-sized foreign firms do (in
particular, positive horizontal and backward spillover effects and negative spillover effects are
transmitted); and ii) the size of domestic firms seems unimportant in explaining spillover effects.
In the second part of the paper, we therefore aim to get more insight into the underlying
mechanisms that potentially drive spillovers. More specifically, we present two mechanisms
that may account for the fact that large foreign firms do not generate backward spillover effects,
the consensus robust positive spillover effect (Havranek and Irsova, 2011). First, we present
industry-level evidence for the hypothesis that large foreign firms may largely import their
intermediate goods rather than sourcing them locally. Second, we also present some support
for the hypothesis that large foreign investors “bring their own supply chain” and therefore do
not generate spillovers along the supply chain. The latter finding also accounts for the negative
forward spillover effects we find: although medium-sized firms source locally (they do generate
positive backward spillover effects), they are more likely to produce more advanced inputs for
MNEs, that are too difficult to handle for domestic firms as inputs. We find further support for
this hypothesis in the fact that domestic firms with a sufficient level of absorptive capability
experience less negative to positive forward spillover effects. The absence of horizontal spillover
effects (positive or negative) originating from large foreign firms could be driven by the fact that
the largest foreign firms are typically exporters and less involved in the local market. We provide
empirical evidence that demonstrates that industries with larger foreign firms show higher export
intensities. Foreign firm size thus functions well as a proxy for these underlying mechanisms
and manages to capture the intensity of linkages generated with domestic firms.
The finding that the size of domestic firms is unimportant can be explained by the fact that
domestic firm size correlates with different characteristics and mechanisms that the literature
suggests to be important for spillover effects to emerge. These mechanisms may result in positive
as well as negative spillover effects. In contrast to foreign firm size, domestic firm size does
144 Foreign Firms’ Size and FDI Spillovers
not appear to be good proxy variable to disentangle these different channels. More appropriate
proxies should be used instead. In this regard, we show that absorptive capability varies within
rather than between size categories and that absorptive capability does relate to spillover effects.
Domestic firms with higher levels of absorptive capability benefit more from foreign presence.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next Section we present related
literature and show some facts on the distribution of foreign firms in terms of size for our sample.
Section 4.3 discusses the data used in the empirical analysis and the measurement of spillover
variables. Section 4.4 deals with the empirical approach. Section 4.5 presents our findings and in
Section 4.6 we provide a further interpretation of our results with a strong focus on the different
underlying mechanisms that explain spillover effects. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Foreign Firms, Size and Spillovers
Although the size of domestic firms has been linked to FDI spillover effects in some contributions,
overall the literature on the issue is rather limited. These contributions have mainly explored
the relation between domestic firm size and horizontal spillover effects. Theoretical reflections
suggest different possibilities when it comes to the relation between domestic firms’ size and
spillover effects. A first strand of research maintains that especially large firms benefit from
FDI spillovers. For horizontal spillovers, Aitken and Harrison (1999) suggest that small firms
may be less able to cope with the ‘market-stealing’ effect of foreign firms. This is confirmed by
their finding that horizontal spillovers are negative only for firms with less than 50 employees.
Large firms may be more able than small firms to exploit the opportunities offered by foreign
technology due to scale effects (Sinani and Meyer, 2004). Large firms also have more access
to finance to invest in capturing spillover effects.3 Mulier et al. (2013) further report that small
(and young) firms are typically more financially constrained.
However, there is also a growing number of papers that -in addition to the traditional factors
labour, capital, and knowledge- identify entrepreneurship capital as an important factor driving
economic growth (see e.g. Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). In these studies, entrepreneurship
manifests itself mainly through the arrival of new small firms. A considerable amount of research
also points towards small and medium-sized firms as important sources of innovation and growth.
Smaller firms tend to be more flexible (less bureaucratic) and probably exploit opportunities that
are too modest to be of interest to bigger firms performing their own R&D and innovation (see
Acs and Audretsch, 1990). Acs et al. (1994) find empirical evidence that large firms are more
adept at exploiting knowledge created within the firm, whereas smaller firms have a comparative
3Alfaro et al. (2010) confirm the positive relation between the development of local financial markets and
spillover effects in a cross-country macro study.
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Figure 4.1: Domestic and foreign firm size distribution (firms employing more than 250 em-
ployees are included in the 250 employee category).
Histogram Foreign
deze
paper
advantage in exploiting outside technology (university laboratories in their case). For a sample
of Estonian firms, Sinani and Meyer (2004) find that horizontal spillover effects are largest in
magnitude for small firms, but insignificant for large firms. Further, domestic firm size may
also be related to the potential interaction with foreign firms which is the rationale for vertical
spillover effects.
Even though domestic firms’ size thus has already received some attention in the literature,
the role of foreign firms’ size has been neglected. To the best of our knowledge we are not aware
of any contribution in this respect. This likely stems from an implicit assumption in the literature
that MNEs are big. When we compare the distributions of the foreign and domestic firms in
the sample in Figure 4.1 (panel on the left and right respectively), we indeed notice that the
distribution of the foreign firms is clearly to the right and has a fatter tail of large companies.
Nevertheless, there is a substantial number of smaller foreign invested firms as well.
In the remainder of this paper we identify four size classes of firms following the EU’s
classification of firms as micro (less than 10 employees), small (between 10 and 50 employees),
medium (between 50 and 250 employees); and large firms (more than 250 employees).4 The EU
4These size classes are described by the European Commission and defined using the following ceilings: micro
firms have less than 10 employees and a turnover or balance sheet total of maximum 2 million Euro; small firms
have less than 50 employees and a turnover or balance sheet total of maximum 10 million Euro, medium-sized firms
have less than 250 employees and a turnover or balance sheet total of maximum 50/43 million Euro respectively;
see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm.
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of foreign firm size categories (manufacturing industries, year 2005).
employment size category
#firms
share in share in share in share in
(number of employees) value added employment capital turnover
micro firms
1-5 28.7% 1.3% 0.7% 1.9% 1.1%
5-10 11.8% 1.1% 0.9% 1.2% 1.6%
small firms
10-20 12.3% 2.2% 1.8% 1.7% 2.2%
20-50 17.0% 6.3% 5.6% 5.3% 7.4%
medium firms
50-100 11.1% 8.6% 7.9% 7.0% 8.3%
100-250 10.8% 17.4% 17.0% 18.3% 15.2%
large firms
250-1000 6.6% 37.0% 29.8% 39.2% 37.6%
1000-... 1.6% 26.1% 36.2% 25.5% 26.5%
Percentages expressed as shares in total foreign number of firms in manufacturing, total foreign value
added, ...
criteria focus both on employment and turnover thresholds, but we only consider employment.
Table 4.1 presents an overview of the number of firms and their share in total value added,
employment, capital and turnover created by all foreign firms for more detailed firm size
categories. Foreign firms with more than 250 employees account for about 8 percent of the total
number of foreign firms, but their share in total value added, turnover, capital, and employment
falls between 60 and 65 percent. Medium-sized firms with 50 to 250 employees make up for
about 22 percent of the number of foreign firms and account for another 25 percent share of
value added, turnover, capital, and employment. Smaller firms are large in numbers but account
for a very small share in value added, turnover, capital, and employment.
4.3 Data and Measurement
We use a Romanian firm-level panel data set to analyse FDI spillover effects from firms in
manufacturing and services industries on Romanian manufacturing firms. The data span the
period 1996-2005 and there is no restriction on firm size. Note that the data set is also used and
discussed in Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012) and Merlevede et al. (2014), but these papers apply
a threshold of minimum five employees on average for firms to be included in the estimation
sample. The data set is trimmed for outliers by removing the top and bottom percentiles of the
annual growth rates of real operating revenues, real capital, labour, and real material inputs.5
5If the ‘outlier’ is the first or last observation for a specific firm and other data points are normal, the remaining
firm-year data are kept. Otherwise all observations for this firm are dropped from the data set.
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Data are drawn from the Amadeus database by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing, which
contains information on the ownership and financials on public and private firms across Europe
(Bureau Van Dijk, 2011). Multiple issues published on DVDs by Bureau Van Dijk were used
to construct the database to get a full overview of financials and ownership through time.6
Nominal data are deflated with industry price-level data at NACE 2-digit level. Price-level
data were extracted from the Statistical Yearbook of the Romanian Statistical Institute (RSO,
2005) and the Industrial Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute for International
Economic Studies (WIIW, 2007). Real output (Y ) is obtained by deflating operating revenues
with producer price indices. Real capital (K) is calculated as tangible fixed assets deflated by the
average of the following industry deflators: machinery and equipment (NACE 2-digit 29), office
machinery and computing (30), electrical machinery and apparatus (31), motor vehicles, trailers
and semi-trailers (34) and other transport equipment (35). Labour (L) is equal to the number of
employees. Real material inputs (M) are obtained by deflating material inputs with a weighted
intermediate input deflator with weights derived from input-output (IO) tables. A time-series of
input-output tables in a Romanian industry code classification (approximately NACE 3-digit)
were obtained from the RSO. This allows us to construct time-varying input-output coefficients.
The subset of Romanian firms in the Amadeus database is known for its excellent coverage (also
see Altomonte and Colantone, 2008 and Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011).
Summary statistics for domestic and foreign firms across four size categories are provided in
Table 4.2. The stylised facts commonly found in the literature that foreign firms are larger in
terms of capital, employment and output produced and more productive are also established in
our data. For each of the six variables, the null hypothesis of equality of means in two-sample
t-tests is rejected when domestic and foreign firms within a size category are compared (at the
1% level, p-value equals zero in each case). This implies that foreign firms outperform domestic
counterparts of the same size in terms of productivity and output generated, and they also use
significantly more inputs. In Table 4.2, we further detect that large domestic and foreign firms
trump their smaller counterparts in all six variables, expect for total factor productivity. Are these
differences statistically significant? A comparison of domestic firms of each size category for
output, employees, capital and intermediates shows that firms in a higher size category overtake
firms in lower size categories (based on two-sample t-tests of equality of means, p-values of
zero). For example, large domestic firms produce significantly more output than domestic firms
of any other size, medium-sized domestic firms generate significantly more output than micro
and small domestic firms and small domestic firms supply significantly more output than micro
domestic firms. A similar test for the foreign firms in the sample leads to the same conclusion.
6A single issue of the Amadeus database is a snapshot of the ownership information and firms that exit are
simply dropped from the data.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for domestic and foreign firms across four size categories (output,
inputs and total factor productivity (TFP), period 1996-2005).
domestic firms foreign firms
number mean st.dev. number mean st.dev.
output*
micro 211,516 225.6 1701.7 19,048 768.4 5004.7
small 62,858 1352.5 5074.6 15,529 2672.8 8592.0
medium 17,137 5192.0 12593.5 9,484 9471.2 30561.0
large 7,252 28126.7 108733.2 4,020 51170.2 98067.9
employees
micro 183,804 3.7 3.1 16,970 4.5 3.6
small 60,917 21.1 15.0 15,023 24.2 17.2
medium 16,902 106.2 78.4 9,311 114.9 78.2
large 7,244 781.4 878.3 3,992 870.5 1279.0
capital*
micro 226,993 42.6 286.7 21,107 194.5 1082.1
small 64,074 383.7 2611.5 16,071 894.9 6247.1
medium 17,319 2114.0 6471.8 9,683 4350.6 18767.0
large 7,273 14210.3 37399.2 4,045 22156.6 49299.9
intermediates*
micro 214,315 158.7 1476.5 19,807 511.5 4469.5
small 63,114 936.8 4382.1 15,703 1708.0 6700.7
medium 17,176 3227.0 9939.6 9,562 5447.9 22495.3
large 7,265 16658.4 91448.6 4,031 30674.8 67704.6
OP TFP
micro 161,966 2.13 1.02 15,420 2.19 1.27
small 59,656 2.11 1.02 14,582 2.27 1.10
medium 16,708 2.31 1.08 9,184 2.73 1.19
large 7,214 2.17 0.97 3,961 2.42 1.16
ACF TFP
micro 114,038 5.79 1.50 10,296 6.03 1.69
small 45,040 5.78 1.38 11,133 6.10 1.37
medium 13,452 5.81 1.23 7,452 6.09 1.11
large 6,356 5.89 1.15 3,416 6.04 1.24
* thousands of local currency
As is also clear from the Table, in terms of productivity the results are more ambiguous (when
we look at the evidence using two-sample t-tests). Considering OP TFP, medium-sized firms are
the most productive domestic companies, large domestic firms are significantly more productive
than small and micro firms, and small domestic firms are significantly more productive than
micro firms. For ACF TFP, however, large firms are found to be the most productive domestic
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companies, while medium-sized firms still outperform small and micro firms, and small firms
have a higher average productivity than micro firms. When we turn to foreign firms, for OP TFP
the same relationships are detected as for domestic companies. In contrast, for ACF TFP the
null hypothesis of equality of means cannot be rejected when the productivity levels of large and
micro foreign firms are compared as well as the productivity levels of medium-sized and small
foreign firms. Small firms again appear to be significantly more productive than micro firms,
and medium-sized firms seem to be significantly more productive than large firms. Productivity
differences therefore appear to be less pronounced across size categories.
To calculate horizontal spillover variables, the current empirical literature applies a definition
that was first introduced by Caves (1974). Typically, the horizontal spillover variable HR jt
captures the degree of foreign presence in industry j at time t and is measured as:
HR jt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(4.1)
where Yit is the output produced by firm i in year t. HR jt is industry j’s share of output that
is produced by foreign firms. Foreign firms are identified by Fit , which is the share of foreign
participation in firm i in year t. To be considered as ‘foreign’ a foreign participation by a single
investor of at least 10% is required.7 HR jt is then combined with input-output coefficients
obtained from input-output tables to calculate vertical spillover variables. For the measurement
of the backward spillover variable BK jt , the literature employs:
BK jt = ∑
k if k 6= j
γ jkt ∗HRkt (4.2)
where γ jkt is the proportion of industry j’s output supplied to sourcing industry k at time
t. The γs are calculated from time-varying IO-tables for intermediate consumption. Backward
spillovers capture the fact that domestic firms supply intermediates to foreign firms. Since firms
cannot easily nor quickly switch industries to buy inputs, this approach avoids the problem
of endogeneity by using the share of industry output sold to downstream domestic markets k
with some level of foreign presence HRkt . Employing the share of firm output sold to foreign
firms would cause endogeneity problems if the latter prefer to buy inputs from more productive
domestic firms. Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012) make the case that diagonal elements from the
IO-tables for intermediate consumption should be included in the vertical spillover measures
7This threshold level is commonly applied in FDI definitions (e.g. by the OECD or the IMF).
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since these transactions do refer to supplier-client relationships, i.e. the rationale for vertical
spillover effects.8 In the same spirit, the forward spillover variable FWjt is defined as:
FWjt = ∑
l if l 6= j
δ jlt ∗HRlt (4.3)
where the IO-tables reveal the proportion δ jlt of industry j’s inputs purchased from upstream
industries l. Inputs purchased within the industry (l 6= j) again may be included or excluded,
depending on whether one prefers a more mechanical or a more intuitive approach to capture the
extent to which domestic firms in a given industry are using foreign firms as their supplier. HR jt ,
BK jt , and FWjt are then related to domestic firms’ productivity to infer the direction, magnitude
and significance of spillovers.
In this framework, we introduce (foreign) firm size in equation (4.4) by considering a
decomposition of (4.1) according to different firm size categories. To determine the different
firm size categories we rely on the EU definition described above. These firm size categories can
now be used to decompose the traditional horizontal spillover variable in (4.1) as follows:
HR jt =
∑i∈ j Fmicit Yit
∑i∈ j Yit
+
∑i∈ j Fsmait Yit
∑i∈ j Yit
+
∑i∈ j Fmedit Yit
∑i∈ j Yit
+
∑i∈ j F larit Yit
∑i∈ j Yit
(4.4)
where e.g. Fmicit is equal to the share of foreign participation in firm i in year t conditional
on the fact that firm i employs less than 10 employees. We denote the different components
on the right-hand side of (4.4) as HRmicjt , HR
sma
jt , HR
med
jt and HR
lar
jt . Then HR
sma
jt , for example,
is industry j’s share of year t output that is produced by small foreign firms. In our empirical
analysis we will employ these different components, calculated as in (4.5), without restricting
their coefficients to be equal. The definitions for BKsizejt , and FW
size
jt then follow from (4.2)
and (4.3) above (where again we will consider both a version including and excluding inputs
purchased within the industry):
HRsizejt =
∑
i∈ j
Fsizeit Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(4.5)
8Since Javorcik (2004), the standard has been to exclude inputs sold within the industry (k 6= j) because this is
captured by HR jt .
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics for spillover variables across size categories.
#obs mean st.dev. min max
horizontal spillover
all firms 580 0.258 0.193 0.000 0.880
micro firms 580 0.022 0.078 0.000 0.875
small firms 580 0.039 0.046 0.000 0.324
medium firms 580 0.063 0.081 0.000 0.552
large firms 580 0.134 0.160 0.000 0.862
backward spillover
all firms 580 0.207 0.078 0.018 0.552
micro firms 580 0.028 0.022 0.001 0.278
small firms 580 0.047 0.029 0.003 0.370
medium firms 580 0.054 0.033 0.003 0.284
large firms 580 0.078 0.055 0.000 0.441
forward spillover
all firms 580 0.211 0.086 0.019 0.579
micro firms 580 0.019 0.016 0.002 0.222
small firms 580 0.043 0.020 0.007 0.162
medium firms 580 0.054 0.035 0.003 0.232
large firms 580 0.094 0.064 0.006 0.409
BKsizejt = ∑
k if k 6= j
γ jkt ∗HRsizekt (4.6)
FW sizejt = ∑
l if l 6= j
δ jlt ∗HRsizelt (4.7)
Table 4.3 shows summary statistics for the three spillover variables and Figures 4.2 and 4.3
visualise the evolution over time of the horizontal and backward spillover variables respectively.
The summary statistics and box plots show that large foreign firms typically account for the
largest part of the spillover variable. In terms of the time dimension we see a clear upward trend
of foreign firms’ share in total industry output in the different size classes, but it tends to be more
pronounced for medium-sized and large firms.
We further examine the correlations between the spillover variables to get some more insight
into potential multicollinearity issues that may affect our results. For the traditional spillover
variables, the correlation between the horizontal and backward spillover variables is equal to
0.46, the correlation between the horizontal and forward spillover variables equals 0.46 and the
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Figure 4.2: Box plot of horizontal spillover variables for different size categories - box plot over
NACE 3-digit industries, selected years indicated.
horizontal
Note: In a box, the horizontal line represents the median, the edges are quartiles one and three, the whiskers capture
the points that lie within 3/2 times the interquartile range of these quartiles (they also indicate the minimum and
maximum, not accounting for outliers). The dots represent outliers, i.e. points that fall outside this range.
correlation between the backward and forward spillover variables amounts to 0.47 (using the
non-zero diagonal definition for the vertical spillovers). When the zero-diagonal definition is used
instead, the numbers are 0.12, 0.19 and 0.37 respectively. Table 4.13 in the Appendix reports the
correlations between each of the decomposed spillover variables for both the non-zero-diagonal
and the zero-diagonal approach. An analysis of the numbers in the Table reveals that overall
these correlations are not very high, especially given the correlations between the traditional
spillover measures.
4.4 Empirical Approach
FDI spillovers are commonly analysed in a production function framework where they are
introduced as additional ‘inputs’ explaining total factor productivity (TFP). We follow the ‘best
practice’ approach as defined in Havranek and Irsova (2011). We use firm-level data, compute
TFP by a method that accounts for the endogeneity of input demand, estimate the regression
in differences, and introduce a rigorous set of industry controls. We specify equation (4.8) as
our basic-level model where firm-level TFP of firm i in industry j at time t is related to lagged
FDI spillover variables, FDI jt−1, and a set of industry-level controls, Z j. This specification is
estimated for firms that are domestic throughout our sample period.
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Figure 4.3: Box plot of backward spillover variables for different size categories - box plot over
NACE 3-digit industries, selected years indicated.backward
Note: In a box, the horizontal line represents the median, the edges are quartiles one and three, the whiskers capture
the points that lie within 3/2 times the interquartile range of these quartiles (they also indicate the minimum and
maximum, not accounting for outliers). The dots represent outliers, i.e. points that fall outside this range.
T FPi jt = αi +ψ1 f
(
FDI jt−1
)
+ψ2Z jt−1 +ξi jt (4.8)
Equation (4.8) is first-differenced and region (αr), industry (α j), and time (αt) dummies
are added. The industry-level controls comprise a Herfindahl index of industry concentration,
an index for downstream demand9, an index of import competition, and an indicator of export
intensity. We further add firm age and the lagged level of firm size (measured by total assets) as
determinants of TFP growth. Equation (4.9) is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered
at the industry-year level because the majority of the variables are defined at the industry-level
while estimation is at the firm-level (Moulton, 1990).
∆T FPi jt = ψ
′
1∆ f (FDI jt−1)+ψ
′
2∆Z jt−1 +δ1ageit +δ2sizeit−1 +αt +α j +αr + εi jt (4.9)
9Downstream foreign entry could increase demand for intermediate products which might result in scale
economies. To separate this effect, the regression includes demand for intermediates following Javorcik (2004)
calculated as demand jt = ∑k a jk ∗Ykt where a jk is the IO matrix coefficient indicating that in order to produce one
unit of good k, a jk units of good j are needed. Ykt represents industry k output deflated by an industry-specific
deflator.
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The estimation of TFP is complicated by the endogeneity of inputs because the input choices
of a firm are likely to be related to its productivity (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). A number of
authors have proposed alternative estimation methods to obtain an unbiased estimate of TFP. The
semi-parametric approaches pioneered by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) (LP) introduced a proxy to handle the endogeneity bias. OP use investment as a proxy10
while LP choose material inputs, arguing that investment is not a good proxy because it is lumpy
and does not respond smoothly to the productivity shock (see Petrin et al., 2004). More recently,
Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF) proposed an alternative semi-parametric procedure to deal with
potential collinearity issues in OP and LP. As the discussion is still ongoing11, we use both OP
and ACF TFP. Note that while TFP estimates are obtained from production functions estimated
by NACE 2-digit manufacturing industry, domestic firms from all manufacturing industries are
pooled in equation (4.9).
4.5 Results
In this Section we first present the empirical results of the estimation of (4.9) taking into account
domestic and foreign firm size differences. We further examine potential sample selection issues
in the FDI spillover literature.
4.5.1 Domestic and foreign firm size
After establishing the stylised fact above that -although the size distribution of foreign firms is to
the right of its counterpart for domestic firms- a non-negligible amount of foreign investment is
done by smaller firms, we investigate whether foreign firms of different size categories generate
similar spillover effects. To do so we use definitions (4.4)-(4.7) and introduce the subcomponents
of the aggregate spillover variables separately in the estimation of equation (4.9). Tables 4.4
and 4.5 present results for foreign (and domestic) firms belonging to different size classes. We
perform regressions for two different TFP estimators (OP and ACF TFP, left and right panel
in the Tables) and consider vertical spillovers on the basis of both a non-zero-diagonal and a
zero-diagonal definition (in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively). The first (sixth) column uses the
full sample of domestic firms and the OP (ACF) TFP measure as dependent variable. Columns
two through five (seven through ten) present results for different size categories of domestic firms.
The most important finding in Table 4.4 is that only a single specific foreign firm size category
seems to be the main driver of spillover effects. Perhaps surprisingly, not the largest foreign firms
10We apply the procedure from Amiti and Konings (2007) to calculate investment from our data.
11Other recent efforts include TFP estimation using firm-level quantity data (TFPQ) rather than deflated revenue
data (TFPR). Unfortunately, we have no data on quantities. Our results should thus be interpreted keeping this
caveat in mind.
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Table
4.5:
Spillovereffects
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and
foreign
firm
size
categories
(zero-diagonaldefinition
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but rather the medium-sized foreign firms (that employ between 50 and 250 employees) generate
spillover effects. More specifically, we find positive horizontal and backward spillover effects
and negative forward spillover effects. Positive horizontal spillover effects can, for example,
arise through demonstration/imitation effects, labour mobility which allows domestic firms to
hire workers that were previously employed by a foreign firm, and increasing competition which
pushes domestic firms to become more productive (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). Backward
spillover effects are generally positive, in line with the expectation that foreign firms collaborate
closely with their local suppliers and for instance provide aid in setting up production facilities
or demand high-quality inputs. The negative forward spillover effects can be explained by
compatibility issues that may occur when domestic firms source inputs from a foreign supplier
(e.g. technologically more advanced inputs that are difficult to handle for the local company). In
Table 4.4, there is some heterogeneity in the effects across domestic firm size categories, with
micro and small firms benefiting from significant positive horizontal spillovers whereas larger
domestic firms do not. However, taking into account standard errors the coefficients are not
statistically different from one another. Further note that this difference disappears when one
uses the zero-diagonal definition to calculate the vertical spillover variables, for which the results
are reported in Table 4.5. In this case, all domestic firms benefit from horizontal spillovers.
There is some indication that foreign firms that employ between 10 and 50 employees generate
spillover effects. Comparing Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 also confirms the findings of Lenaerts and
Merlevede (2012) (although they use a sample of firms with at least five employees on average):
the use of a non-zero-diagonal definition of vertical spillovers makes the horizontal spillover
variable insignificant. It also tends to increase the backward spillover effect as point estimates of
coefficient are comparable, while the average value of the backward spillover variable will be
larger when the diagonal is included (as even in the detailed IO-tables the diagonal elements still
account for a substantial share of intermediate supply, see Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012)).
We further consider whether the estimated coefficients in each of the columns of Table 4.4
are statistically different from each other using Wald tests. For the results based on OP TFP, we
find that generally the horizontal spillover from the medium-sized foreign firms is statistically
different at the 5% level from that of the large foreign firms. Furthermore, the forward spillover
from medium-sized foreign firms is statistically different from that of the small and large foreign
firms at the 5% level. When spillover effects on medium and large domestic firms are evaluated,
the backward spillover from medium-sized foreign firms is statistically different from that of
all other size classes at the 5% level (except for the small category when spillover effects on
medium-sized domestic firms are considered). In the ACF TFP case, the same conclusion is
reached regarding the horizontal spillover. Forward spillover effects from medium-sized foreign
firms differ significantly from those of large and small foreign firms and backward spillover
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effects from medium-sized foreign firms are significantly different from those arising from micro
or large firms in most cases at the 5% level.
There are two additional issues that we need to address as they may have an impact on our
results. The first of these issues is multicollinearity. In this paper, we perform two additional
tests of which the results are reported in the Appendix to get some more insight into this potential
issue. As a first test, the horizontal and vertical spillover variables are entered separately by
size category to examine spillover effects on all domestic firms and on four size categories of
domestic firms. The results of this test are shown in Table 4.14. In Table 4.14, we detect positive
horizontal and backward spillover effects and negative forward spillover effects that arise from
medium-sized foreign firms. In none of the other cases statistically significant spillover effects
are found. These results confirm our earlier conclusions. Table 4.15 in the Appendix presents
estimation results in which the forward spillover variables are dropped from the regressions.
Backward spillover effects again appear to mainly arise from the medium-sized foreign firms.
Note that when only the backward spillover variables are introduced in the regressions, for both
OP and ACF TFP spillover effects arise from medium-sized foreign firms and for ACF TFP
there is also some evidence of positive backward effects from small foreign firms (results not
shown here). The second issue is related to the fact that total factor productivity is estimated
and that in the estimation process a number of assumptions and generalisations are made, as
pointed out by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Dumont et al. (2005) and Eberhardt and Helmers
(2010). The two-step estimation approach described in Section 4.4 implies that an estimate
of TFP, rather than a measure of TFP, is introduced into the second equation as the dependent
variable. In addition, intuitively the assumptions that TFP is unobservable in the first equation
but observable in the second equation do not seem to match up. To deal with this issue, Feenstra
and Hanson (1999) and Dumont et al. (2005) develop a method that can be used to correct the
standard errors obtained when the second equation that TFP relates to a number of variables
or determinants is estimated. This correction involves taking the additional variance that arises
because TFP is estimated into account. In this paper, we take this issue into consideration by
running a bootstrap procedure on the estimations reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The results of
the bootstrapping exercise nicely correspond to those reported in Table 4.4: only medium-sized
foreign firms appear to transmit spillover effects. The effects on domestic competitors in the
same industry are positive as are the effects on domestic suppliers (for OP TFP this applies
particularly to larger domestic firms). Negative forward spillover effects are observed as well.
The bootstrapping exercise for Table 4.5 reveals strong evidence with respect to the horizontal
and forward spillover effects originating from medium-sized foreign firms. The results on the
backward spillovers are somewhat less strong. Generally, our conclusion that spillover effects
are mainly generated by medium-sized foreign firms appears to hold.
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The empirical evidence in this Section leaves us with two main issues to explain: i) why do
only medium-sized foreign firms generate spillover effects; and ii) why does domestic firm size
have such a negligible impact on spillover effects. Before suggesting some explanations and
interpretations for both of these findings, we briefly elaborate on the potential sample selection
issue in the spillover literature.
4.5.2 Is sample selection an issue in the FDI spillover literature?
The potential ‘sample selection’ issue that we look into refers to the representativeness of the
data sets used throughout the literature. In the literature most often only firms above a certain
threshold are covered.12 Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) include
the number of observations or the number of firms (calculated as the number of observations
divided by the number of years) in their meta-analyses as a control but do not find any effect.
Clearly, the number of firms or observations is not a proxy to identify potential sample selection
issues. Our finding that domestic firm size is of lesser importance to explain potential differences
in spillovers suggests a limited impact of sample selection. Foreign firm size, on the other hand,
seems to be important, but since only medium-sized firms drive spillover effects, the exclusion
of smaller foreign firms should not impact conclusions on spillover effects to a large extent. In
Table 4.6 we present evidence on the potential sample selection issue by estimating equation
(4.9) for different samples where we increase the threshold in terms of the average number of
employees for domestic and foreign firms to be included in the estimation sample. Horizontal
and vertical spillover variables (non-zero-diagonal definition) are then recalculated based on the
new sample of firms meeting the threshold. Note the difference with Tables 4.4 and 4.5 where we
consider spillovers from four sets of foreign firms but use all domestic firms, irrespective their
size (in columns one and six). The results in Table 4.6 are in line with what we expect, sample
selection seems a limited issue. We detect a robust significant positive impact of supplying
foreign firms. Only when the sample is restricted to a sample with only firms that employ on
average more than 250 employees, these spillovers are no longer detected. This confirms our
findings in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. There is also an indication of negative forward spillovers when
micro firms are excluded, but they disappear when firms with less than 75 employees on average
are excluded. In conclusion, one should be aware of the sample thresholds used in empirical
work, but it is unlikely to bear a large impact on results.
12For example, the data set in Aitken and Harrison (1999) covers all firms with more than 50 employees and a
sample of smaller firms; Blalock and Gertler (2008) use a data set of establishments with more than 20 employees;
Barrios et al. (2011) use a survey data set of plants with more than 20 employees that generally are still surveyed
when their employment level falls below the threshold, Javorcik (2004) uses a survey with extensive coverage but
no cut-off is mentioned.
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Figure 4.4: Distributions of OP TFP of micro, small, medium-sized and large foreign firms in
year 2005.
4.6 Interpretation of results
4.6.1 Why do large and small foreign firms not generate spillover effects?
Although small foreign firms are on average more productive than their domestic counterparts
(see Table 4.2), the fact that they do not generate any spillover effects is likely to be due to scale
effects. Indeed, Vacek (2010) suggests that only larger foreign firms have a sufficiently large
scale to generate spillover effects.13 The more surprising result in Table 4.4 (and Table 4.10
below), however, is that we find little to no robust evidence of spillover effects from large foreign
firms. In this Section we first refute an obvious candidate rationale that may offer an explanation
for this result and then suggest other mechanisms for which we are able to provide support with
some empirical evidence.
As the prime rationale for spillover effects is the technological superiority of foreign firms,
one may argue that foreign firms’ size is related to technological superiority and that medium-
sized foreign firms outperform other foreign firms. Figure 4.4 therefore plots the distribution of
the level of OP TFP of foreign firms in 2005. As one can infer from the Figure, the distributions
are fairly similar, the distribution for medium-sized foreign firms does certainly not stand out
13We find some further support in the BEEPS 2005 questionnaire (cf. infra). Of the 33 small foreign firms in
Romania, 30 answered yes to the question whether they compete locally but only 16 answered yes to the question
whether they compete nationally.
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Figure 4.5: Log median number of employees and the share of imported intermediate inputs in
total intermediate use (NACE 2-digit industries).
and one can infer considerable heterogeneity around the average. The correlation between log
OP (ACF) TFP and the log number of employees is -0.10 (-0.004) for the sample of foreign
firms. The relative level of technological superiority across firm size categories therefore is
unlikely to be the main driver of our finding that only medium-sized foreign firms generate
spillover effects. Note that this does not preclude a role for technological superiority of for-
eign firms (see e.g. Lenaerts and Merlevede, 2014), it is however not related to foreign firms’ size.
A mechanism that may account for our findings is that -in comparison to medium-sized
MNEs- large MNEs may import (a large share of) their intermediates rather than engaging in lo-
cal sourcing, and that they export (a large share of) their output. This rules out potential upstream
and downstream linkages with domestic firms, and potentially reduces the competitive impact in
the domestic market. This mechanism is particularly relevant in the light of the emergence of
global value chains, in which MNEs play a crucial role. According to the 2013 World Investment
Report from the United Nations, trade in intermediates -used in different stages of the MNEs’
production processes and sourced from/supplied to their affiliates or other partners- represents
roughly 60% of global trade (UNCTAD, 2013). Whereas our data set is ideally suited to establish
our two main findings, it is less suited for a direct test at the firm-level of the import/export effect.
We do produce some industry-level evidence based on our firm-level data combined with further
external data. From Eurostat we retrieve input-output tables for the years 2000 and 2005 that
are less detailed than the IO-tables used above (NACE 2-digit rather than the Romanian NACE
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Figure 4.6: Log median number of employees and the share of exports in total industry output
(NACE 2-digit industries).
3-digit equivalent), but these IO-tables do allow calculating the share of imported intermediates
in total intermediate use by industry. Figure 4.5 plots these shares of imported intermediates in
total intermediate use against the log of the median number of employees of foreign firms in the
industry. We find a significant positive correlation, suggesting that industries where larger MNEs
are active use a higher share of imported intermediate inputs, leaving less scope for backward
spillover effects. Simple OLS regressions for both years separately show coefficients of 0.07 and
0.09 that are significant at the 5 percent level.
The finding that large foreign firms do not generate horizontal spillover effects in our sample
could likewise result from the fact that these firms are less involved in the Romanian economy.
Large foreign manufacturers might be more likely to use Romania as an export platform from
where the source country or other markets are also served. Our firm-level data again do not allow
for direct testing but to shed some light on this potential mechanism we retrieve the share of
export in total industry output for the years 2000 and 2005 from the Eurostat input-output tables.
We again relate this to the log size of the median foreign firm in the NACE 2-digit industry.
Figure 4.6 reveals a positive relationship between median size and export orientation. Simple
OLS regressions for both years separately show coefficients of 0.11 and 0.19 that are significant
at the 5 and 1 percent level.
The second mechanism we consider is the idea that large MNEs do not necessarily import
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their intermediates but may “bring their own supply chain”; i.e. foreign firms that are already
linked through the supply chain coordinate their foreign investment before entry and do not build
linkages with local firms. An interesting example of this mechanism for the case of Romania is
related to Renault’s decision to buy the Romanian car manufacturer Dacia in 1999 and the entry
of suppliers such as Mittal Steel and Michelin (published in Ziarul Financiar (Financial News-
paper) on April 19, 2001 as pointed out by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005)). This mechanism
is likely to run from large firms to other large or medium-sized foreign firms, large investors
might even force their home country suppliers to follow their investment.14 Kuo and Li (2003)
confirm that one of the main motivations for Taiwanese SMEs to invest abroad is “following
their major clients”. Smaller investors probably lack the power to force or persuade their home
country suppliers (or clients) to follow their investment. To test for such a mechanism we link
entry of MNEs in different size categories (see Merlevede et al. (2014) on how this is identified
in the data set) to entry of large MNEs in upstream and downstream industries (the detailed
Romanian NACE 3-digit equivalent classification is used here). Because entry of large foreign
firms is a fairly unique event and the number of industry-year pairs with entry of more than a
single large foreign firm is very small, we recode entry of large firms as a zero-one event, i.e.
we define EntryLARGEkt−x as a dummy variable that indicates whether at least a single large foreign
firm entered industry k in t.15 This also avoids assuming that the effect of entry of two foreign
firms is twice that of a single foreign entrant. We then are able to examine whether the entry of
large foreign firms is correlated with entry of other foreign firms in upstream and downstream
industries. To do so we run probit regressions to test whether entry of foreign firms of different
size categories in a given industry j is correlated with entry of large foreign firms in supplying
or sourcing industries − j as such testing whether large foreign firms “bring their own supply
chain”. We calculate these industry-level variables similarly as in (4.6) and (4.7) but replace
HRsizekt with Entry
LARGE
kt−x . We define the dependent variable in the probit regressions in a similar
way as Entrysizekt , a zero-one variable indicating whether we observe entry of foreign firms of a
specific size class. We do so because it is likely that there is a considerable heterogeneity in the
amount of suppliers a foreign firm brings, e.g. the activity of the large foreign investor might
play an important role. We exploit i) the fact that entry of a large foreign firm is typically a fairly
unique and isolated event in terms of industry-year pairs and ii) that in terms of timing supply
chain entry should be swiftly following the large foreign firm’s entry in order to reduce potential
spillover effects. We therefore consider concurrent entry and last year’s entry in linked industries.
For these reasons, our strategy is likely to work reasonably well for the effect of large foreign
14Although initially Renault set out to continue cooperating with Dacia’s local suppliers, eleven foreign suppliers
of the company were ‘asked’ to enter the Romanian market quickly to take over from these local suppliers as the
latter could not meet Renault’s expectations.
15Entry of large firms occurs in only 17% of industry-year observations of our data set, of these 70% is a single
large foreign entrant, another 15% is two large foreign entrants, and the remainder varies between 3 and 7 large
foreign entrants.
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firm’s entry. It is difficult, however, to set up a similar analysis for the supply chain impact of
entry of foreign firms of other size classes because entry of such foreign firms is much more
frequent and nearly always multiple firms enter. Add heterogeneity in the amount of suppliers
a foreign firm brings to the mix and identifying a “bring your own supply chain” effect is no
longer possible.
Results are listed in Table 4.7. We do find indications that the mechanism described above
is at work. The probability to observe entry of large, medium, or “large or medium”16 foreign
firms positively correlates with entry of large firms in the concurrent or previous year in sourcing
industries. These findings are also consistent with the negative forward level effect and the
positive forward absorptive capability interaction effect found below. When foreign firms bring
their supply chain with medium and large firms that produce the majority of their output for
their large MNE customer, a domestic firm will need a sufficient level of absorptive capability to
translate the availability of more advanced inputs into productivity gains. The entry of micro or
small firms does not seem to be related to large firms’ investment in related industries.17
Unfortunately, our data set does not allow for a firm-level test of the mechanisms described
above. Nevertheless, we are able to present some firm-level results on the basis of the Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a questionnaire on the business
environment in transition countries, organised jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development and the World Bank.18 In Romania 45 foreign firms responded to the survey
in 2002 and 73 in 2005 (five foreign firms participated in both waves).19 For these firms we
know whether they employ between 2 and 49, between 50 and 249, and between 250 and 9999
employees. In Table 4.8 we relate these size categories to different questions that relate to the
mechanisms introduced in the previous paragraphs. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.8 analyse the
answers to the question “What percentage of your material inputs and supplies are imported
directly?”. The first mechanism above yields the expectation that large foreign firms should be
more likely than other foreign firms to import their intermediate inputs. This is exactly what we
find in column 1 where we regress firms’ intermediate importer status (the status equals one if
the firm imports any intermediates and zero otherwise) on a dummy for medium firms and a
dummy for large firms (small firms being the excluded category) for the sub-sample of foreign
firms. Large foreign firms are found to be significantly more likely to import intermediates.
16This is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when either a large or a medium-sized foreign firm enters, or
both at the same time.
17As indicated above, industry-year pairs with zero entry of micro or small firms are limited. This caveat should
be kept in mind for these results.
18E.g. Gashi et al. (2014) use the full BEEPS data set to study export behaviour of SMEs in transition countries.
19The survey from 1999 is structured differently and corresponding questions are hard to find, the 2009 survey is
well beyond the time-period of our firm-level data set.
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Table 4.8: Firm-level evidence of the different mechanisms using BEEPS data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
interm. imp. int. exporter export supplier MNE sup.
importer share share to MNE share
probit OLS probit OLS probit OLS
medium 0.408 8.247 0.419 13.663* 0.266** 2.319**
[0.275] [7.617] [0.268] [7.150] [0.131] [1.177]
large 1.208*** 32.873*** 0.933*** 19.630** 0.682*** 5.654***
[0.347] [9.327] [0.326] [8.645] [0.159] [1.609]
foreign 0.536*** 7.416***
[0.148] [1.498]
Obs. 113a 113a 118a 118a 819 819
(Pseudo) R-sq. 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05
Chi-sq. 12.9 8.76 34.2
Prob.>Chi-sq. 0.00 0.03 0.00
Data for Romania from BEEPS 2002 and 2005. a Only foreign firms used in the estimations. Firm-level
estimates for firms responding to the questions detailed in the text. Standard errors in brackets. ***/**/*
denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
This is confirmed in column 2 where we find that large foreign firms on average import about a
33 percentage points larger share of their imports than their small and medium-sized counterparts.
The question “What percentage of your sales are exported directly?” allows to test whether
large foreign firms produce less for the local market than other foreign firms. Column 3 in Table
4.8 uses the sub-sample of foreign firms to confirm that large foreign firms are more likely to
become exporters than small foreign firms, whereas medium-sized foreign firms are not. Column
4 suggests that on average large foreign firms export a 20 percentage points larger share of their
output than small foreign firms. Although the evidence is not decisive, combined with Figure 4.6
above it does lend support to the idea that larger foreign firms are less likely to be involved in the
local market.20
The survey does not contain a question that allows for a direct test of our claim that large
foreign firms “bring their own supply chain”. However, based on the answer to the question
“What percentage of your domestic sales are to multinationals located in your country?” we can
20In addition to the evidence presented here, the results of Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for Indonesia are also
in line with the mechanisms discussed above. Arnold and Javorcik (2009) find an increased reliance on imported
intermediates and an increase in the volume (and share in output) of exports after a firm has been acquired by a
foreign investor. Acquired firms also seem large on average in their sample and employ about 279 (i.e. e5.632)
employees.
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produce some further indirect support. If large foreign firms do bring their own supply chain,
foreign firms should be more likely to supply multinationals than domestic firms. The BEEPS
data reveal that 11% of domestic firms supply MNEs, whereas 27% of foreign firms do. In
column 5 of Table 4.8 we find that -controlling for firm size- foreign firms are more likely to
supply other foreign firms, in column 6 we find that they on average supply about 7.5 percentage
points more to MNEs than domestic firms. Combined with our findings above on entry of foreign
suppliers following the entry of large foreign firms, this further supports the claim that the lack
of backward spillover effects from large foreign firms can be (partly) explained by the fact that
they bring their own suppliers.
A final element that we need to address is whether our findings may be driven by indus-
try characteristics rather than firm size. This issue might arise when medium-sized firms are
strongly present in industries that might be expected to generate (larger) spillover effects. Such a
correlation would then imply that other industry characteristics rather than firm size are driving
the estimation results. It is not straightforward to test for this potential issue because spillover
variables are defined at the industry-level. This implies that the identification of spillover effects
stems from variation across industries. To further explore the issue, we investigate i) a ranking
of industries in terms of output produced by medium-sized foreign firms (the industry with the
highest share has rank number one, with the second highest share number two and so on); and
ii) the correlation across the ranking of industries for different size categories. For year 2005,
the highest shares of industry output produced by medium-sized foreign firms are detected in
the following NACE rev 1.1 industries (note that we use NACE industries comparable to the
Romanian IO-table classification): processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables (15.3);
manufacture of leather and leather products (19); manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
(21); soaps, detergents, up-keeping products, cosmetics, perfumery (24.5); plastic processing
(25.2); processing of concrete, cement and lime items, and cutting, shaping and finishing of
stone (26.6, 26.7); motorcycles, bicycles and other transport means (35.4); and other industrial
activities (36). This list of industries is highly heterogeneous and covers both high-tech and
low-tech industries according to the classification in Nicolini and Resmini (2010), who find
intra-industry spillovers in low-tech and inter-industry spillovers in high-tech manufacturing
industries. This list thus indicates that medium-sized foreign firms do not necessarily cluster
in those industries that are expected to generate spillover effects. As a further test, we consider
correlations between the rankings for the various size classes and test whether these correlations
are statistically significant. The idea here is that for our results to be driven by a strong presence
of medium-sized firms in specific industries, these industries should not have a strong presence of
firms in other size classes for which we do not find spillover effects. Correlations are presented
in Table 4.9. In the Table, positive and statistically significant correlations are detected between
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Table 4.9: Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the rank numbers assigned to industries based on
the share of industry output produced by foreign firms of a specific size in 2005. Analysis based
on all industries and on the manufacturing industries only (top and bottom panel respectively).
All industries micro small medium large
micro 1
small 0.6177* (0.0000) 1
medium 0.3587* (0.0002) 0.6072* (0.0000) 1
large -0.1061 (0.2935) 0.0510 (0.6142) 0.2656* (0.0076) 1
Manufacturing micro small medium large
micro 1
small 0.3881* (0.0024) 1
medium 0.3094* (0.0171) 0.5604* (0.0000) 1
large -0.3759* (0.0033) -0.2621* (0.0450) -0.0207 (0.8764) 1
* denotes significance at 5 percent. Numbers between brackets are the p-values of the Pearson’s correlation
coefficients. To come up with rank numbers, industries are sorted according to the share of industry output
produced by foreign firms of a specific size class. The industry in which the share is the highest gets rank
number 1, the industry with the second highest share rank number 2, and so on. This procedure is followed
for each size class of foreign firms and then the correlations between all rankings are determined.
the medium and micro rank variables, and the medium and small rank variables. Industries with
a larger presence of medium-sized firms are thus likely to also have a stronger presence of micro
and small firms. The correlation between the rank variables for medium and large firms is also
positive when all industries are considered (insignificant when only manufacturing industries are
used). Overall, these results suggest that firm size appears to drive our results rather than specific
industry characteristics.
From the evidence presented in this Section, we conclude that foreign firm size adequately
proxies for the mechanisms explored above and thus captures the intensity of the linkages that
are set up with domestic firms. This intensity is lower for linkages with large foreign firms,
in comparison to medium-sized foreign firms, because these firms appear to be more likely to
import their intermediates, export their output and bring their own supply chain when investing
abroad. Linkages, and especially backward linkages with domestic suppliers, however, are
important for the transmission of technology and potential productivity effects on domestic firms.
Note that Hobday et al. (2001), for example, identify the limited backward linkages between
MNEs in enclaves in the electronics industry and domestic firms and the rest of the economy as
one of the issues that arises in this industry in Malaysia and Thailand. They also point to the
potential issue that MNEs in enclaves are footloose. Technological progress in these countries
mainly occurs within MNEs rather than within the domestic economy, in contrast to South Korea
and Taiwan. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) shows that when MNEs create enclave economies within
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developing countries, these firms can even be detrimental for the host economy.
4.6.2 Domestic firm size versus absorptive capability
Our second conclusion was that domestic firm size is of little importance to understand spillover
effects. From the discussion above on why firm size could matter and the literature on the
issue, one can infer that firm size typically serves as a proxy for several underlying channels or
mechanisms. The correlation of these different channels is not necessarily positive and even the
interpretation of a single mechanism does not necessarily point in one direction. In this Section,
we show that firm size serves as a poor proxy for domestic firms’ absorptive capability (captured
by a firm’s technology level), which is often cited as a decisive determinant for the direction and
magnitude of spillover effects.21
There are, however, opposing interpretations of the level of technology that give rise to
different outcomes. Findlay (1978) constructs a dynamic model of technology transfer through
FDI from developed to developing countries. He argues that there is a positive connection
between the distance to the world’s technological frontier and economic growth. Findlay’s model
implies that productivity spillovers are an increasing function of the technology gap between
foreign and domestic firms. However, measures of the level of technology are commonly used as
a measure of the ability of firms to assimilate outside knowledge and technology. Blomström
(1986) finds that foreign firms are more likely to wipe out local competitors if the initial level
of technology is low and human capital is poor, i.e. if absorptive capability is low. Kokko et al.
(1996) report that horizontal spillovers are positive and significant only for plants with small or
moderate technology gaps vis-à-vis foreign firms. Sjöholm (1999) finds that high technology
differences give rise to large spillovers, although results are sensitive to the choice of technology
measure. There is no theoretical ground for a clear interpretation of the relationship between
technology and FDI spillovers. Findlay (1978) suggests that spillovers are a negative function of
the level of technology, while the absorptive capability interpretation suggests a positive relation.
A measure of absorptive capability needs to reflect the relative technical capabilities of a
domestic firm vis-à-vis the foreign firms in the same industry, either to compete with them or
to use (produce) similar inputs (output). To construct such a measure, we use OP (ACF) TFP
(tfpit). ACit is defined in (4.10) as the distance between firm i’s lagged level of TFP, tfpit−1, and
the lagged “foreign frontier” in its industry. The latter is defined as the average TFP level of
foreign firms between the 75th and 99th percentile of the TFP distribution of foreign firms in
industry j (tfp jt−1,FOR). More productive firms thus have higher values of AC in (4.10).
21In this regard, the example of Dacia’s former suppliers which could not live up to the expectations of Renault
also gives an indication of the limited absorptive capability of these firms. This prevented them from benefiting
from their supply chain linkages with Renault.
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of absorptive capability of domestic firms in different size classes, year
2005 (absorptive capability is defined as a domestic firm’s OP TFP level relative to the OP TFP
level of foreign firms averaged over all firms between the 75th and 99th percentile in a NACE
3-digit industry).GAP by size class
GAP IS LARGER THAN 1 => other paper : some domestic firms more productive than some foreign firms
ACit =
tfpit−1
tfp jt−1,FOR
(4.10)
Figure 4.7 illustrates how the absorptive capability distribution (according to the OP TFP
definition) varies across domestic firm size categories. Following (4.10), a value of 1 indicates
that the domestic firm is as productive as the average foreign firm between the 75th and 99th per-
centile of the TFP distribution of foreign firms in the same industry. The distributions look fairly
similar across firm size classes and the bulk of domestic firms is less than half as productive as the
foreign frontier. Figure 4.7 clearly suggests that firm size only makes a poor proxy for the ability
of a firm to benefit from spillovers (see also the discussion in Sinani and Meyer, 2004). We inte-
grate absorptive capability in our analysis by considering the interaction of AC with the respective
spillover variables. The level effect of absorptive capability itself is negative, which indicates that
the productivity growth of domestic firms with a high absorptive capacity (i.e. a small technology
gap) is lower. Girma (2005) constructs absorptive capacity in a similar way and obtains the same
result. The level effects of the spillover variables for the OP definition of absorptive capacity in
Table 4.10 are in line with those reported in Table 4.6. The interaction effects further confirm that
absorptive capability plays a role as these effects are statistically significant in many cases. For
the OP TFP definition of absorptive capability, the negative level forward spillover effect appears
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to be partly offset by a positive effect that increases with absorptive capability in some cases.
This applies especially to small and micro-sized domestic firms. Positive backward spillover
effects are larger for firms with a higher level of absorptive capability, though be it from the small
foreign firm size category (i.e. it does not directly affect the level effect found for medium-sized
foreign firms). The interaction effects are mostly negative for backward spillovers that originate
from micro or large foreign firms and positive when they arise from small firms. For the ACF TFP
definition, for which the results are presented in Table 4.11, the interaction effects are less pro-
nounced. Only the positive interaction effects for the backward spillover variables turn out to be
statistically significant (especially when these spillovers emanate from for smaller foreign firms).
The level effects of the different spillover variables again correspond with our earlier conclusions.
We conclude that domestic firm size is of minor importance because it does not function well
as a proxy for different underlying mechanisms with competing effects. It is therefore advisable
to focus on other ways of identifying these mechanisms through more in-depth analysis. Lenaerts
and Merlevede (2014) present a more in-depth analysis of the impact of the relative level of
technology of foreign and domestic firms.
4.7 Conclusions
The literature on the spillover effects from foreign to domestic firms implicitly focuses on large
(foreign) firms. This is due to either data availability or, more importantly, the a priori assumption
that small firms play no role in the mechanisms behind these spillovers. This paper analyses
the role of foreign and domestic firms’ size for a sample of Romanian manufacturing firms.
Our analysis reveals two main conclusions: i) the largest and smallest foreign firms do not
generate spillover effects, only medium-sized foreign firms do; and ii) the size of domestic firms
is unimportant in explaining spillover effects. Based on these results, we extend our analysis to
determine which underlying mechanisms potentially drive spillover effects and whether the size
of foreign and domestic firms can serve as a proxy for these mechanisms.
Our results reveal that domestic firm size is of minor importance in the spillover framework
because it captures different underlying mechanisms and interpretations that compete with one
another. It is therefore advisable to focus on other ways of identifying these mechanisms through
more in-depth analysis. We show that domestic firms’ absorptive capability varies within rather
than between firm size categories. Domestic firms’ absorptive capability itself is related to
spillover effects, however.
With respect to foreign firms, firm size is found to be important and we provide evidence
that foreign firm size is likely to make a good proxy for the intensity of linkages generated
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with domestic firms. We show that -rather than engaging in local sourcing- industries with
larger MNEs import (a larger share of) their intermediates and export (a larger share of) their
output. This rules out potential upstream and downstream linkages with domestic firms, and
potentially reduces the horizontal effect in the domestic market. We further show that large
MNEs do not necessarily import their intermediates but may “bring their own supply chain”; i.e.
foreign firms that are already linked through the supply chain coordinate their foreign investment
before entry and do not build linkages with local firms. These mechanisms are also supported
by complementary evidence based on the BEEPS data set. Although micro and small foreign
firms are on average more productive than their domestic counterparts, they do not generate any
spillover effects which is probably due to scale effects.
The findings reported in this paper are also important from a policy-perspective because
investment promotion policies often target investors of a specific size. For example, a large
survey of investment promotion agencies conducted by the United Nations in 2000 reveals that
about 20% of these agencies only targets large investments above 5 million USD (UNCTAD,
2001). Importantly, especially transition countries appear to have set a high barrier for investment
to target (i.e. at 525,000 USD according to the survey). Considering the evidence presented in
this article, policy-makers should ensure that medium-sized foreign firms do not fall short of
these requirements.
Appendix
The Appendix to this Chapter comprises an additional Table with empirical results on the
importance of domestic firms’ size. In this analysis, spillover effects from all foreign firms of
different sizes are considered simultaneously. To this end, the traditional spillover variables,
as defined in equations (4.1)-(4.3), are used and the sample of domestic firms is split up into
four size classes. Table 4.12 then presents results for domestic firms belonging to different
size classes. We perform regressions for the OP and ACF TFP estimators (left and right panel)
and consider vertical spillovers on the basis of both a non-zero-diagonal and a zero-diagonal
definition (top and bottom panel in Table 4.12 respectively). The first column uses the OP TFP
measure and all domestic firms are included in the sample. These results again are in line with
Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012), as horizontal spillover effects turn out to be insignificant when
the non-zero diagonal definition is used and significantly positive for the zero-diagonal definition.
The backward spillover effect also goes up because the point estimates of the coefficient are
similar in the top and bottom panel of the Table, but the average value of the backward spillover
variable is larger when the diagonal elements are included. Columns two to five present results
of the estimation of the same specification as in column 1 for different domestic firm size
categories. Taking into account standard errors, coefficients cannot be rejected to be equal and
results are fairly stable across size classes. Small and medium-sized firms seem to experience
negative forward spillovers. The zero-diagonal results reveal a similar conclusion: taking into
account standard errors, it is not possible to reject coefficients to be equal across size classes.
These results are confirmed using ACF TFP rather than OP TFP. There is evidence of important
positive backward spillover effects, but they do not seem to vary systematically with domestic
firms’ size. Finally, Table 4.13 presents correlations between the spillover variables and Tables
4.14 and 4.15 present additional estimation results that provide us with some more insight into
potentially multicollinearity issues. In Table 4.14, the spillover variables from the different firm
size categories are entered separately. Table 4.15 document results when only the horizontal and
backward and when only backward spillovers are considered respectively.
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Table 4.13: Correlations between the horizontal (HR), backward (BK) and forward (FW)
spillover variables across four size categories.
HR BK FW
micro small medium large micro small medium large micro small medium large
HR
micro 1
small -0.09 1
medium -0.08 0.15 1
large -0.02 -0.02 0.18 1
non-zero-diagonal definition of the vertical spillover variables
BK
micro 0.37 0.05 -0.02 0.00 1
small 0.01 0.23 0.09 0.00 0.03 1
medium 0.04 0.12 0.43 0.01 0.06 -0.15 1
large 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.39 -0.06 0.04 0.15 1
FW
micro 0.56 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.26 0.07 0.08 -0.02 1
small 0.01 0.46 0.14 -0.04 0.07 0.20 0.18 0.06 0.20 1
medium 0.07 0.04 0.49 -0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.54 0.08 -0.01 0.16 1
large -0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.40 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.32 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 1
zero-diagonal definition of the vertical spillover variables
BK
micro 0.07 0.09 -0.03 0.00 1
small -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.09 1
medium 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.20 -0.32 1
large 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.21 1
FW
micro 0.10 0.23 0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.07 1
small 0.00 0.11 0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.33 1
medium 0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.14 -0.02 0.20 1
large -0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.06 0.01 1
Note: correlations are reported for the lagged first differenced versions of the spillover variables as these are
introduced in the equations.
Table 4.14: Spillover effects across domestic and foreign firm size categories: the spillover vari-
ables are entered separately by size category (non-zero-diagonal definition of vertical spillovers -
results for OP TFP).
all domestic domestic firms with average number of employees
firms < 10 10-50 50-250 > 250
micro foreign firms
horizontal 1.255 1.742 0.806 -0.747 -0.985
[1.475] [1.547] [1.365] [1.397] [1.103]
backward -0.435 -0.492 -0.171 -0.946 -0.379
[1.816] [1.869] [1.950] [1.574] [0.988]
forward -2.108 -2.800 -1.570 0.083 1.561
[2.840] [2.979] [2.527] [2.860] [2.355]
Obs. 167,022 107,780 42,847 11,161 5,234
R2 0.041 0.046 0.068 0.080 0.120
small foreign firms
horizontal 0.207 0.266 0.173 0.105 0.704
[0.651] [0.697] [0.650] [0.519] [0.461]
backward 1.651 1.416 2.345 2.322 0.707
[1.411] [1.610] [1.503] [1.416] [0.496]
forward 1.617 1.634 1.443 1.326 -0.386
[1.285] [1.345] [1.256] [1.133] [0.958]
Obs. 167,022 107,780 42,847 11,161 5,234
R2 0.043 0.047 0.072 0.084 0.122
medium foreign firms
horizontal 1.096** 1.156** 1.050** 0.674 0.746**
[0.457] [0.458] [0.468] [0.474] [0.325]
backward 2.612*** 2.631*** 2.537*** 3.088*** 1.578***
[0.726] [0.769] [0.713] [0.773] [0.480]
forward -3.325*** -3.308*** -3.374*** -3.363*** -2.135***
[1.094] [1.127] [1.037] [0.964] [0.808]
Obs. 167,022 107,780 42,847 11,161 5,234
R2 0.052 0.055 0.084 0.098 0.131
large foreign firms
horizontal -0.292 -0.344 -0.227 -0.155 -0.129
[0.229] [0.230] [0.242] [0.231] [0.158]
backward 0.844 0.998* 0.607 0.412 0.351
[0.571] [0.583] [0.594] [0.537] [0.419]
forward 0.156 0.286 -0.087 -0.061 -0.137
[0.715] [0.739] [0.697] [0.694] [0.491]
Obs. 167,022 107,780 42,847 11,161 5,234
R2 0.042 0.046 0.068 0.079 0.120
Spillover effects from four size categories of foreign firms on all domestic manufacturing firms and on four size
classes of domestic manufacturing firms in period 1996-2005. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the
industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
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5 | FDI Spillovers and
Multinational Firm
Heterogeneity1
Abstract
Theoretical work implies that more investment promotion will attract foreign firms that are less
productive than previous entrants. We analyse to what extent less productive foreign firms are
capable of generating positive spillover effects. We find that only sufficiently productive foreign
firms generate positive backward spillover effects. When we combine foreign and domestic
firm heterogeneity, more productive multinationals, and especially those that are more than
two standard deviations more productive than an individual domestic firm, are found to be the
main source of positive backward spillover effects for this firm. More productive domestic
firms benefit from larger positive effects. Supplying less productive multinationals results in
negative spillover effects. Lower productivity levels of domestic and foreign firms generally
lead to a more negative impact. If investment promotion aims at technology transfer to domes-
tic firms, policy-makers should be aware that this might result in zero or negative spillover effects.
Keywords: FDI spillovers, multinationals, firm heterogeneity, technology transfer
JEL classification: F23
5.1 Introduction
Many developing and developed countries have implemented investment promotion policies to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Policy-makers believe that foreign direct investment will
contribute to faster economic growth and welfare through increases in capital stocks, improve-
ments in technology, and through the creation of jobs (Harding and Javorcik, 2011; Borensztein
et al., 1998). Aside from these direct effects, policy-makers also expect substantial indirect
1This Chapter is the result of joint work with Prof. dr. Bruno Merlevede. Another version of this Chapter is
available as Ghent University Working Paper 2014/879.
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positive spillover effects on domestic firms. Through a range of channels -see Crespo and
Fontoura (2007) for a discussion- domestic firms may benefit from foreign presence. Expected
benefits are fuelled by the idea that foreign firms must have some special advantages, such as
superior technology, in order to enter new markets successfully (Markusen, 1995).
Recent trade literature that incorporates the mode of foreign market access into the “new”
trade theory supports the latter idea. For horizontal investment Helpman et al. (2004) show that
only the most productive firms in an industry engage in foreign activities. Of those firms that
serve foreign markets, only the most productive engage in FDI. Antràs and Helpman (2004)
obtain a similar finding for vertical investment. If FDI occurs (which is not necessarily the
case, depending on model parameters more productive firms might only buy intermediates
from independent suppliers abroad), then only the most productive firms are able to cover the
costs associated with foreign investment. For a large sample of Euro-area firms, Geishecker
et al. (2009) confirm that firms with affiliates abroad are more productive and contribute more
to economy-wide productivity growth. The above implies that when investment promotion
activities lower the costs associated with foreign investment, countries will -ceteris paribus-
attract more firms but less productive foreign firms than those already present in the host economy.
In the empirical literature, there is also a relative consensus on the superiority of MNEs
relative to their domestic counterparts in terms of productivity (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). The
latter result, however, typically builds on averages. For our Romanian data we obtain a similar
result if we regress our productivity measure on a set of industry-year interaction dummies and
a foreign ownership dummy. For our TFP measure obtained using the Olley-Pakes estimator
(Olley and Pakes, 1996) we get a coefficient of 0.094 with a standard error of 0.003. However,
when we plot the distributions of productivity levels of foreign and domestic firms for e.g. the
‘Manufacture of food products and beverages’ industry (15, NACE revision 1.12) in Figure 5.1,
we observe that although the distribution for foreign firms is clearly to the right, the level of
productivity of the most productive domestic firms certainly does not fall short of the level of
productivity of the least productive foreign firms.
Interpreting the level of productivity of a foreign affiliate as a summary measure of its special
characteristics, Figure 5.1 raises the question whether all foreign affiliates carry the same poten-
tial as a source of spillovers. This is our main research question: do FDI spillover effects depend
on the foreign firms’ productivity levels? The answer to this question is important as at least part
of the rationale for investment promotion activities is the expectation of positive spillover effects
2Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes, i.e. the standard
European classification system.
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Figure 5.1: Density plot of Olley-Pakes (OP) TFP for domestic and foreign firms in the
‘Manufacture of food products and beverages’ industry (NACE 2-digit industry 15 (revision 1.1)).
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to domestic firms. It seems natural to expect more spillovers from more productive affiliates.
At the macro-level, Findlay (1978) finds that the scope for positive spillovers increases when
the distance to the technology frontier is larger. Sjöholm (1999) reaches a similar conclusion
at the firm-level. The technology frontier is typically defined by the most productive foreign
firm(s). However, although more productive foreign affiliates might offer a larger scope for
positive spillovers, domestic firms need to be able to tap into this potential. The latter idea is not
new to a literature that has often used the distance between a domestic firm’s productivity level
and the frontier foreign firm(s) as an indicator of absorptive capability. In this form domestic
firm heterogeneity has received a considerable amount of attention (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007).
Kokko (1996), for example, finds that horizontal spillovers are positive and significant only
for plants with small or moderate technology gaps relative to foreign firms. Combining scope
and absorptive capability arguments leads to potential non-linearities. Girma and Görg (2007)
find a U-shaped relationship between productivity growth and their horizontal spillover variable
interacted with the level of technology and Girma (2005) observes that horizontal spillovers
increase with absorptive capability up to a threshold level, beyond which the increase is much less
pronounced. We therefore integrate domestic firm productivity heterogeneity into our analysis of
the impact of foreign firm productivity on spillovers from foreign direct investment. In short, we
try to identify “how much whom benefits from whom”.
To our knowledge, the heterogeneity in the productivity of foreign firms (whether or not
relative to domestic firms’ productivity) has not yet been analysed as a potential determinant of
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FDI spillover effects. There is some related literature that looks at other forms of foreign firm
heterogeneity, however. Girma et al. (2008), for example, consider domestic-market-oriented
versus export-oriented FDI. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) examine the relationship between a
firm’s ownership structure (partially or wholly foreign-owned) and the spillovers that occur. In
another study, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) differentiate between American and European
MNEs in order to determine how spillovers are affected by the origin of foreign investors. Work
by Marin and Bell (2006), Castellani and Zanfei (2007), and Marin and Sasidharan (2010)
explores how differences in technology-related activities in foreign subsidiaries affect ensuing
spillovers. Bartelsman et al. (2008) examine how firms’ productivity growth is affected by the
distance to global and national frontiers. Their results suggest that the pull of the global frontier
goes down when distance increases as opposed to the pull of the national frontier which does
not change with distance. Finally, Nicolini and Resmini (2010) investigate whether spillovers
generated by MNEs in low-tech manufacturing sectors are different from those generated by
MNEs in high-tech manufacturing sectors in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. Nicolini and
Resmini (2010) find that intra-industry spillover effects arise from MNEs in labour-intensive
sectors while inter-industry spillover effects emerge from MNEs in high-tech sectors. However,
industries are typically characterised by substantial firm-level heterogeneity and it is not a priori
clear whether all MNEs are similar in their capacity to generate spillover effects.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the setting for our analysis. The Figure shows two stylised productivity
distributions, one for foreign (F) and one for domestic (D) firms, with two domestic firms A and B
and two foreign firms C and D singled out. Foreign firm D is among the most productive (foreign)
firms in the market, while C is at the lower end of the foreign firms’ productivity distribution.
Note that in the Figure and its discussion below we compare foreign and domestic firms that
operate in the same industry. Throughout the paper, however, we consider the productivity of
firms in the same industry as well as that of firms in industries upstream/downstream. We first
focus on foreign firms’ ability to generate spillovers, i.e. do all foreign firms generate (equal)
spillovers or do C and D differ in their ability to generate spillovers. On the one hand, only
the most productive foreign firms like D could carry the potential to generate positive spillover
effects, but, on the other hand, the gap between D and the domestic firms might be too wide for
spillovers to manifest themselves making firm C a more likely source of spillovers in this case.
The absorptive capability of domestic firms could be important as well. With A and B holding
comparable positions in the domestic firms’ productivity distribution as C and D in the foreign
distribution, domestic firm B may not benefit from linkages with foreign firm C since B is more
productive than C, but B may well benefit from the presence of foreign firm D. Firm A, on the
other, hand might benefit from C, but not from D, or it may even lack the absorptive capacity to
benefit at all.
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Figure 5.2: Stylised productivity distributions of domestic (D) and foreign (F) firms. Firms A
and B are domestic, firms C and D are foreign.
Note: This stylised representation of the productivity distributions of the domestic and foreign firms in the sample
is based on the OP TFP distributions of these firms as shown in Figure 5.1 for NACE 2-digit industry 15. In the
Figure, firms A, B, C and D are assumed to be active in the same industry.
We use a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms to analyse how foreign firms’ productivity
affects their ability to generate spillover effects and how this interacts with domestic firms’
productivity as an indicator of their ability to capture them. First, we focus on foreign firms’
productivity. We decompose the traditional spillover variables into subcomponents according to
foreign firms’ productivity levels. More specifically, we classify foreign firms in four productivity
quartiles and calculate horizontal and vertical spillover variables for every quartile separately. We
find that positive backward spillovers predominantly emerge from the most productive foreign
firms in each industry. Next, we introduce domestic firm heterogeneity. We first test whether
domestic firms are affected differently by more and less productive foreign firms. In order to
do so, we split the traditional ‘overall’ spillover variables into a component that refers to ‘more
productive’ and one that refers to ‘less productive’ foreign firms relative to each domestic firm’s
productivity level. Backward linkages with more productive foreign clients are found to result in
positive spillovers, whereas the opposite holds for linkages with less productive foreign firms. A
further refinement reveals that especially linkages with foreign firms with a productivity level
more than two standard deviations larger than the domestic firm boost the latter’s productivity.
Domestic firm heterogeneity matters as well. More productive domestic firms benefit more from
the backward spillover effects, whereas negative spillovers weigh more heavily on the least
productive domestic companies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, spillovers from foreign
direct investment are introduced in the standard empirical framework. Section 5.2 also introduces
our data. Section 5.3 introduces foreign firm heterogeneity in the standard empirical framework
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and presents results. Section 5.4 presents results for the interaction of foreign and domestic firm
heterogeneity. Section 5.5 presents some robustness tests and, finally, Section 5.6 summarises
the key points of the article.
5.2 Spillover Measurement, Empirical Framework and Data
5.2.1 Spillovers from foreign direct investment in the standard empirical framework
The literature on linkages and technology transfer between multinationals and local firms is
extensive. Commonly, indirect or spillover effects from FDI are analysed by including variables
capturing spillover potential as additional inputs explaining total factor productivity (TFP) in a
production function framework. Spillovers are categorised into horizontal (intra-industry) and
vertical (inter-industry) effects. Horizontal spillover effects occur between firms in competitive
relationships in similar stages of the supply chain. Vertical spillover effects arise between firms in
supplier-client relationships. In this case, the literature identifies backward spillover effects that
originate from linkages between MNEs and their local suppliers and forward spillover effects that
originate from linkages between MNEs and their local clients. Following Caves (1974), the first
studies on the indirect effects of FDI focused exclusively on horizontal spillovers. Although the
idea of vertical spillovers dates back to McAleese and McDonald (1978) and Lall (1980), these
vertical effects did not receive a lot of attention until theoretical work by Rodriguez-Clare (1996)
and Markusen and Venables (1999) and empirical work by Javorcik (2004) revived the interest.
Since then vertical and especially backward spillovers are regarded as a more likely channel for
(positive) productivity spillovers. Although literature surveys by Görg and Greenaway (2004),
Crespo and Fontoura (2007), Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013)
suggest that empirical evidence on overall FDI spillovers is ambiguous3, positive backward
spillover effects seem robust throughout the literature. Havranek and Irsova (2011) confirm this
by means of a meta-analysis. They conclude that the average backward spillover effect of foreign
firms on their suppliers is both statistically and economically significant. Havranek and Irsova
(2011) further indicate that the best practice estimate of forward spillovers is insignificant. Given
these findings and in line with other recent work such as Damijan et al. (2013), we focus on
backward spillover effects in this study.4
To define variables that capture spillover potential the literature typically draws on work
by Caves (1974) and Javorcik (2004). Following Caves (1974) the horizontal or intra-industry
spillover variable is commonly calculated as follows:
3A potential explanation for these results is that MNEs fear technology leakage and therefore do not bring their
most advanced technologies with them but only technologies that are sufficiently advanced to allow them to have an
incremental advantage over domestic firms (Glass and Saggi, 1998).
4Furthermore, Damijan et al. (2013) indicate that foreign affiliates in Eastern Europe -we consider Romania- are
mainly engaged in end-user consumer goods.
5.2 Spillover Measurement, Empirical Framework and Data 191
Horizontal jt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(5.1)
where Yit is the output produced by firm i in industry j at time t and Fit is the share of foreign
participation in firm i at time t. A firm is classified as foreign when there is at least a single
foreign investor who owns at least 10% of the shares. Horizontal jt captures the degree of foreign
presence in industry j at time t by the share of industry j’s output produced by foreign firms.
The backward spillover variable for industry j measures the foreign presence in industries c
supplied by industry j at time t and is commonly calculated as follows:
Backward jt =∑
c
γ jct ∗Horizontalct (5.2)
Backward jt is a weighted average of Horizontal in the sourcing industries c. The weights
are input-output coefficients: γ jct represents the share of industry j’s total intermediate supply
that is supplied to each industry c. These coefficients are derived from input-output tables for
intermediate consumption. Following Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012), we do include within-
industry intermediate supply in Backward jt because within-industry intermediate supply does
refer to supplier-client relationships (i.e. the rationale for backward spillover effects).5 In our
view Backward serves as a proxy for linkages between MNEs and their local suppliers, which
does include within-industry intermediate supply.
As indicated above FDI spillover variables are introduced as additional inputs explaining total
factor productivity in a production function framework. In this paper, we rely on the standard
‘best practice’ framework (see Havranek and Irsova, 2011) and specify equation (5.3) as our
basic model where we relate the productivity level of firm i in industry j at time t to a set of FDI
spillover variables, FDI j, and a set of control variables, Zi j.
T FPi jt = αi +ψ1FDI jt−1 +ψ2Zi jt−1 +ξi jt (5.3)
Our set of control variables includes firm age, firm size, a Herfindahl index of industry
concentration, import competition and export intensity at the industry-level6, the share of
5In most studies, inputs supplied or sourced within the same industry are excluded from the backward spillovers
because these inputs are included in the horizontal spillover (hence c 6= j would be introduced as additional condition
in (5.2); see Javorcik (2004)). We present results using this definition as a robustness check.
6Unfortunately, this information is not available at the firm-level.
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intermediates in total industry output, and an index of demand in downstream industries7.
Equation (5.3) is first-differenced and time (αt), industry (α j), and region (αr) dummies are
added to obtain equation (5.4) which is estimated by OLS. Following Moulton (1990), we cluster
standard errors at the industry-year level because the estimation is performed at the firm-year
level whereas some of the explanatory variables are defined at the industry-year level.
∆T FPi jt = ψ ′1∆FDI jt−1 +ψ
′
2∆Zi jt−1 +αt +α j +αr + εi jt (5.4)
Because the input choices of a firm are likely to be based on its productivity, the estimation
of total factor productivity (TFP) will be biased if the endogeneity of inputs is not addressed
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). A number of alternative estimation procedures have been
suggested in order to deal with this issue. The most popular alternatives are the semi-parametric
approaches developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP).
In the semi-parametric approaches, a proxy is introduced to handle the endogeneity bias. Olley
and Pakes (1996) use investment as a proxy. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argue that investment
is lumpy and does not respond smoothly to productivity shocks and propose to use material
inputs as a proxy instead. In a more recent contribution, Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF) present
an alternative semi-parametric procedure that deals with potential collinearity issues in Olley
and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).8 We present results for OP and ACF TFP.9
Note that TFP estimates are obtained from production functions estimated by NACE 2-digit
manufacturing industry, while (5.4) pools domestic firms from all manufacturing industries.
5.2.2 Data
We use a large panel of Romanian manufacturing firms extracted from the Amadeus database
by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. The Amadeus database consists of financial and
ownership information on public and private companies across Europe (Bureau Van Dijk, 2011).
From this large database, we constructed a sample covering the period 1996-2005.10 Other work
that makes use of the Amadeus database has pointed out the excellent coverage of the subset
of Romanian firms (see e.g. Altomonte and Colantone (2008) and Merlevede et al. (2014)).
7Downstream foreign entry could increase demand for intermediate products which may result in scale economies.
To separate this effect, the regression includes demand for intermediates. Following Javorcik (2004) this is calculated
as demand jt = ∑
k
a jk ∗Ykt where α jk is the IO-matrix coefficient which indicates that in order to produce one unit of
good k, α jk units of good j are needed. Ykt is the output of industry k deflated by an industry-specific deflator.
8Other efforts include TFP estimation based on firm-level quantity data (TFPQ) rather than deflated revenue
data (TFPR). Unfortunately, data on quantities are not available to us. Results should therefore be interpreted with
this caveat in mind.
9We follow Amiti and Konings (2007) to compute investment from the data.
10We use multiple issues (published on DVDs) of the database because a single issue is only a snapshot of the
ownership information and firms that exit are dropped from the next issue released. In order to get a full overview
of ownership and financials through time, multiple issues are required. See Merlevede et al. (2014).
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Foreign direct investment started to enter Romania in the late 1990s, after the country’s economic
policy targets shifted from stabilisation to growth promotion (UNCTAD, 2003). This resulted in
the implementation of privatisation and market access reforms and policies aimed at attracting
foreign investment. Examples of the latter are corporate tax rates reductions, the introduction of
new incentives, the establishment of an investment promotion agency in 2002 and the conclusion
of several bilateral investment and double taxation treaties (reaching a total number of 94 and 70
treaties at the end of 2002, respectively - the number of treaties concluded was a lot higher in
Romania than in other Central and Eastern European countries) (UNCTAD, 2003). Combined
with an excellent coverage, the timing of the start of FDI inflows makes our sample an ideal
setting to study FDI spillover effects. In our data set, we observe firm entry and exit and find that
whereas only 16% of the total number of firms was foreign in 1996, the number had increased to
22% by 2005. Most of these investors are European.
We focus on firms that are always domestic and that have at least five employees on average.
Our sample is further trimmed for outliers by removing the top and bottom percentiles of the
annual growth rates of real operating revenues, real material inputs, real capital and labour.11
Nominal data are deflated with industry price-level data at the NACE 2-digit level. Price-level
data are taken from the Statistical Yearbook of the Romanian Statistical Office (RSO, 2005) and
the Industrial Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute for International Economic
Studies (WIIW, 2007). Labour (L) is the number of employees. Real output (Y) is constructed
by deflating operating revenues with industry-level producer price indices. Real capital (K) is
calculated as tangible fixed assets deflated by the average of the following industry deflators:
machinery and equipment (NACE 2-digit 29), office machinery and computing (30), electrical
machinery and apparatus (31), motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) and other trans-
port equipment (35). Real material inputs (M) are obtained by deflating material inputs with
a weighted intermediate input deflator. The weights are taken from input-output tables that
were obtained from the Romanian Statistical Office. These input-output tables are provided in
a Romanian industry code classification that maps into the NACE 3-digit classification. We
have a time-series of input-output tables which allows us to calculate time-varying input-output
coefficients.
Table 5.1 displays summary statistics of firm-level variables for all firms and for domestic
and foreign firms separately. Foreign firms realise more output, have higher capital stocks and
employ more workers. On average, they are also more productive than their local counterparts.
Two-sample t-tests for each of these variables reveal that these differences are statistically
11If the ‘outlier’ is due to the first or last observation for a specific firm and other data points are normal, the other
firm-year data are kept. If this is not the case, all observations for the firm are dropped from the data.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics (period 1996-2005).
All firms Domestic firms Foreign firms
mean sd mean sd mean sd
employment 85.82 409.92 65.15 263.27 137.79 500.64
log real output 13.52 2.03 13.32 1.95 14.25 2.12
log real capital 12.02 2.35 11.75 2.27 12.96 2.35
log real materials 12.80 2.30 12.67 2.21 13.25 2.53
log TFP OP 1.97 0.94 1.93 0.91 2.09 1.01
log TFP ACF 5.74 1.52 5.69 1.52 5.95 1.47
Spillover variables
obs mean sd min max
horizontal 464 0.271 0.191 0.000 0.872
backward 464 0.081 0.075 0.000 0.738
significant at the 1% level (the null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected in each case,
p-values equal to zero). Foreign firms produce on average 27.1 percent of industry output
(based on 464 industry-year observations). This number varies between 0 and 87.2 percent. On
average 8.1 percent of output in client industries is produced by foreign firms. Note that we only
consider vertical linkages with manufacturing industries here, whereas input-output coefficients
are calculated on the basis of IO-tables containing all industries. We do so because we do not
want to use the productivity estimators discussed above to obtain TFP measures for services
sectors.12 Additionally, FDI has been concentrated in manufacturing industries in our sample
period (Pauwels and Ionita, 2008).
5.3 Foreign Firm Heterogeneity
We first investigate whether the productivity level of foreign firms is important for their capacity
to generate spillover effects to domestic firms. In order to study the impact of foreign firm
heterogeneity on FDI spillover effects, we split the spillover variables defined in (5.1) and (5.2)
above in different subcomponents. The decomposition of the horizontal and backward variables
is based on the categorisation of MNEs in different productivity classes. A firm is classified
on the basis of its ‘initial’ productivity, i.e. the average productivity over the first three years
we observe the firm.13 The decomposition is operationalised by defining four different dummy
variables QxTFP that indicate to which productivity quartile x a foreign firm belongs. For example,
12Backward spillover variables for services industries are included as a control variable.
13Classifying firms based on average productivity does not qualitatively affect results. These results are available
on request.
5.3 Foreign Firm Heterogeneity 195
Q1TFP is set to one if the firm belongs to the first (lowest) quartile of the productivity distribution
and zero otherwise. As shown in equation (5.5), these dummies are then introduced in (5.1)
such that the four subcomponents sum to the original horizontal spillover variable. Rather than
restricting the subcomponents’ impact to be equal, each HRQxjt will enter (5.3) as a separate
explanatory variable, i.e. we relax the implicit assumption that all foreign firms are equal in
generating spillover effects, notwithstanding substantial productivity differences. Using (5.2)
and (5.5), the backward spillover variable is decomposed accordingly as shown in equation (5.6).
Horizontal jt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
=
∑
i∈ j
(Q1T FP +Q2T FP +Q3T FP +Q4T FP)∗Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
=
∑
i∈ j
Q1T FP ∗Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
+ ...+
∑
i∈ j
Q4T FP ∗Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
= HRQ1jt +HR
Q2
jt +HR
Q3
jt +HR
Q4
jt
(5.5)
Backward jt =∑
c
γ jct ∗Horizontalct
=∑
c
γ jct (HRQ1ct +HR
Q2
ct +HR
Q3
ct +HR
Q4
ct )
= BK Q1jt +BK
Q2
jt +BK
Q3
jt +BK
Q4
jt
(5.6)
We consider three alternatives to classify firms in initial productivity quartiles, which are
reflected in three versions of equation (5.4). First, we determine percentile cut-offs on the basis
of the within-industry distribution of initial productivity and then estimate equation (5.7). In this
case, potential differences in productivity across industries are not taken into account.
∆T FPi jt = ψ ′1a∆HR
Q1within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1b∆HR
Q2within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1c∆HR
Q3within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1d∆HR
Q4within
jt−1
+ψ ′1e∆BK
Q1within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1 f∆BK
Q2within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1g∆BK
Q3within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1h∆BK
Q4within
jt−1
+ψ ′2∆Zi jt−1 +αt +α j +αr + εi jt
(5.7)
Second, we use percentile cut-offs that are based on the distribution of initial productivity
across all industries. This allows foreign firms in a specific industry to cluster in the same quartile
(and therefore spillover variable). This alternative is examined by estimating equation (5.8).
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Table 5.2: Cross-tabulation of within-industry and across-industry productivity quartiles.
across industries
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
w
ith
in
in
du
st
ri
es Q1 10.8 7.5 5.8 1.3
Q2 7.6 5.8 8.1 3.7
Q3 5.4 5.7 6.0 8.2
Q4 0.8 6.2 5.5 11.5
∆T FPi jt = ψ ′1a∆HR
Q1across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1b∆HR
Q2across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1c∆HR
Q3across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1d∆HR
Q4across
jt−1
+ψ ′1e∆BK
Q1across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1 f∆BK
Q2across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1g∆BK
Q3across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1h∆BK
Q4across
jt−1
+ψ ′2∆Zi jt−1 +αt +α j +αr + εi jt
(5.8)
Intuitively, the difference between these two alternatives boils down to the issue whether
domestic firms learn differently from the most productive foreign firms within each (downstream)
industry or from the most productive foreign firms altogether (irrespective of whether the latter
belong to the same or different industries). We further clarify this difference by the following
examples. Consider a firm that is active in the IT industry and that provides other firms with a
service. The first alternative decomposition allows us to examine whether this IT firm benefits
more from supplying this service to the most productive firm than from supplying it to a less
productive firm within a downstream industry (e.g. the food industry). The second alternative
enables us to study whether the IT firm benefits more from providing the service to a firm that
is among the most productive companies when all industries in the economy are considered
simultaneously (e.g. a chemicals producing firm) than from supplying a less productive firm
(e.g. a food processing firm), even though this less productive firm still can be one of the most
productive companies within its own industry. Alternatively, it also gives us more insight into
the impact on the IT firm when the food processing firm is more productive than the chemicals
producer even if the chemicals industry on average is more productive than the food industry.
Clearly, both alternative decompositions will be different only to the extent that the variation
within industries is small relative to the variation across industries. Table 5.2 shows a cross-
tabulation of both sets of productivity quartiles with table entries expressed as a percentage of
the total number of foreign firms. The diagonal accounts for about 34% of observations, so two
thirds of foreign firms are classified in a different quartile depending on whether one uses the
within- or across-industry distribution of initial productivity. As a third alternative, we consider
a combination of the previous approaches and split the horizontal spillover variable on the basis
of the within-industry distribution of initial productivity and the backward spillover variable
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the two decompositions of the horizontal spillover variable.
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(a) Decomposition of the horizontal spillover variable based on the within-industry distribution of
initial productivity.
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(b) Decomposition of the horizontal spillover variable based on the across-industry distribution of
initial productivity.
on the basis of the productivity distribution across all industries (which is reflected in equation
(5.9)). This third alternative is motivated by the notion that horizontal spillover effects arise from
intra-industry linkages between firms. We therefore expect that for these effects especially the
relative productivity within an industry matters (for instance, competition effects from more
productive foreign firms on domestic companies may differ from those of less productive foreign
firms within an industry). On the other hand, vertical spillovers arise from inter-industry linkages
hence the productivity levels of foreign client firms across all industries seems to be more relevant
in this case. This is also clear from the examples mentioned above.
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∆T FPi jt = ψ ′1a∆HR
Q1within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1b∆HR
Q2within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1c∆HR
Q3within
jt−1 +ψ
′
1d∆HR
Q4within
jt−1
+ψ ′1e∆BK
Q1across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1 f∆BK
Q2across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1g∆BK
Q3across
jt−1 +ψ
′
1h∆BK
Q4across
jt−1
+ψ ′2∆Zi jt−1 +αt +α j +αr + εi jt
(5.9)
Figures 5.3a and 5.3b present box plots of the horizontal spillover variable decomposed
according to the within- and across-industry productivity distributions. The edges of a box show
the first and third quartile, the horizontal line within a box indicates the median and the whiskers
of a box represent the points that lie within 3/2 times the interquartile range of quartiles one and
three (also showing the maximum and minimum values when outliers are not accounted for).
The dots are outliers and indicate data points that fall outside the range marked by the whiskers.
Figure 5.3a shows a box plot of the decomposition of the horizontal spillover variable in four
quartiles defined according to the initial productivity level within each industry of foreign firms.
The 25 percent least productive foreign firms seem to produce a smaller share than the foreign
firms in the other quartiles, which do not seem to differ very much in terms of their share in
industry output. Figure 5.3b presents a box plot of the decomposition of the horizontal spillover
variable in four quartiles defined according to the initial productivity level across manufacturing
industries. In this case foreign firms in the second quartile seem more likely to be producing
larger shares of industry output.
Table 5.3 presents results of the estimation of equation (5.4) with FDI spillover variables as
defined in (5.5) and (5.6). Columns 1 to 3 report results for the alternative decompositions based
on OP TFP. The general conclusion that emerges is that backward spillovers from the most
productive foreign firms are positive and significant. In column 1, which uses the decomposition
based on the within-industry distribution of TFP, there is a clear ranking in terms of point
estimates with the least productive foreign firms within each industry showing the most negative,
though not significant, impact on domestic firms’ TFP. Only linkages with the most productive
foreign firms result in a significant positive spillover effect. Switching to the “across industries”-
classification affects backward spillover effects in columns 2 and 3. Now quartiles two, three
and four all contribute positively to domestic firms’ TFP, with coefficients of similar size. The
quartile three effect is not statistically significant different from zero while the other two are.
Comparing the results in column 1 with those in columns 2 and 3 suggests that especially the
most productive foreign firms within each industry affect domestic firms’ TFP positively as in
column 2 and 3 the most productive firms from industries with lower average productive are now
contained in quartile two or three (e.g. a quarter of the most productive foreign firms (Q4) within
industries are classified as below median productive in Q2 (cf. Table 5.2)). Foreign firms in the
“food and beverages” and the “wood processing” industries appear to have a stronger presence
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in Q1 and Q2 (classification across industries), whereas foreign firms in industries such as the
“manufacture of machinery and equipment” and “crude oil processing” industries show up in Q3
and Q4. Since the evidence in columns 1-3 is highly comparable, the industry composition does
not appear to drive these results.
In column 4 we show results for spillover variables that are calculated using a zero-diagonal
definition (cf. supra). As argued in Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012), the difference with the
previous column amounts to a ‘mechanical’ interpretation based on within-industry and between-
industry effects versus more intuitive supply chain, within-industry competition, and labour
market effects. The point estimate of the backward spillover effects is now larger, but the change
in definition results in smaller values of the backward spillover variables which implies that
the backward spillover effect actually decreases in size. Horizontal spillover effects are largely
absent in columns 1 to 3. Point estimates suggest that the impact of the most productive foreign
firms is the smallest or even negative. Results for the zero-diagonal backward definition in
column 4 show the opposite result, i.e. horizontal spillover effects from more productive foreign
firms (Q3 and Q4) are now significantly positive. This is in line with Lenaerts and Merlevede
(2012) who find that the impact of within-industry intermediate supply is likely to be captured
as a positive horizontal spillover effects when it is not accounted for in the backward spillover
variable due to the use of a zero-diagonal definition. The positive horizontal spillover effect
from more productive foreign firms found in column 4 is likely to be due to within-industry
intermediate supply (hence the smaller size of the backward spillover effect).
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.3 we present results on the basis of the estimation of a single
production function for the manufacturing industry as a whole rather than estimations by NACE
2-digit industry. These results confirm the findings for the backward spillover effects reported in
columns 1 and 3.
In columns 7 and 8 we repeat the analysis using ACF TFP rather than OP TFP. In column 7
the backward spillover effect is now only statistically significant for foreign firms in the third
quartile of the within-industries productivity distribution, while in column 8 it is only significant
for the second quartile of the across-industries productivity distribution. Going from OP to ACF
reduces the number of observations by about 25%, which might drive the observed differences
in results. If we apply the classification of foreign firms obtained from the initial OP productivity
distribution and estimate using ACF productivity as a dependent variable in columns 9 and 10,
we do confirm the results obtained in column 3. In our further analysis (cf. infra) results are
better aligned between OP and ACF TFP.
To rule out that these results are driven by multicollinearity, we run estimations where we
enter the different subcomponents one at a time. The results of these estimations are presented in
Table 5.12 in the Appendix and largely confirm the results in Table 5.3: positive backward effects
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are primarily driven by the best MNEs. The most noteworthy difference is that the backward
spillover effect of MNEs in quartile three is now statistically significant in a higher number of
cases. As a further robustness test we also ran estimations where the ‘traditional’ horizontal
spillover variable, as defined in equation (5.1), is used and only the backward spillover variable
is decomposed into four subcomponents. The results of this test provided in Table 5.13 in the
Appendix also confirm our earlier findings with regards to the backward spillovers. Horizontal
spillovers are insignificant. Furthermore, Tables 5.14 and 5.15 in the Appendix show the correla-
tions between each of the spillover variables used in the analysis in Table 5.3 (according to the
various classifications). The numbers reported in these Tables generally are not very high. On the
basis of this evidence, we conclude that our results do not appear to be driven by multicollinearity.
One may further have the concern that our estimations are affected by endogeneity, because
(the most productive) MNEs can be expected to engage in linkages with the most productive
domestic suppliers (i.e. ‘cherry picking’). We address this concern in several ways. First, firms
cannot quickly nor easily switch industries to buy their inputs. Making use of the share of
industry output sold to foreign firms in downstream industries rather than the share of firm
output to calculate spillover effects thus mitigates potential endogeneity issues. Especially when
the spillover variables are decomposed, it seems unlikely that foreign firms will be able to
find a domestic supplier that is able to provide the inputs that they require, fits into a specific
industry and productivity class or holds a specific position in the productivity distribution (and
then quickly and easily switch between suppliers with these characteristics in function of their
expected productivity). Furthermore, there are many reasons why firms engage in FDI. Research
suggests that FDI into transition countries such as Romania often is motivated by cost incentives
(Nicolini and Resmini, 2010). It does not appear to be very likely that foreign firms locate in
Romania to benefit from collaborations with highly productive domestic suppliers. In addition,
the spillover variables are lagged and following Haskel et al. (2007), equations are estimated in
first-differences and time, industry and region dummies are introduced into the equations. In this
way, time-invariant factors and other unobservable factors that drive the productivity of domestic
firms are captured.
Another potential issue that requires further discussion is raised by Feenstra and Hanson
(1999), Dumont et al. (2005) and Eberhardt and Helmers (2010). These authors underline that
when total factor productivity is used as a dependent variable in an empirical analysis, one has
to be aware of the fact that TFP is estimated instead of observed. Note that intuitively it does
not to appear to be very coherent that TFP is assumed to be unobservable to the researcher in
the first equation but that it is simply treated as an observable variable in the second equation.
The estimation of TFP is based on several generalisations and assumptions and further results
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in additional variance. Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) therefore indicate that the estimated
elasticities of labour, capital and materials have to be examined in more detail as well as the
implications of selecting a specific TFP estimator. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Dumont et al.
(2005) suggest to correct the standard errors in the second step to account for this additional
variance. In this paper, we try to address these concerns by performing a bootstrapping exercise
on our main estimation results. For Table 5.3, this exercise largely confirms the evidence on the
positive backward spillover effects arising from the most productive MNEs, especially for the
within- and across-industries classifications.
The results presented above can also be interpreted in the framework proposed by Nicolini
and Resmini (2010). In their study, positive vertical spillover effects arise from MNEs in high-
tech manufacturing industries and positive horizontal and vertical spillover effects from MNEs
in low-tech manufacturing industries in Romania in period 1998-2003. If one can assume that
the most productive MNEs within the high-tech manufacturing industries are among the most
productive firms within the economy, as opposed to firms operating in low-tech manufacturing
industries, than we show that these firms will have a positive impact on the productivity of their
suppliers (cf. our ‘across’ industries classification results). We further demonstrate that even
if MNEs are not among the most productive firms when the entire economy is considered (e.g.
firms involved in low-tech manufacturing activities), these firms still generate positive spillover
effects to their domestic suppliers if they are among the most productive companies within their
own industry (cf. our ‘within’ industries classification results).
5.4 Foreign and Domestic Firm Heterogeneity
Notwithstanding the fact that foreign firms are on average more productive than their local
counterparts, Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 reveal that there is a considerable overlap between foreign
and domestic firms’ productivity distributions. Therefore we take the analysis a step further and
allow domestic firms’ productivity (and domestic firms’ productivity relative to foreign firms’
productivity), to bear an impact on spillover effects. In order to do so we define and calculate
spillover variables at the firm-level by classifying foreign firms as either ‘more productive’ or
‘less productive’ relative to each individual domestic firm f . This is illustrated in Figure 5.4
where the productivity level of each individual domestic firm f , such as E, serves as a baseline for
the calculation of firm-specific spillover variables. To construct the ‘more productive’ spillover
variables for firm E, we gather the more productive foreign firms (the segment of the distribution
indicated by the thick full line) and use only these foreign firms to create HRmore in (5.10) using
a similar reasoning as in (5.1). ‘Less’ productive spillover variables for firm E are constructed
using only those foreign firms whose productivity level falls below E’s (the segment of the
distribution indicated by the dotted line). This analysis is repeated for each domestic firm f and
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Figure 5.4: Stylised productivity distributions of domestic (D) and foreign (F) firms. Illustration
of the calculation of firm-level spillovers for domestic firm E.
Note: This stylised representation of the productivity distributions of the domestic and foreign firms in the sample is
based on the OP TFP distributions of these firms as shown in Figure 5.1 for NACE 2-digit industry 15.
thus yields different values for domestic firms that differ in their initial level of productivity.
We define firm-specific horizontal spillover variables for a given firm f in industry j at time t
in (5.10) and (5.11). In (5.12) and (5.13) we show how we calculate the inter-industry BKmore
and BKless variables for a given firm f based on (5.2). Note that we compare the productivity
level of firm f in industry j with the productivity levels of foreign firms in sourcing industries
c. The spillover variables constructed in (5.10) and (5.11) and the derived backward spillover
variables will enter the regressions as separate variables to allow for different effects. Equations
(5.10)-(5.13) define firm-specific spillover variables. Table 5.4 presents summary statistics for
the horizontal and backward spillover variables split-up according to these definitions. The share
in industry output of more productive firms is on average about twice the share of less productive
foreign firms in industry output.
HRmoref jt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Yit |T FPf j>T FPi j
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(5.10)
HR lessf jt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Yit |T FPf j≤T FPi j
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(5.11)
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Table 5.4: Summary statistics of the firm-level spillover variables.
Less Productive More Productive
horizontal spillovers
<TFP f >2sd <2sd <1sd <1sd <2sd >2sd >TFP f
mean 0.096 0.003 0.012 0.080 0.154 0.027 0.007 0.188
std. dev. 0.107 0.025 0.041 0.089 0.120 0.052 0.021 0.135
backward spillovers
<TFP f >2sd <2sd <1sd <1sd <2sd >2sd >TFP f
mean 0.028 0.003 0.011 0.035 0.066 0.020 0.007 0.049
std. dev. 0.031 0.014 0.020 0.033 0.058 0.024 0.010 0.044
BK moref jt =∑
c
γ jct ∗
∑
i∈c
Fit ∗Yit |T FPf j>T FPic
∑
i∈c
Yit
(5.12)
BK lessf jt =∑
c
γ jct ∗
∑
i∈c
Fit ∗Yit |T FPf j≤T FPic
∑
i∈c
Yit
(5.13)
Table 5.5 contains the results for the firm-level spillover variables. The first four columns
show results based OP TFP, the last four columns show results based on ACF TFP. Column 1
incorporates all spillover variables (non-zero diagonal definition, cf. supra) in a single estimation.
Backward spillover effects are positive and significant if they originate from more productive
foreign firms, and they are negative and significant if they originate from relationships with
foreign firms that are less productive than domestic firm f . These negative backward effects
may, for example, arise when MNEs push the original client of domestic firms out of the market
but require less inputs, force local firms to produce on a less efficient scale, or are more difficult
to cooperate with. Columns 2 and 3 confirm these results when spillovers from more and less
productive foreign firms are considered one at a time. Horizontal spillover effects are not detected
when both ‘more’ and ‘less’ spillover variables are introduced in the same regression. They
become significant if entered one at a time. Horizontal spillovers from more productive foreign
firms are positive, whereas those from less productive foreign firms are negative.14 The sign
of the coefficients on the horizontal spillover variables is confirmed for ACF TFP in columns
5 to 7, but the spillovers are never significant. The backward spillover effects are robust to the
14A potential explanation for the latter is that despite their low productivity level these firms still manage to
capture a share of the market.
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change in TFP-measure. Columns 4 and 8, which show results for the zero-diagonal backward
definition, confirm the positive effect from more productive foreign firms. Horizontal spillover
effects are significant, but, as indicated before, likely pick up within-industry intermediate
supply relationships. Note that a bootstrapping exercise of the estimations presented in Table 5.5
validates the findings reported for each of the columns in the Table. In addition to addressing
potential multicollinearity by separating spillovers from more and less productive firms as in
columns 2, 3, 6 and 7, we present a correlation table of the various spillover measures in Table
5.16 in the Appendix. From this Table it is clear that the correlations in the non-zero-diagonal
case are higher than those for the zero-diagonal case, which is to be expected. However, in
Table 5.5 the same conclusions with respect to the backward spillover effects are reached for
both definitions. Moreover, the correlations take the highest values between the horizontal
and backward spillover in the same class (i.e. both more or less). This is not very surprising
considering the way these variables are constructed. The remaining correlations, however, are
moderate to low. We therefore conduct one further experiment in which we drop the horizon-
tal spillover variables from the regressions (estimates not reported here). The results of this
experiment fully confirm our findings. Domestic firms should thus be careful when entering
a supplier contract with a foreign firm. Firms only benefit from these linkages provided their
foreign client is more productive. These results are in line with Section 5.3, where we found pos-
itive backward spillover effects only to originate from the most productive foreign firms within
each industry. The latter will typically be more productive than the majority of the domestic firms.
We now consider a refinement of our more-less approach through a further decomposition of
the ‘more productive’ and ‘less productive’ versions of the spillover variables. First, we calculate
the standard deviation of the level of productivity for the sample of all domestic firms. Then,
we add and subtract one and two times the standard deviation from the productivity level of
each individual domestic firm f (such as firm E in Figure 5.4) to obtain four cut-off values.
These cut-off values allow us to create three classes of MNEs on each side of the domestic firm’s
productivity level: i) foreign firms that are up to one standard deviation more (less) productive
than the domestic firm (< 1sd); ii) foreign firms that are between one and two standard deviations
more (less) productive (< 2sd); and iii) foreign firms that are more than two standard deviations
more (less) productive (> 2sd). Foreign firms more than two standard deviations apart from the
domestic firm could be considered as “significantly” more or less productive. Table 5.4 presents
summary statistics for the spillover variables split-up according to these definitions (based on
96,681 firm-level observations). Foreign firms that fall within one standard deviation above or
below the domestic firm’s productivity level account for the largest part of foreign firms share in
industry output. Foreign firms that have a productivity level which is more than two standard
deviations larger than that of the domestic firm account on average for less than one percent of
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208 FDI Spillovers and Multinational Firm Heterogeneity
industry output, but there is substantial variation across firms.
Table 5.6 presents the estimation results where we allow for further heterogeneity in the
spillover coefficients for different productivity classes of MNEs. Columns 1 and 4 present results
for the full set of spillover variables for OP and ACF TFP respectively, while columns 2, 3, 5,
and 6 introduce either the more or the less spillover variables by themselves in the estimation.
Backward spillover effects are primarily driven by foreign firms that are substantially more
productive (> 2sd). For OP TFP all more productive foreign firms generate positive backward
spillover effects, while for ACF TFP only those foreign firms that are significantly, i.e. more
than two standard deviations, more productive generate positive backward spillover effects.
Linkages with less productive foreign firms are nearly always significantly associated with
negative spillover effects. For both OP and ACF TFP point estimates switch sign from more to
less productive foreign firms. The size of point estimates seems inversely related to foreign firm
productivity with the most productive MNEs generating the largest positive backward spillover
effects. Horizontal spillover effects are largely absent. There is some indication that significantly
less productive foreign firms are associated with negative effects. Given the numbers in Table
5.6, this impact is fairly small, however. To rule out potential multicollinearity effects, the
last two columns of Table 5.6 present estimation results where the different subcomponents
are considered separately. Results are in line with those reported in columns 1-6. The most
productive foreign firms are thus confirmed to be the main source of positive backward spillover
effects. Table 5.17 in the Appendix comprises the correlations between the various horizontal
and backward spillover variables introduced in Table 5.6. In each model, again the correlations
are the highest between the horizontal and backward spillover variables of the same productivity
class (which is to be expected given the construction of the spillover variables). The correlations
of the variables across different productivity classes are rather low. We again perform a further
test by omitting the horizontal spillover variables from the estimations (estimations not reported
here). The results from this test again fully confirm our earlier conclusions. We also perform
a bootstrapping analysis of the estimations presented in Table 5.6. The results of this analysis
correspond with our previous findings. For ACF TFP, the estimates of the horizontal spillover
effects are somewhat less robust and the backward less > 2sd spillovers in columns 4 and 6 are
no longer significant. All other results are validated in the bootstrapping procedure.
Upon closer inspection, the definition of HRmore in (5.10) implies that -ceteris paribus- less
productive domestic firms in a given industry will have a higher value for the more spillover
variables. This can be seen from Figure 5.5 that plots for each domestic firm the initial level of
OP TFP against the value of BKmore. The previous set of estimations therefore does not account
for the potential impact of domestic firms’ productivity as an indicator of absorptive capability.
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Figure 5.5: Backward spillover variables from more productive MNEs related to local firm OP
TFP.
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The literature, however, has highlighted the importance of absorptive capability of domestic
firms as a determinant of spillover effects (see Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). We introduce the
idea of absorptive capability by splitting domestic firms in different groups according to their
initial level of productivity. As for foreign firms, we define four quartiles of initial productivity
across all industries and estimate separate regressions for each quartile of domestic firms. The
results are presented in Table 5.7. The first four columns present results for OP TFP, columns
five to eight present results for ACF TFP (here quartiles for both foreign and domestic firms are
defined on the basis of ACF TFP). The overall pattern is fairly stable across different productivity
quartiles and it is in line with the findings in Table 5.6, i.e. supplying the most productive foreign
firms is the main channel through which positive spillover effects are transmitted. The least
productive domestic firms seem to benefit only from those MNEs in supplying industries that
are considerably more productive. Domestic Q1 and Q2 firms only benefit significantly from
foreign firms that are considerably more productive in the ACF TFP case, or that are at least one
standard deviation more productive in the OP TFP case. Marginally more productive foreign
firms do not generate positive spillover effects which is in line with the findings in Table 5.3 that
only the most productive foreign firms generate positive backward spillover effects. The most
productive domestic firms (Q3 and Q4 firms), on the other hand, seem to benefit from all foreign
firms that are more productive. The more productive domestic companies also seem to benefit
more: point estimates for all backward spillover variables from more productive foreign firms are
positive, significant, and larger than for their less productive domestic counterparts. Supplying
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Figure 5.6: Contribution of the backward spillover to OP TFP by domestic firms’ initial
poductivity level (total period-average).
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less productive foreign firms results in negative spillover effects. Lower levels of domestic and
foreign firms’ productivity generally give rise to a more negative impact. When the estimations
reported in the Table are bootstrapped, we find highly similar results. The backward spillover
effects from more productive MNEs show up as positive and statistically significant. Negative
backward spillover effects from less productive MNEs again appear to mainly affect weaker
domestic firms. For OP TFP, the spillovers from MNEs up to one standard deviation more or less
productive are no longer significant. The same conclusion is reached for the effects of MNEs
between one and two standard deviations on domestic firms in Q3 for ACF TFP. Overall, the
pattern and significance of the effects detected in the Table thus are confirmed.
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the total period-average backward spillover contribution to OP and
ACF TFP respectively in function of domestic firms’ initial level of TFP.15 In the Figures each
dot represents a domestic firm and the vertical lines indicate the cut-off values for domestic firm
productivity quartiles. There is considerable heterogeneity across firms, but the more productive
domestic firms on average clearly benefit more than their less productive counterparts. Figures
5.6 and 5.7 suggest that domestic firms need to have a sufficient absorptive capability in order to
benefit from positive spillover effects. Overall, positive backward spillover effects are the largest
for more productive domestic firms whereas spillover effects turn negative for less productive
15The figures we obtain when we only consider the contributions of statistically significant backward spillover
effects are very similar and therefore not included in this article.
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Figure 5.7: Contribution of the backward spillover to ACF TFP by domestic firms’ initial
poductivity level (total period-average).
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firms. Horizontal spillovers are absent. These findings are in line with Gorodnichenko et al.
(2007) and Damijan et al. (2013). Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) find positive backward spillover
effects that decrease with domestic firms’ distance to frontier. Damijan et al. (2013) report that
less productive firms are more likely to be faced with negative vertical spillovers than more
productive firms, which are more likely to benefit from positive effects. While we confirm
these previous findings, we more importantly show that they are not solely related to absorptive
capability, but also crucially depend on foreign firms’ level of productivity as an indicator of
their capability to generate spillover effects.
The findings reported in this paper also have important policy implications.16 First, policy-
makers need to take into account that not all foreign firms are a source of positive productivity
spillover effects. In fact, when foreign firms’ productivity levels are too low, no or even negative
backward spillover effects are detected.17 This issue is particularly relevant when investment
promotion policies are specifically aimed at attracting MNEs to facilitate technology transfer and
16In a recent contribution on optimal taxation schemes, Langenmayr et al. (forthcoming) examine whether high-
productivity firms should be treated more favourable than low-productivity firms in a setting where governments
can impose different tax rates on firms with different productivity levels. From their analysis, they conclude that this
approach is only advantageous when the optimal profit tax rates are high and tax competition is low. When this does
not hold, favouring low-productivity firms is more appropriate.
17Note that in some cases low-productivity firms can enter a market because of a “technology acquisition”
rationale, see Fosfuri and Motta (1999) In this framework, firms that are lagging behind in terms of technology
invest abroad in order to acquire the technology of other companies with better technology.
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positive productivity spillovers to domestic firms. Nevertheless, FDI is also associated with direct
effects that should be considered as well. Even though less productive MNE are associated with
negative or no spillover effects, they still bring capital and jobs when they enter the market.18
Second, our results also clearly indicate that the absorptive capacity of domestic firms is crucial in
determining which firms can benefit from positive spillover effects. Low-productivity domestic
firms appear to benefit less from positive spillovers than their more productive counterparts and
in addition are confronted with larger negative spillover effects from low-productivity MNEs.
This implies that even when countries manage to attract those foreign firms that transmit positive
spillover effects, domestic firms still have to be able to tap into this spillover potential. Policy
measures aimed at raising the productivity of domestic firms are important to address these
issues, as these measures enhance firms’ absorptive capability and competitiveness. Absorptive
capacity has already received a lot of attention in the spillover literature. Cohen and Levinthal
(1990) discuss the importance of absorptive capacity in relation to R&D. Importantly, they show
that absorptive capacity can be a byproduct of firm activity when the knowledge a firm wants to
acquire is closely related to its current knowledge but that firms have to put effort into building
up absorptive capacity when this is not the case (by undertaking R&D investments). They further
show that firms need to have absorptive capacity to benefit from R&D spillovers from their
competitors and that spillovers -in part- can also stimulate firms to invest in R&D and improve
their absorptive capacity. Combining these findings with the evidence presented in our paper
thus clearly leads to the conclusion that absorptive capacity is very important for firms to adopt
knowledge and technologies in order to benefit from spillover effects, but that this absorptive
capacity does not necessarily arise automatically. Policy can thus play a role here.
5.5 Robustness
In this Section, we verify the robustness of the estimation results presented in Table 5.7. We
focus on Table 5.7 because this Table integrates the different layers of foreign and domestic firm
heterogeneity.
As a first robustness test, we start from a similar set-up as in Table 5.7 and perform two
estimations, one in which the more spillover variables are entered separately and one in which
only the less spillover variables are entered. Results are presented in the top and bottom panel of
Table 5.8. In the top panel, results confirm that positive backward spillover effects predominantly
originate from foreign firms whose productivity level exceeds the domestic firm’s productivity
level by more than two standard deviations. The more productive domestic firms are able to
absorb positive backward spillover effects from all more productive foreign firms. Less pro-
18In our sample, a comparison of average capital and employment levels of foreign firms does not suggest clear
differences between the different productivity quartiles.
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ductive domestic firms only benefit from linkages with foreign firms that are more than two
standard deviations more productive in the ACF TFP case and at least one standard deviation
more productive for OP TFP. The estimated impact of linkages with the other foreign firms is
mixed. There also is limited evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. In the bottom panel of
Table 5.8, the pattern of backward spillover effects is similar to the pattern in Table 5.7, and
again all statistically significant effects are negative. Overall, the results in Table 5.8 confirm our
previous findings.
One may wonder whether our results are driven by specific exit and entry patterns. Therefore
we present in Table 5.9 the results of repeating Table 5.7 for a balanced sub-sample of domestic
firms that are present in the sample in years 1998-2005. A comparison of Tables 5.7 and 5.9
reveals that the obtained coefficient patterns are highly similar in both tables. Specific entry or
exit patterns are therefore not driving our results. Classifying domestic firms in productivity
quartiles within rather than across industries neither alters our conclusions as one can infer from
Table 5.10. Although the additional benefits accruing to more productive domestic firms seem
somewhat smaller in Table 5.10 than in Table 5.7, more productive foreign firms are once more
confirmed to generate larger positive backward spillover effects and more productive domestic
firms are able to benefit more. Figure 5.8 shows results for ACF TFP where we consider ten
deciles of domestic firm productivity rather than four quartiles. The drawback of this approach is
that this decreases the degrees of freedom and the number of represented industries in the decile
sub-samples, thus reducing the source of variation for identification. Bearing this caveat in mind,
moving from quartiles to deciles in Figure 5.8 shows fairly similar results to Figure 5.7.
Could it be that results are driven by a limited number of extremely (un)productive ‘outlier’
foreign firms that dominate the spillover variables that are more than two standard deviations
larger (smaller) than the productivity level of all domestic firms? A calculation of the average
number and the share of foreign firms that are more or less productive reveals that in 2005 on
average between 12 (7) percent and 93 (88) percent of foreign firms are classified as more (less)
productive. The average percentages of more productive foreign firms are the smallest in various
sub-industries of the ‘Manufacture of food products and beverages’ (NACE 2-digit industry 15)
and the ‘Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture
of articles of straw and plaiting materials’ (20). On the other hand, the average percentages
are the highest in various sub-industries of ‘Manufacture of refined petroleum products’ (23);
‘Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.’ (29); ‘Manufacture of office machinery and
computers’ (30); and ‘Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and
apparatus’ (32). Furthermore, in 2005, averaged over domestic firms, up to 51 percent of foreign
firms over all industries are more than two standard deviations more productive (mean is 10
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Figure 5.8: Contribution of the backward spillover to ACF TFP by domestic firms’ initial
poductivity level (ten deciles of domestic firms, total period-average).
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percent), between 1 and 37 percent of foreign firms fall between one and two standard deviations
(mean is 19) and between 10 and 41 percent of foreign firms are up to one standard deviation
more productive (mean is 30). On average up to 22 percent of foreign firms are more than two
standard deviations less productive (mean is 5), between 1 and 32 percent of foreign firms fall
between one and two standard deviations (mean is 12) and between 5 and 39 percent of foreign
firms are up to one standard deviation less productive (mean is 24). A detailed inspection of the
data further revealed that for the average domestic firm, firms of almost all industries are part of
each of the six subclasses. We therefore conclude that the values of the > 2sd spillover variables
are not driven by ‘outlier’ firms.
Our results clearly indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity among foreign firms in
terms of productivity levels. This heterogeneity implies that not all firms carry an equal spillover
potential. One might argue that the level of productivity is merely conveying other characteristics
that drive spillover potential. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) examined the relationship between
a foreign firm’s ownership structure and ensuing spillover effects. Foreign productivity does
not appear to be driven by the ownership structure of foreign firms. Figure 5.9 in the Appendix
shows the productivity distributions of majority- and minority-owned MNEs. It is clear that the
distributions for both types of ownership are very close to one another. Foreign productivity is
also not driven by the country of origin of a foreign firm. For a sample of foreign firms locating
in Romania, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) find no relationship between the country of origin of
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an MNE and its level of productivity. A closer look at the foreign owner of firms in the different
productivity quartiles in our data reveals that in many cases firms are spread quite evenly over
the quartiles. For firms with an Hungarian owner, for example, we find 197 firms in the first,
128 firms in the second, 144 firms in the third and 101 firms in the fourth quartile. Firms with
an owner from a more developed country are more inclined to end up in the third and fourth
quartiles (e.g. for Great Britain, the numbers are 69, 72, 155 and 160 respectively), whereas the
reverse applies to owners from a less developed country in Europe (e.g. Bulgaria and Serbia),
Asia (e.g. Turkey), and America (e.g. Peru). The country of origin does therefore not appear to
explain the results reported in this paper. Finally, foreign firm characteristics such as R&D efforts
are potentially correlated with productivity levels. However, we prefer to think of productivity as
an outcome variable that not only reflects R&D efforts itself but also the efficiency and usability
of R&D efforts.
5.6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce multinational firm heterogeneity in the FDI spillover framework
to examine how the productivity level of a multinational affects this firm’s spillover potential.
Theoretical work suggests that -ceteris paribus- investment promotion activities will attract
foreign firms that are less productive than those already invested in the host country because
investment promotion lowers the costs associated with foreign investment. As part of the ratio-
nale of investment promotion is the expectation of substantial indirect positive spillover effects
to domestic firms, it is important to analyse the link between the productivity of foreign firms
and their capability to generate positive spillover effects. Furthermore, while on average foreign
firms are more productive than domestic firms, we find a considerable overlap between both
distributions. Therefore, a substantial amount of domestic firms has productivity levels that
exceed those of foreign firms.
We use a panel of Romanian manufacturing firms that covers the years 1996-2005 to investi-
gate this relationship. In a first step we establish the result that only the more productive foreign
firms generate positive backward spillover effects. We find no evidence of horizontal spillover
effects. To arrive at this conclusion, we split the productivity distribution of foreign firms in
four quartiles and define horizontal and vertical spillover variables for each quartile by means of
a decomposition of the traditional spillover variables. Next, we link our work to the literature
on domestic firm absorptive capacity and spillover effects and combine foreign and domestic
firm heterogeneity in our analysis. We start by introducing a simple firm-specific decomposition
of the standard spillover variables. We compare the productivity level of each domestic firm
with that of all MNEs in the sample and classify the foreign firms as more or less productive.
We then calculate spillover variables for both more and less productive MNEs separately. As
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expected, more productive foreign firms are found to generate statistically significant positive
backward spillover effects. What might be less anticipated is that less productive foreign firms
are associated with statistically significant negative spillover effects.
We then refine our analysis in two dimensions. We allow for further foreign firm hetero-
geneity by decomposing more and less productive foreign firms in three groups: i) foreign firms
that are up to one standard deviation more/less productive than domestic firm f , ii) foreign
firms that are between one and two standard deviations more/less productive and iii) foreign
firms that are more than two standard deviations more/less productive. Additionally, we create
four sub-samples of domestic firms according to their productivity level to capture absorptive
capability. We find that foreign firms that are more than two standard deviations more pro-
ductive than domestic firms are the main source of positive backward spillover effects. More
productive domestic firms capture larger spillover effects: point estimates for all backward
spillover variables from more productive foreign firms are positive, significant, and larger than
for their less productive domestic counterparts. Supplying less productive foreign firms results
in negative spillover effects. Lower levels of domestic and foreign firms’ productivity gener-
ally give rise to a more negative impact. These results are robust to a number of robustness checks.
Previous literature such as Damijan et al. (2013) also report that less productive domestic
firms are more likely to be faced with negative vertical spillovers. While we confirm these
findings, we more importantly show that negative effects are not solely related to absorptive
capability, but also crucially depend on foreign firms’ level of productivity as an indicator of their
capability to generate spillover effects. Our results are also important from a policy-perspective.
Policy-makers should keep in mind that not all foreign firms are a source of positive spillovers,
especially when investment promotion policies aim at attracting MNEs to facilitate technology
transfer and productivity spillover effects to domestic firms. However, even less productive
foreign firms still bring capital and jobs and these direct effects of FDI also have to be accounted
for. Besides this focus on foreign firms, policy-makers also have to consider the role of domestic
firms and their absorptive capacity. Even when a country succeeds in attracting those MNEs
that are able to transmit positive productivity spillovers, domestic firms still need to have the
ability to tap into this potential. Policy therefore also has to comprise measures to increase
domestic firms’ productivity, as this will improve the competitiveness and absorptive capability
of these companies. This is particularly relevant as Cohen and Levinthal (1990) demonstrate that
absorptive capacity is not always acquired automatically but instead requires efforts from firms
in terms of investment.
Appendix
Figure 5.9: Density plot of OP TFP for minority and majority foreign-owned firms (2005).
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As discussed in the Robustness Section of the Chapter, Figure 5.9 in this Appendix introduces
the productivity distributions of the majority and minority foreign-owned firms in the sample in
the year 2005. The former are firms in which the share of foreign participation equals no less
than 50%, the latter are firms with a share of foreign participation that falls between 10% and
50%. Because the distributions overlap to a large extent, the Figure suggests that the productivity
of foreign firms is not related to their ownership structure.
To obtain the industry-level estimation results in Table 5.3, foreign firms are classified into
four quartiles on the basis of their ‘initial’ productivity, which is calculated as the average
productivity in the first three years the firm is observed. Alternatively, firms can also be classified
based on their average productivity over all years they are present in the sample. To this end,
first the average productivity throughout the sample of each MNE is determined. Then, MNEs
are classified into four classes based on this average productivity level. For each class of MNEs
horizontal and vertical spillover variables are constructed, which are then introduced simulta-
neously into the estimation equation. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.11.
Similarly as reported in the previous Tables, positive backward spillover mainly emerge from
the most productive multinationals. There is also some evidence of negative backward spillover
effects for the less productive MNEs, but these results are less robust (especially for the second
quartile). Overall, these results are in line with our earlier conclusions.
The remainder of this Appendix comprises the empirical results of several further robustness
checks. In order to verify whether the results in Table 5.3 are affected by multicollinearity, two
additional tests are performed. The first test involves running regressions in which the horizontal
and vertical spillover variables of each of the four quartiles are considered separately. The
results of this test are shown in Table 5.12 and confirm those in Table 5.3. For the first quartile,
no significant effects are found. The results for quartiles two, three and four point to positive
backward spillover effects, which become larger as the productivity level of the MNEs goes
up. The backward spillover effects in the third quartile are statistically significant in the Table.
Horizontal spillover effects are positive and significant in only a few cases. In the second test,
the ‘classic’ horizontal spillover variable of equation (5.1) is combined with the decomposed
backward spillover variable expressed in equation (5.6). Table 5.13 displays the estimation
results. These results correspond nicely with our previous findings: the most productive MNEs
are clearly the driving force behind the positive backward spillover effects. In Tables 5.14 and
5.15 the correlations between each of the spillover variables used in the estimations of which
the results are reported in Table 5.3. Tables 5.16 and 5.17 present the correlations between the
different horizontal and backward spillover variables in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. Note
that when the horizontal spillover variables are dropped from the estimations in Tables 5.5 and
5.6, the results on the backward spillover effects are fully validated.
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Table 5.14: Correlations between the horizontal and backward spillover variables used in the
estimations reported in Table 5.3 in columns 1-4 (classification based on the OP TFP distribution).
non-zero within industries within industries
diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
w
ith
in
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 0.074 1
HR Q3 0.008 -0.058 1
HR Q4 -0.026 -0.055 -0.153 1
w
ith
in
BK Q1 0.593 0.063 0.052 0.043 1
BK Q2 -0.034 0.379 0.104 0.050 0.212 1
BK Q3 -0.049 0.009 0.455 0.020 0.174 0.322 1
BK Q4 -0.010 0.045 0.003 0.438 0.247 0.361 0.273 1
non-zero across industries across industries
diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
ac
ro
ss
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 0.039 1
HR Q3 -0.020 -0.127 1
HR Q4 -0.016 -0.020 -0.046 1
ac
ro
ss
BK Q1 0.584 0.027 -0.007 0.028 1
BK Q2 0.052 0.329 -0.026 0.057 0.214 1
BK Q3 0.000 -0.016 0.641 0.047 0.014 0.072 1
BK Q4 0.010 -0.032 -0.009 0.423 0.056 0.066 0.125 1
non-zero within industries across industries
diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
w
ith
in
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 0.074 1
HR Q3 0.008 -0.058 1
HR Q4 -0.026 -0.055 -0.153 1
ac
ro
ss
BK Q1 0.029 0.014 0.189 0.114 1
BK Q2 0.030 0.187 0.141 0.151 0.214 1
BK Q3 0.309 -0.057 0.276 0.054 0.014 0.072 1
BK Q4 -0.056 0.144 0.040 0.201 0.056 0.066 0.125 1
zero within industries across industries
diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
w
ith
in
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 0.074 1
HR Q3 0.008 -0.058 1
HR Q4 -0.026 -0.055 -0.153 1
ac
ro
ss
BK Q1 0.001 -0.020 0.035 0.044 1
BK Q2 0.020 0.020 0.080 0.022 0.296 1
BK Q3 -0.026 -0.016 0.196 0.044 0.208 0.164 1
BK Q4 -0.045 -0.052 0.016 -0.016 0.091 0.118 0.434 1
Note: lagged first-differenced versions of each of the spillover variables are considered to come up with
the correlations.
Table 5.15: Correlations between the horizontal and backward spillover variables used in the
estimations reported in Table 5.3 in columns 5-8 (classification based on the OP TFP distribution
for the manufacturing industry as a whole (OPM TFP) in the two top panels and on the ACF
TFP distribution estimated by NACE 2-digit industry in the bottom two panels).
OPM non-zero within industries within industries
TFP diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
w
ith
in
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 0.036 1
HR Q3 -0.036 -0.080 1
HR Q4 -0.092 -0.142 -0.083 1
w
ith
in
BK Q1 0.446 0.030 0.034 0.078 1
BK Q2 0.015 0.318 0.022 -0.011 0.301 1
BK Q3 -0.007 -0.025 0.557 0.128 0.225 0.169 1
BK Q4 -0.014 -0.033 0.070 0.496 0.288 0.103 0.419 1
OPM non-zero within industries across industries
TFP diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
w
ith
in
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 0.036 1
HR Q3 -0.036 -0.080 1
HR Q4 -0.092 -0.142 -0.083 1
ac
ro
ss
BK Q1 0.212 0.166 0.104 0.022 1
BK Q2 0.041 0.085 0.178 0.176 0.209 1
BK Q3 0.083 0.025 0.270 0.245 0.095 0.436 1
BK Q4 -0.051 -0.019 0.090 0.363 0.024 0.123 0.345 1
ACF non-zero within industries within industries
TFP diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
w
ith
in
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 -0.032 1
HR Q3 0.025 0.027 1
HR Q4 -0.055 -0.150 -0.115 1
w
ith
in
BK Q1 0.578 0.037 0.055 0.007 1
BK Q2 -0.043 0.432 0.089 0.014 0.225 1
BK Q3 -0.027 0.017 0.459 0.044 0.253 0.250 1
BK Q4 -0.037 -0.049 0.077 0.448 0.117 0.196 0.313 1
ACF non-zero within industries across industries
TFP diagonal HR Q1 HR Q2 HR Q3 HR Q4 BK Q1 BK Q2 BK Q3 BK Q4
w
ith
in
HR Q1 1
HR Q2 -0.032 1
HR Q3 0.025 0.027 1
HR Q4 -0.055 -0.150 -0.115 1
ac
ro
ss
BK Q1 0.118 0.128 0.242 0.046 1
BK Q2 0.116 0.152 0.077 0.132 0.267 1
BK Q3 0.086 0.072 0.141 0.128 0.048 0.156 1
BK Q4 -0.072 -0.011 0.205 0.248 0.032 0.046 0.143 1
Note: lagged first-differenced versions of each of the spillover variables are considered to come up
with the correlations.
Table 5.16: Correlations between the horizontal and backward spillover variables used in
the estimations reported in Table 5.5 (classification based on the OP TFP and the ACF TFP
distribution, non-zero-diagonal and zero-diagonal definition of the backward spillover variables).
OP TFP
non-zero-diagonal zero-diagonal
HR more HR less BK more BK less BK more BK less
HR more 1
HR less -0.422 1
BK more non-zero diag. 0.736 -0.239 1
BK less non-zero diag. -0.259 0.805 -0.190 1
BK more zero diag. 0.408 -0.078 0.748 -0.108 1
BK less zero diag. -0.070 0.480 -0.108 0.773 -0.127 1
ACF TFP
non-zero-diagonal zero-diagonal
HR more HR less BK more BK less BK more BK less
HR more 1
HR less -0.051 1
BK more non-zero diag. 0.835 0.019 1
BK less non-zero diag. 0.042 0.822 0.073 1
BK more zero diag. 0.619 0.071 0.820 0.081 1
BK less zero diag. 0.105 0.554 0.078 0.831 0.082 1
Note: lagged first-differenced versions of each of the spillover variables are considered to come up with
the correlations.
Table 5.17: Correlations between the horizontal and backward spillover variables used in
the estimations reported in Table 5.6 (classification based on the OP TFP and the ACF TFP
distribution, non-zero-diagonal definition of the backward spillover variables).
OP TFP
HR more HR less BK more BK less
> 2sd < 2sd < 1sd > 2sd < 2sd < 1sd > 2sd < 2sd < 1sd > 2sd < 2sd < 1sd
HR more>2sd 1
HR more<2sd 0.04 1
HR more<1sd -0.08 -0.15 1
HR less>2sd -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 1
HR less<2sd -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.02 1
HR less<1sd -0.08 -0.15 -0.30 -0.09 -0.05 1
BK more>2sd 0.72 0.17 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.12 1
BK more<2sd 0.06 0.65 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 0.18 1
BK more<1sd -0.04 -0.07 0.70 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 1
BK less>2sd -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.84 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 1
BK less<2sd -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.76 0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.11 1
BK less<1sd -0.07 -0.09 -0.17 -0.08 -0.01 0.77 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 0.09 1
ACF TFP
HR more HR less BK more BK less
> 2sd < 2sd < 1sd > 2sd < 2sd < 1sd > 2sd < 2sd < 1sd > 2sd < 2sd < 1sd
HR more>2sd 1
HR more<2sd 0.06 1
HR more<1sd -0.13 0.04 1
HR less>2sd -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 1
HR less<2sd -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.24 1
HR less<1sd -0.09 -0.11 0.14 0.02 0.22 1
BK more>2sd 0.82 0.16 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 1
BK more<2sd 0.12 0.78 0.17 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.22 1
BK more<1sd -0.12 0.15 0.80 -0.01 0.00 0.22 -0.10 0.28 1
BK less>2sd -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.62 0.35 0.16 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 1
BK less<2sd -0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.23 0.72 0.37 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.46 1
BK less<1sd -0.10 -0.07 0.27 0.05 0.24 0.80 -0.12 -0.03 0.37 0.16 0.45 1
Note: lagged first-differenced versions of each of the spillover variables are considered to come up with the
correlations.
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6 | Are Multinationals Special?
Productivity Spillovers from
Matched Domestic Firms1
Abstract
Foreign firms are assumed to be a potential source of spillover effects to domestic firms because
they are superior to the latter in terms of a range of characteristics. Ultimately this translates in a
TFP advantage over domestic firms. However, we document a substantial heterogeneity in TFP
performance both among foreign and domestic firms. We therefore analyse whether domestic
firms that are similar to foreign firms can act as a potential source of productivity spillover
effects. If this is the case, individual firm-level technological superiority seems the main driver
of spillover generating potential rather than ‘foreignness’. If not, foreign firms are special and
bring something ‘special’ to the domestic economy. Our analysis consists of matching foreign
firms with domestic twin firms of similar TFP levels. We then analyse whether or not matched
firms are able to generate similar spillover effects as actual foreign firms. By matching domestic
firms that share the characteristics that determine a foreign firm’s ability to transmit spillovers,
we test i) whether sufficiently similar domestic firms actually exist and ii) whether foreign firms
potentially still have (unidentified) firm-specific advantages.
Keywords: multinationals, firm heterogeneity, productivity, spillover effects
JEL classification: F23
6.1 Introduction
Comparative analysis of the foreign firms and the domestic firms that serve a domestic market
suggests that the former outperform the latter in many areas, including growth, productivity and
level of technological sophistication. These performance gaps between multinational enterprises
(MNEs) and domestic firms are often attributed to the ‘firm-specific advantages’ that multination-
1This Chapter is the result of joint work with Prof. dr. Bruno Merlevede.
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als have, which enable them to overcome the costs incurred upon entering a foreign market and
take up a strong competitive position on that market (Markusen, 1995). Helpman et al. (2004)
describe these firm-specific advantages as intangible assets in the form of superior production
technology. The hypothesis that MNEs are ‘special’ firms with firm-specific advantages was
introduced in a number of early contributions such as Hymer (1976) and integrated into the
OLI-framework by Dunning (1981). In many studies, MNEs are thus considered to have a
positive impact on the host country’s economy through direct and indirect effects. Borensztein
et al. (1998), for example, show that foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important catalyst of
development and economic growth in transition and developing economies. Indirect or spillover
effects from FDI originate from linkages between multinationals and domestic firms in com-
petitive (horizontal effects) and supplier-client (vertical effects) relationships. Recent literature
surveys on FDI spillovers indicate that backward linkages, between domestic suppliers and
multinational clients, constitute the main channel for positive spillover effects (see Hanousek
et al. (2011) and Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) among many other surveys). In contrast, the
evidence on horizontal and forward (between foreign suppliers and domestic clients) spillover
effects is more ambiguous.
Empirical research on the spillover effects of foreign direct investment has challenged the as-
sumption that all multinationals are special firms with the potential to generate positive spillover
effects. In fact, similarly as for the domestic firms in the market, there is substantial heterogene-
ity among MNEs. Several studies therefore aim to identify the characteristics that determine
whether a multinational is able to transmit spillover effects. A first important characteristic is
the technology (high-tech/low-tech) in the industry in which the MNE operates, as suggested
by Nicolini and Resmini (2010). A related characteristic is the involvement of foreign affiliates
in technology-related activities (see Castellani and Zanfei (2007), Marin and Bell (2006) and
Marin and Sasidharan (2010)). Lenaerts and Merlevede (2014) demonstrate that MNEs need to
be sufficiently productive in order to have a positive impact. When this is not the case, spillover
effects turn out to be insignificant or even negative. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008, 2011) find
that the ownership structure and country of origin of an MNE also matter. Other work points
to export-oriented versus domestic-market-oriented FDI (Girma et al., 2008), the time since
foreign entry (Merlevede et al., 2014), and the role of firm size (see Chapter 4 of this dissertation).
These studies show that spillover effects only arise from multinationals with specific charac-
teristics and that this heterogeneity has to be taken into account in the analysis of spillover effects.
From the heterogeneity among multinational firms it also follows that not all MNEs necessar-
ily outperform domestic firms. Narula and Marin (2003), for example, notice that knowledge
creation and utilisation do not differ much between foreign firms and Argentinian companies.
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Harris (2009) reports that MNEs in some industries and regions of the UK are equally or even less
productive than domestic firms. Other work links these performance gaps to the ‘multinational’
status of firms, claiming that although foreign firms outperform domestic firms in many cases,
this does not necessarily apply to domestic firms with affiliates abroad (i.e. domestic MNEs, the
most productive domestic firms according to Helpman et al. (2004)). Pfaffermayr and Bellak
(2000), for example, arrive at these results using data on Austria. Bellak (2004) and Temouri et al.
(2008) reach a similar conclusion. Castellani and Zanfei (2007) compare direct and spillover
effects from foreign and domestic multinationals. They report that domestic MNEs are a source
of productivity spillovers to domestic firms in Italy. Domestic firms can be a good source of
spillover effects because of cultural proximity (no cultural and linguistic barriers) and their level
of embeddedness. Likewise, exporters emerge from many data sets as being on average larger
and more productive than their domestic counterparts. Using data for Chilean manufacturing
plants from 1990 to 1999, Alvarez and López (2008) find evidence that both foreign-owned and
domestic exporting plants improve productivity of local suppliers. Horizontal spillovers from
exporting are mainly generated by plants with foreign ownership. This suggest that all types of
internationalised firms with a productivity advantage potentially generate spillover effects.
This brings about the question whether sufficiently productive domestic firms are able to
generate spillover effects as well. As a test, we explore the potential of domestic firms that
are comparable to the foreign MNEs in the sample as a source of positive spillover effects to
domestic companies. Since the ability of MNEs to transmit positive spillovers depends on the
characteristics of these firms, we investigate whether domestic firms with similar characteristics
are also able to bring about these effects. To this end, MNEs and domestic firms that operate
within the same industry are matched on the basis of productivity, the underlying idea being that
‘foreign technology’ is the ultimate source of spillover effects. Alternatively, we match firms
on the basis of productivity, firm age and firm size. The latter are other relevant characteristics
that we observe in our data. Firm size is discussed in Chapter four of this dissertation and
the importance of firm age is clear from the work of Merlevede et al. (2014). Following the
matching procedure, we construct “matched domestic spillover variables” and compare them to
the traditional FDI spillover variables. These variables are then introduced as additional inputs
that explain domestic firm productivity in a production function framework.
This approach enables us to disentangle the different effects at play. When no spillover
effects are detected from the matched domestic firms, this suggests that MNEs truly are ‘special’
and that there are other factors than the matching covariates that matter.2 When spillover effects
2Clearly, this also will depend on the quality of the matching. Note that when one would observe the universe of
firms in a cross-country setting cross-country differences in quality of matching would be informative by itself.
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arise in both cases, the matching covariates appear to be the main drivers of spillover effects. In
addition, differences between results from matching on the basis of productivity and results from
matching on productivity, firm age and firm size can convey some information on the relative
importance of productivity. Our empirical results point to strong positive backward spillover
effects from FDI. The evidence on the spillover effects of matched domestic firms suggests that
these firms generate positive backward and forward spillover effects and negative horizontal
spillover effects (although the latter are less robust). These effects appear to be driven by firms
in the services industries, as no spillover effects are detected when manufacturing industries are
considered separately. Backward spillover effects are only detected when matching is performed
on the productivity measure, which lends support to the role of productivity as a determinant of
spillover effects.
The remainder of this paper is organised into four Sections. Section 6.2 outlines the method-
ological framework. The Section provides an overview of the matching of foreign and domestic
firms, the calculation of the FDI and matched domestic spillover variables and the estimation
procedure. Section 6.3 introduces the data set. In Section 6.4 the empirical results are presented.
Finally, Section 6.5 summarises the findings reported in this study.
6.2 Methodology
As indicated above, the aim of this paper is to determine whether domestic firms that have similar
characteristics as the multinationals in our sample can also act as a source of positive productivity
spillover effects. This analysis allows us to further our understanding of the mechanisms that
drive spillover effects. A comparison of the spillovers that arise from MNEs with those from the
domestic firms that are selected as matches allows us to verify whether multinationals are ‘special’
firms (i.e. when only spillovers are detected for this set of firms) or whether the characteristics
of these firms explain the effects found. This is particularly relevant considering the literature on
firm-level heterogeneity among MNEs where various firm characteristics have been identified
as determinants of spillover effects. To shed more light on this issue, we perform an empirical
analysis that comprises three steps. As a first step, the MNEs in our data are matched with
domestic firms of a similar productivity (alternatively, firms of a similar productivity, age and
size). Then, spillover variables are calculated for both sets of firms. The final step of the analysis
involves the estimation of the spillover effects.
6.2.1 Matching
In order to examine the spillover potential of domestic firms with similar characteristics as the
multinationals in the sample, a suitable match for each multinational has to be identified. MNEs
are matched with domestic firms that are active in the same industry in each year. This implies
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that for each year in which we observe a multinational firm, we aim to find the best matching
domestic firm. Firms that are observed in more than one year may therefore be matched to a
different domestic firm in each year. We take this approach to avoid selection of domestic firms.
More specifically, for example, when an MNE is observed in years 1996-2000 and all years
are considered simultaneously, we have to find a domestic firm for which data are available
in these four years. The reason for this is that we need yearly data to construct the spillover
variables. This however implies that all firms that enter at a later point in time or that exit from
the sample in this period cannot be included in the matching procedure, even though these firms
may actually be highly comparable to the MNE. To rule out that our results are affected by these
selection issues, we match firms on a year-by-year basis.
In the matching procedure, we use two sets of characteristics on which firms that operate in
the same industry are matched by year (i.e. two sets of characteristics in addition to year and
industry).3 The first set comprises the productivity level of the firm. This focus on productivity
is motivated by the FDI spillover literature where the prime source of spillover effects is thought
to be technological superiority (Markusen, 1995). In this regard, Lenaerts and Merlevede (2014),
for example, provide evidence for the role of firm productivity as a determinant of spillover
effects. This approach further allows us to verify to what extent spillover effects are simply
driven by productivity (cf. the findings of Lenaerts and Merlevede, 2014). The second set of
characteristics on which firms are matched consists of productivity, firm age (measured on the
basis of the year of incorporation) and firm size (measured by the number of employees). This
second set is used as well because firm age and size have also been found to determine MNEs’
potential to generate spillovers. In particular, the former is related to the work by Merlevede
et al. (2014) on the time since foreign entry and the latter is introduced in the fourth Chapter
of this dissertation.4 Taking the second set of characteristics into account may further have the
advantage that firms that are more alike are matched.
As our productivity measure, we use both Olley and Pakes (1996) total factor productivity
(OP TFP) and Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin total factor productivity (WLP TFP) (Wooldridge,
2009; Petrin and Levinsohn, 2012). OP TFP is used because this is the baseline TFP measure
throughout the dissertation and hence it is also used as a productivity measure in Lenaerts and
Merlevede (2014). This measure is only available for the manufacturing industries in our data set.
OP TFP originally was not estimated for services as the traditional production function approach
seems less fit for these industries. That is why we also make use of the more recent WLP TFP
3Industries are defined according to a Romania industry classification code that maps into the NACE 3-digit
level.
4Because most foreign firms enter as greenfield investment, firm age is a good proxy for time since foreign entry
(which is unavailable for domestic firms).
240 Are MNEs Special? Spillovers from Matched Domestic Firms
measure that has several advantages over OP TFP. WLP TFP overcomes the critique of Ackerberg
et al. (2008) on the OP methodology and is straightforward to implement. Furthermore, the WLP
TFP measure can also be estimated for the majority of the services industries as was done in the
development of the CompNet database of the ECB (European Central Bank, 2014).5
The matching of MNEs and domestic firms on the characteristics listed above is performed
using nearest-neighbour matching based on Mahalanobis scoring.6 We match a set of ‘treated’
observations (the MNEs in the data) to a set of ‘control’ observations (the pool of domestic
firms) on the basis of the Mahalanobis distance measure. For each pair of observations, the
Mahalanobis distance equals the matrix product d′Xd, where d is a vector of differences in the
set of variables on which observations are matched and X is the inverse of the covariance matrix
of these variables. MNEs are matched with the ‘closest’ domestic firm or their nearest neighbour,
which is the domestic firm for which the Mahalanobis distance is the smallest. Because matches
are selected independently for each MNE, a domestic firm can be selected as the preferred
match for multiple MNEs (i.e. matching with replacement). As an alternative, we also perform
matching without replacement. This alternative is useful for industry-year pairs where most
MNEs within a specific industry are more productive than the majority of the domestic firms.
For matching with replacement, highly productive domestic firms will repeatedly turn out to be
the preferred match. We therefore include matching without replacement as a robustness test.
Note that MNEs and domestic firms for which productivity and thus output are unavailable are
dropped from the data.
In the following part of this Section, more information about the matching procedure and its
outcome is provided. Specifically, we discuss for how many of the MNEs a suitable match is
detected and how comparable the MNEs and their matches are in terms of the variables on which
they are matched. We further take a closer look at the characteristics of the domestic firms that
are selected as matches (e.g. do large firms or firms that have affiliates tend to be chosen?). Some
more attention is also devoted to our approach in which firms are matched on a year-by-year
basis. We also compare matching on productivity with matching on productivity, age and size as
well as matching with and without replacement.
5In CompNet, WLP TFP is estimated for the ‘productive economy’ which includes most of the services
industries. Agriculture, hunting and forestry; Fishing; Public administration and defence, compulsory social
security; Education; Health and social work; Other community, social and personal service activities and Activities
of households industries are excluded.
6This is done using the mahapick and the mahaselectunique commands available in the statistical software
package Stata. The mahaselectunique package takes the output of the mahapick package as an input and selects
an unique match for each treated observation in a randomised order. This package can thus be used for matching
without replacement.
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Table 6.1: Overview of the number of MNEs that need a match and the number of matches that
are found using different procedures by year. Columns (2) and (3) show matching on productivity
only, columns (4) and (5) show matching on productivity, age and size. Columns (2) and (4) are
based on matching with replacement, columns (3) and (5) on matching without replacement.
Panel on the left matching for manufacturing only, panel on the right manufacturing and services.
#MNEs #Domestic Matches #MNEs #Domestic Matches
Matching on OP TFP Matching on WLP TFP
TFP TFP age size TFP TFP age size
year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1996 1925 1923 1920 1869 1868 3866 3859 3806 3789 3759
1997 2312 2310 2307 2204 2203 4305 4295 4244 4137 4105
1998 2720 2718 2715 2590 2589 4970 4963 4881 4766 4695
1999 3139 3137 3131 2963 2943 5829 5824 5687 5556 5424
2000 3542 3539 3533 3307 3270 6721 6718 6537 6349 6156
2001 3996 3993 3980 3728 3667 7260 7257 7071 6845 6675
2002 4290 4288 4275 4007 3924 7629 7627 7451 7176 7006
2003 4378 4375 4356 4096 4024 8787 8785 8659 8299 8159
2004 4518 4516 4496 4243 4142 9592 9591 9439 9078 8890
2005 4326 4325 4299 4057 3955 9328 9326 9143 8822 8642
Table 6.1 presents for each year the number of MNEs in the sample that need a match and
the number of matches that are found in different cases. The panel on the left-hand side of the
Table shows the analysis based on the OP TFP measure, which only comprises manufacturing
industries. The panel on the right-hand side presents these numbers for the WLP TFP measure,
which covers both manufacturing and services industries. The number of MNEs is obtained by
only considering those firms for which total factor productivity is available. When matching is
based on the OP TFP measure, about 10% of the multinationals in the sample drop out because
OP TFP is not available for these firms. Of these 10%, almost half of the MNEs would always
be removed from the sample since the output variable for these firms is not filled out. For about
25% of the MNEs there is no WLP TFP measure. 17% of these firms does not have output
filled out either. This difference in availability of OP TFP and WLP TFP is related to the fact
that for WLP TFP a lot more industries are considered. For the later years, more matches are
found than in the beginning of the period. In all cases, matching with replacement generates
more matches than matching without replacement. This suggests that in some cases where a
domestic firm is selected several times as the best match no suitable replacement for this firm
can be found. The number of matches found is higher when only productivity is considered
rather than productivity, age and size, as is clear from a comparison of the numbers in columns
(2)-(3) with those in columns (4)-(5). Generally, finding a match appears to be more difficult in
industries with fewer firms on average. This applies particularly to matching without replacement.
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Figure 6.1: Density plots of log WLP TFP (top panel) and log labour productivity (bottom
panel) for foreign and domestic firms in the ‘Textile Clothing’ industry (industry 29) in 2005.
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(a) Density plot of log WLP TFP for foreign and domestic firms in the ‘Textile Clothing’ industry in
2005.
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(b) Density plot of log labour productivity for foreign and domestic firms in the ‘Textile Clothing’
industry in 2005.
We first further elaborate on matching with and without replacement. In the matching with
replacement procedure, multiple potential matches are selected for each MNE and these matches
are ranked on the basis of their distance. The domestic firm with rank number 1 has the lowest
distance and is then selected as the match. This implies that the rank number associated with the
match -which is also available in the matching without replacement procedure- holds information
about the match. For OP TFP, the average rank number for matching without replacement over all
years is 1.56, and it increases from about 1.35 in 1996 to 1.67 in 2005 (when matching is based on
productivity only). The industries with most difficulties are industries 36, 67 and 70 (Romanian
code classification). For WLP TFP, the average rank number over all years equals 1.71 and varies
from 1.49 in 1996 to 1.72 in 2005. In this case, the industries in which finding a match is more
difficult are industries 20, 26, 36, 38, 55, 58, 67, 80. When productivity, firm age and firm size are
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considered as characteristics in the matching procedure, the average rank number for matching
without replacement is 2.13 in the OP TFP case and 1.89 in the WLP TFP case. In these cases,
finding a suitable match proves to be more difficult in industries 29, 31, 33, 36, 55, 57, 63 and 70
(OP TFP) and industries 29, 31, 36, 55, 57, 58, 69, 70, 72, 78 and 98 (WLP TFP). An analysis of
the number of firms in these industries for the year 2005 reveals that most of these industries
only have a limited number of firms. In the larger industries in which this issue occurs (e.g.
industry 29, the textile clothing industry), the productivity distribution of the MNEs is clearly to
the right of those of the domestic firms as evidenced by Figure 6.1a. The distributions for other
variables such as labour productivity overlap to a larger extent, see Figure 6.1b. This suggests
that in these particular industries it may be more difficult to find a suitable match as the produc-
tivity differences between foreign and domestic firms are larger and therefore there is less overlap.
Then, we further investigate whether MNEs tend to be matched with a different domestic
firm in each year. Considering all years in the sample, when matching is based on OP TFP 91%
of the MNEs are matched to a different domestic firm in each year (both for matching with and
without replacement). For about 9% of the multinational firms, at least one domestic firm is
selected as a match more than once. When matching on OP TFP, age and size is examined, this
number drops to 50% for matching with and 59% for matching without replacement. In a higher
number of cases, one or several domestic firms are thus chosen as the preferred match more than
once. When WLP TFP is used as the productivity measure in the matching procedure, about
93% of the MNEs are matched to another domestic firm in each year (again for matching with
and without replacement). When age and size are also included as characteristics, we observe
this in 66% and 72% of the cases for matching with and without replacement respectively. A
closer look at the data further reveals that there are only very few firms that are matched to the
same domestic firm in every year. These results suggest that it is not straightforward to find for
each MNE a single domestic firm that can be used as a match throughout the sample period.
We then continue our analysis by exploring how comparable the domestic firms that are
selected as matches actually are with respect to the multinational they are matched with. In order
to shed more light on this issue, Table 6.2 presents summary statistics for total factor productivity
(i.e. the variable on which firms are matched) for the set of MNEs and the domestic matches for
matching on productivity only. In the panel on the left-hand side, these summary statistics are
reported for matching based on the OP TFP productivity measure (matching with replacement,
manufacturing industries only). The panel on the right-hand side presents the summary statistics
for the WLP TFP measure (matching with replacement, manufacturing and services industries).
For both productivity measures, the column on the left shows the mean and standard deviation
for the MNEs, the column on the right shows these statistics for the sample of matched domestic
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics for the multinationals (MNEs) that need a match and the domestic
firms (DOM) that are selected as matches (matching with replacement on the basis of OP TFP
(manufacturing) and WLP TFP (manufacturing and services) in period 1996-2005 (in logs).
OP TFP #obs WLP TFP #obs
MNEs DOM MNEs DOM MNEs DOM MNEs DOM
1996 mean 2.27 2.28 1925 1923 mean 10.12 10.12 3866 3859
sd 1.15 1.13 sd 1.75 1.72
1997 mean 2.12 2.13 2312 2310 mean 8.39 8.38 4305 4295
sd 1.11 1.09 sd 1.44 1.41
1998 mean 1.98 1.98 2720 2718 mean 8.22 8.22 4970 4963
sd 0.95 0.94 sd 1.47 1.44
1999 mean 2.11 2.11 3139 3137 mean 8.35 8.35 5829 5824
sd 1.00 0.98 sd 1.49 1.46
2000 mean 2.10 2.10 3542 3539 mean 8.32 8.31 6721 6718
sd 1.06 1.03 sd 1.42 1.39
2001 mean 2.11 2.11 3996 3993 mean 8.22 8.21 7260 7257
sd 1.05 1.02 sd 1.43 1.40
2002 mean 2.07 2.07 4290 4288 mean 7.72 7.72 7629 7627
sd 0.99 0.96 sd 1.29 1.27
2003 mean 2.07 2.07 4378 4375 mean 7.68 7.68 8787 8785
sd 0.96 0.93 sd 1.28 1.25
2004 mean 2.04 2.04 4518 4516 mean 7.73 7.72 9592 9591
sd 0.95 0.93 sd 1.25 1.23
2005 mean 2.05 2.05 4326 4325 mean 7.80 7.79 9328 9326
sd 0.98 0.95 sd 1.21 1.19
All mean 2.08 2.08 35146 35124 mean 8.11 8.10 68287 68245
sd 1.01 0.99 sd 1.48 1.46
firms. A comparison of both columns reveals that the summary statistics appear to be highly
similar across both sets of firms in the OP TFP and the WLP TFP case. We then further test
whether the average values of log OP TFP and log WLP TFP are statistically different between
the MNEs and the domestic firms. In both cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
means are equal (for OP TFP the p-value of the two sample t-test is 0.8598, for WLP TFP it is
0.6487; all years considered). These results suggest that the matching procedure appears to work
quite well: we find a suitable match for almost all MNEs in the sample and these domestic firms
indeed have a comparable productivity level. As an alternative to matching on the productivity
measure only, we also perform an analysis in which firms are matched on productivity, age and
size. For this alternative procedure, again the summary statistics of the variables on which the
matching are preformed are studied. These summary statistics are provided in Tables 6.10 and
6.11 in the Appendix present (a further discussion of the Tables can be found there as well).
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In this case, finding a suitable match within each industry and year of a similar productivity,
age and size is less straightforward, especially in industries with a limited number of potential
matches. We thus consider the results obtained from matching on productivity, age and size as a
robustness test and think of matching on total factor productivity only as our baseline case.
The last part of this Section focuses in more detail on the characteristics of the domestic firms
that are selected as matches. One may wonder whether the foreign multinationals in the sample
tend to be matched to domestic firms that have affiliates as well, hence that are multinationals
themselves. This is an important possibility to explore. When the foreign MNEs tend to be
matched to domestic MNEs and spillover effects are detected in both cases, this points to the
importance of multinationality rather than foreignness as a driver of spillover effects (in line with
the work of Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) and Bellak (2004), among others). First, the domestic
matches selected when OP TFP and OP TFP, firm age and firm size are used as matching criteria
(with and without replacement) are analysed. Considering all of these cases, between 4% and
5% of the foreign multinationals are matched to a domestic multinational on average over the
sample period. This number varies between 0% and 12% when individual years are considered.
These numbers already give us an indication that foreign firms are not necessarily matched with
domestic MNEs. We further can identify a number of industries in which foreign MNES are
matched with domestic MNEs in more than 20% of the cases. These industries are industries
36, 39 and 75 (Romanian industry classification). When this analysis is repeated for matching
based on WLP TFP and on WLP TFP, age and size, we find that on average over all sample years
between 5% and 6% of the matches covers foreign and domestic MNEs. This number takes a
value between 0% and 13% when separate years are considered. For individual industries, in
industries 36, 55, 75 and 87 again on average over the sample period in more than 20% of the
cases foreign firms are matched with a domestic multinational. A closer look at the industries
in which in more than 20% of the cases a domestic MNE is selected reveals that generally
these industries only have a small number of firms. Especially when matching is done without
replacement, this implies that the same domestic firm, which may be a multinational, is selected
multiple times, thus raising the percentage of matches with a domestic MNE. Overall, domestic
MNEs do not appear to have a stronger representation among the selected matches than one
would expect from their presence in the data. These findings also imply that we cannot easily
disentangle the impact of foreignness and multinationality.
A second characteristic to investigate is the size of the domestic firms that are selected as
matches. More specifically, we examine whether foreign firms are likely to be matched with
large domestic companies. This exercise is done for the matching based on productivity only,
since firm size is considered as one of the characteristics in the other cases. We evaluate firm
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size in terms of the average number of employees a firm employs over the sample period. On the
basis of the average number of employees, four size categories are defined: micro firms (less
than 10 employees), small firms (10-50 employees), medium-sized firms (50-250 employees)
and large firms (more than 250 employees) (following the EU size classification). First, we verify
whether MNEs tend to be matched with large domestic firms when matching is performed for OP
TFP (with and without replacement). On average over the sample period, 15% of the matches
consists of the combination of a foreign MNE and a large domestic firm. For individual years,
this number varies between 12% and 20%. The numbers generally are higher for the earlier
years in the sample period, when less firms are observed. There are several industries in which
between 20% and 30% of the cases involve matching foreign MNEs with large domestic firms:
49, 50, 55, 61, 64, 65, 67 and 72 (combining results with and without replacement). In industries
36, 44, 54, 56, 57, 58, 63, 74 and 75 these cases represent more than 30%. When we focus on
matching based on WLP TFP, we find that on average over the sample 16% of the matches links
a foreign MNE to a large domestic firm, with numbers that vary between 14% and 19% when
individual years are studied. Industries in which on average over the sample period between 20%
and 30% of the matches are of this nature are 21, 38, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 64, 72 and 79 (again
considering with and without replacement simultaneously). More than 30% of the cases are of
this nature in industries 27, 36, 44, 48, 54, 57, 61, 63, 65, 67, 74, 75, 81 and 82. We compare
these percentages to the composition of the different size classes of domestic firms. This test
shows that the industries where more than 30% of the matching is with large firms are industries
in which large domestic firms are more strongly present. In industries 27, 36, 44, 56, 57, 74
and 75, for example, over half of the domestic firms are large. This evidence thus suggests that
MNEs are not automatically matched with larger domestic firms. When large domestic firms
appear to be more prevalent among the selected matches, this usually reflects industries in which
these firms are more prevalent overall or industries in which the pool of potential matches is
smaller (smaller industries).
6.2.2 Spillovers from foreign and domestic firms
The second step of our analysis consists of the calculation of proxy variables that capture the
spillover potential of the MNEs and the matched domestic firms in the sample. This Section
therefore first provides more details on the methodology used in most empirical work to calculate
FDI spillover variables and then shows how these measures can be adapted to come up with
spillover variables for the matched domestic firms. The spillover effects from foreign direct
investment emanate from intra-industry (horizontal) and inter-industry (vertical) linkages be-
tween foreign and domestic firms. Horizontal or intra-industry spillover effects arise between
firms in competitive relations. Vertical or inter-industry spillover effects emerge between firms
in supplier-client relations and can further be distinguished into backward and forward effects.
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Backward effects occur between MNEs and domestic suppliers upstream in the supply chain, for-
ward effects are found between MNEs and domestic clients downstream. Through these spillover
effects, which can be transmitted through a number of channels, multinationals are expected to
contribute to the productivity growth of domestic firms. Nevertheless, several recent surveys
of the literature suggest that the evidence on spillover effects is inconclusive (see Hanousek
et al. (2011) and Havranek and Irsova (2011, 2013) among other contributions). A number of
potential explanations for these findings have been put forward. Görg and Greenaway (2004),
for example, point out that older work mostly concentrates on intra-industry relations which may
not constitute the main channel for spillover effects. This is confirmed by Havranek and Irsova
(2011, 2013), who demonstrate that backward linkages are the main source of positive effects
while forward and horizontal linkages are less important.
Because firm-level data on linkages between companies are often unavailable, most studies
make use of industry-level measures to capture spillover effects. The methodology to calculate
horizontal spillover variables dates back to Caves (1974).
Horizontal jt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
(6.1)
In equation (6.1), the horizontal spillover variable for industry j at time t is calculated as the
share of industry j’s output that is produced by foreign firms. This variable can therefore be
regarded as a measure of the degree of foreign presence in an industry. Fit represents the owner-
ship status of a firm by the share of foreign participation in firm i at time t (which takes a value
between 0 and 100%, alternatively Fit can also be a dummy variable that is equal to one when a
firm is foreign-owned). A firm is classified as foreign when it has at least a single foreign in-
vestor who holds no less than 10% of the shares. Yit equals the output produced by firm i at time t.
Following Javorcik (2004), the backward and forward spillover variables for industry j at time
t are obtained as weighted averages of the horizontal spillover variables in the sourcing/supplying
industries respectively. The weights are captured by coefficients derived from input-output tables
for intermediate consumption. These coefficients are used to determine the relative position of
firms in the supply chain. Within-industry intermediate supply and use are typically excluded
from the vertical spillover variables (c 6= j rather than c in equation (6.2) and r 6= j instead of r
in equation (6.3)) since these inputs are already accounted for by the horizontal spillover variable
(Javorcik, 2004) (henceforth the zero-diagonal definition for the vertical spillover variables). In
this study, however, we follow Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012) who maintain that within-industry
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supply and use should be introduced into the vertical spillover variables because these inputs are
still traded in a supplier-client setting (despite that this occurs in the same industry) (henceforth
the non-zero-diagonal definition for vertical spillover variables).
The backward spillover variable Backward jt captures linkages between MNEs and their
domestic suppliers and is calculated as follows:
Backward jt =∑
c
γ jct ∗Horizontalct (6.2)
In equation (6.2), the weights γ jct correspond to the share of industry j’s total intermediate
supply sold to each industry c. Horizontalct represents the horizontal spillover variables in
sourcing industries c. In this way, Backward jt is a measure of the foreign presence in industries
c that are supplied by industry j. Similarly, the forward spillover variable for industry j that
captures linkages between MNEs and local clients is constructed as follows:
Forward jt =∑
r
δ jrt ∗Horizontalrt (6.3)
The coefficients δ jrt in equation (6.3) are equal to the share of industry j’s inputs purchased
from industries r at time t. Horizontalrt represents the horizontal spillover variables in supplying
industries r.
The spillover variables for the set of matched domestic firms are constructed using the
definitions the horizontal and vertical spillover variables in equations (6.1)-(6.3). We now
replace each MNE’s output, Yit , with the output produced by the best matching domestic firm,
Y matchit . Based on these new output values, we calculate the total industry output and construct
the horizontal spillover variables as in equation (6.4). Fit in equation (6.4) is unchanged. For
domestic firms Y matchit equals Yit .
Horizontalmatchjt =
∑
i∈ j
Fit ∗Y matchit
∑
i∈ j
Y matchit
(6.4)
The total output produced by different firms within each industry is no longer equal to ∑Yit
but to ∑Y matchit instead.
7 Horizontalmatchjt is therefore equal to the output produced by matched
7Output values of certain domestic firms may be introduced multiple times in the measure.
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domestic firms as a share of the new total industry output. Horizontalmatchjt captures the impor-
tance of the matched domestic firms in the industry by their share in industry output. Clearly, we
are only able to construct Horizontalmatchjt as in (6.4) for industries for which the TFP measure is
available. Therefore Horizontalmatchjt can only be calculated for the manufacturing industries (61
out of 105 industries) for OP TFP. For WLP TFP, which is available for the productive economy,
we are able to obtain Horizontalmatchjt for 84 out of 105 industries. The remaining industries are
filled out using the traditional spillover variables (Horizontal jt).8
To obtain backward and forward domestic spillover variables, the horizontal matched domes-
tic spillover variables are pre-multiplied by input-output coefficients γ jct and δ jrt that represent
the share of industry output/input supplied to/sourced from all other industries respectively, as
detailed in equations (6.5) and (6.6):
Backwardmatchjt =∑
c
γ jct ∗Horizontalmatchct (6.5)
Forwardmatchjt =∑
r
δ jrt ∗Horizontalmatchrt (6.6)
Table 6.3 shows the correlations between the horizontal and vertical spillover variables that
are introduced in different sets of estimations. The top panel of the Table presents correlations
between the FDI spillover variables (panel on the left manufacturing industries only, panel
on the right all industries). The two middle panels report correlations between the matched
domestic spillover variables obtained when productivity is the only variable considered in the
matching procedure. In the two bottom panels, correlations between spillover variables when
matching is done on productivity, firm age and firm size are shown. In the left-hand side of the
Table OP TFP is used as a productivity measure, in the right-hand side WLP TFP is considered.
Overall, the correlations vary between 0.33 and 0.60. The numbers in the Table thus suggest that
multicollinearity is not likely to affect our estimation results. As a further test, we exclude the
forward spillover variables from our estimations. The results of this test are discussed are each
results Table.
We further consider the correlations between different sets of horizontal, backward and
forward spillovers variables in Table 6.4. The lowest correlations are detected for the horizontal
spillover variables. The correlations between the FDI spillover variable and the various OP TFP
8In the Appendix we consider a different exercise where we consider spillover effects from foreign and matched
domestic firms at the same time.
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Table 6.3: Correlations between the horizontal, backward and forward spillover variables used
in the estimations reported in Tables 6.5 (for OP TFP, manufacturing industries only) and 6.6
(for WLP TFP, manufacturing and services). Correlations are reported by estimated equation.
Traditional FDI spillover variables
OP TFP WLP TFP
horizontal backward forward horizontal backward forward
horizontal 1 horizontal 1
backward 0.40 1 backward 0.38 1
forward 0.41 0.46 1 forward 0.44 0.38 1
Matching based on TFP only (with and without replacement)
OP TFP WLP TFP
with horizontal backward forward with horizontal backward forward
horizontal 1 horizontal 1
backward 0.54 1 backward 0.41 1
forward 0.52 0.43 1 forward 0.49 0.36 1
without horizontal backward forward without horizontal backward forward
horizontal 1 horizontal 1
backward 0.50 1 backward 0.39 1
forward 0.50 0.41 1 forward 0.47 0.33 1
Matching based on TFP, age and size (with and without replacement)
OP TFP WLP TFP
with horizontal backward forward with horizontal backward forward
horizontal 1 horizontal 1
backward 0.50 1 backward 0.50 1
forward 0.57 0.56 1 forward 0.60 0.48 1
without horizontal backward forward without horizontal backward forward
horizontal 1 horizontal 1
backward 0.47 1 backward 0.39 1
forward 0.56 0.53 1 forward 0.53 0.38 1
Note: lagged first-differenced versions of the spillover variables are considered to come up with
the correlations. The vertical spillover variables are calculated according to the non-zero-diagonal
definition.
matched domestic spillover variables range from 0.10 to 0.19. For WLP TFP, the numbers are
0.06 to 0.26. When backward and forward spillover variables are considered, we detect higher
correlations in Table 6.4. In the OP TFP case, the correlations vary between 0.43 and 0.66 for
the backward spillover variables and between 0.20 and 0.39 for the forward variables. A similar
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analysis for WLP TFP reveals correlations between 0.35 and 0.56 for the backward spillover
variables and between 0.22 and 0.40 for the forward spillovers. The correlations between the
corresponding spillover variables based on OP TFP and WLP TFP for each of the different
matching procedures are reported in the bottom panel of the Table (below the double horizontal
line). These correlations range from 0.11 to 0.24, from 0.29 to 0.44 and from 0.22 to 0.29 for the
horizontal, backward and forward spillover variables respectively.
6.2.3 Estimation Procedure
The final step of the empirical analysis involves the estimation of different sets of production
functions in which domestic firm total factor productivity (TFP) is related to the spillover vari-
ables (horizontal, backward and forward) and a number of firm-level and industry-level controls
(Havranek and Irsova, 2011, 2013). The estimation procedure consists of two steps. In the first
step, an unbiased estimate of total factor productivity (TFP) is obtained. In the second step, this
TFP measure is used as the dependent variable in the production function framework.
Many empirical studies start from a Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate TFP.
However, in the linearised Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t as presented in
equation (6.7), productivity ωit is unobserved. This implies that there is endogeneity of inputs,
which will lead to biased estimation results when the production function is estimated using
OLS or fixed-effects (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). To address this issue, several alternative
estimation methodologies have been proposed that can be used to obtain an unbiased productivity
measure. In the semi-parametric methodology developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP)
investment is introduced as a proxy for productivity.9 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) select
material inputs as a proxy because investment is lumpy and it does not react smoothly to
productivity shocks (Petrin et al., 2004). To deal with potential collinearity issues in the OP and
LP methodologies, Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF) put forward an alternative semi-parametric
procedure. More recently, Wooldridge (2009) proposed a new methodology that allows the
implementation of the OP and LP methods in a GMM-framework. We use the implementation of
this methodology as introduced by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) for our Wooldridge-Levinsohn-
Petrin (WLP) TFP estimator. In this paper, both OP TFP and WLP TFP are used in the matching
procedure and OP TFP is used as the dependent variable in the estimations. Note that production
functions are estimated by NACE 2-digit industry j.
qit = β0 +βllit +βkkit +βmmit +ωit + εit (6.7)
In the second step of the estimation procedure, the firm-level TFP measure obtained in the
9To compute investment from the data, the approach by Amiti and Konings (2007) is used.
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first step is related to the lagged spillover variables and control variables. First, the spillover
variables from the multinationals in the sample are used (FDI jt−1). Then, the spillover variables
constructed on the basis of the sample of matched domestic firms are considered (DOM jt−1).
The baseline specifications for both cases are shown in equation (6.8).
tfpi jt = αi +ψ1 f (FDI jt−1)+ψ2Zi jt +ξi jt
tfpi jt = αi +ψ1 f (DOM jt−1)+ψ2Zi jt +ξi jt
(6.8)
∆tfpi jt = ψ
′
1∆ f (FDI jt−1)+ψ
′
2∆Zi jt−1 +αt +α j +αr + εi jt
∆tfpi jt = ψ
′
1∆ f (DOM jt−1)+ψ
′
2∆Zi jt−1 +αt +α j +αr + εi jt
(6.9)
Following Haskel et al. (2007), equation (6.8) is first-differenced and then industry α j, region
αr and time αt dummies are introduced. This results in equation (6.9), which pools domestic
firms from all manufacturing industries and is estimated by OLS. Following Moulton (1990), the
standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level since estimation is performed at the firm-
level whereas the spillover variables and some of the controls are defined at the industry-level.
This methodology corresponds to what Havranek and Irsova (2011) define as ‘best practice’ in the
spillover literature. ‘Best practice’ comprises an analysis of spillover effects that uses an unbiased
measure of TFP, relies on firm-level data, performs estimations in differences and adds controls
for industry fixed-effects, industry competition and demand in downstream industries. Demand
in downstream industries is constructed following Javorcik (2004) as demand jt = ∑k a jk ∗Ykt in
which α jk is the IO-matrix coefficient indicating that α jk units of good j are needed to produce
one unit of good k. Ykt represents industry k output deflated by an industry-specific deflator.
Downstream foreign entry can raise demand for intermediates which leads to economies of scale.
The set of control variables Zi jt further contains a Herfindahl index of industry concentration,
industry-level controls for import competition, export intensity and the share of intermediate
supply in total industry output, and firm age, and the lagged level of firm size (measured by real
output). The data used to construct the industry-level controls are taken from the input-output
tables.
Although this two-step estimation procedure is widely used in the literature, Feenstra and
Hanson (1999), Dumont et al. (2005) and Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) argue that most empirical
studies disregard that total factor productivity is an estimate extracted from a Cobb-Douglas
production function rather than an observable variable. Furthermore, intuitively the assumption
that productivity is unobservable in the first step does not appear to match with the assumption
that TFP is observable in the second step. Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) propose to devote
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more attention to the estimated coefficients of labour, capital and materials as well as to the TFP
estimator that is selected. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Dumont et al. (2005), on the other
hand, come up with a methodology to adjust the standard errors in the second step to control for
the additional variance that arises in the first step in which TFP is estimated. In our study, we
account for these issues by running a bootstrap procedure on our main second-step estimations.
The results of this procedure are briefly discussed after each analysis.
6.3 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper draws on a firm-level panel data set for Romania that spans
the period 1996-2005. These data were extracted from the Amadeus database by Bureau Van
Dijk Elektronic Publishing, which is used in many studies on spillover effects. The Amadeus
database provides detailed data on the ownership and financials of companies in a wide range
of European countries (Bureau Van Dijk, 2011). The data are published on DVDs that are
released frequently. A single issue therefore only contains a snapshot of the data (in particular,
of the ownership information) and firms that exit are simply dropped from the database. That is
why several issues of the database were combined to set up the sample of Romanian firms (see
Merlevede et al., 2014). This sample is limited to firms with on average at least five employees
and is trimmed for outliers. Specifically, the top and bottom percentiles of the annual growth
rates of real material inputs, real operating revenues, real capital and labour were dropped.10
The nominal data are deflated with industry price-level data at the NACE 2-digit level, which
are obtained from the Industrial Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute for
International Economic Studies (WIIW, 2007) and the Statistical Yearbook of the Romanian
Statistical Office (RSO, 2005). Real output (Y) is calculated as operating revenues deflated with
industry-level producer price indices. Real capital (K) equals tangible fixed assets deflated by
the average of the industry deflators of the machinery and equipment (NACE 2-digit 29), office
machinery and computing (30), electrical machinery and apparatus (31), motor vehicles, trailers
and semi-trailers (34) and other transport equipment (35) industries. Labour (L) is equal to the
number of employees. Real material inputs (M) are calculated by deflating material inputs with
a weighted intermediate input deflator, where the weights are obtained from input-output (IO)
tables. Input-output tables for each year of the sample are provided by the Romanian Statistical
Office. The industry classification in these IO-tables is based on a Romanian industry code
classification that corresponds to the NACE 3-digit classification. The input-output coefficients
used in the calculation of the spillover variables are thus time-varying.
We focus on the case of Romania for a number of reasons. First, several studies on Romania
10Note that when the ‘outlier’ is caused by the first or last observation for a firm and the data in the remaining
years are normal, the other firm-year data are kept. Otherwise, all observations for the firm are removed.
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using the same or similar data sets have established the existence of FDI spillover effects to
domestic firms in the country (e.g. Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012, 2014) and Merlevede et al.
(2014)). This allows for a clear comparison of the spillover potential of the foreign firms in our
sample with that of the domestic firms they are matched with. Second, these studies also indicate
that the coverage of the Romanian data set in the Amadeus database is very good (Altomonte and
Colantone, 2008). This implies that the matching procedure and the calculation of the spillover
variables will not be distorted by the presence/absence of specific firms in the data. As indicated
above, an additional advantage for Romania is the availability of detailed input-output tables.
The sample period also nicely coincides with the entry of foreign direct investment inflows into
Romania (UNCTAD, 2003). Romania is one of the main recipients of foreign investment in
its region (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD, 2005). Investment in the country mostly originates from
European countries and targets manufacturing industries (Pauwels and Ionita, 2008).
6.4 Empirical Results
This Section presents the estimation results for different sets of estimations using the FDI
spillover variables and the matched domestic spillover variables. In all cases results are shown
for a panel of domestic manufacturing firms in the period 1996-2005. All regressions include
time, region and industry dummies and seven other firm-level and industry-level controls. OP
TFP is used as the dependent variable. Results are reported for vertical spillovers calculated
according to the non-zero-diagonal definition (following Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012)), results
for the zero-diagonal definition are available on request.11
Table 6.5 shows the first set of estimation results for the manufacturing industries only. In
the Table, the results for the FDI spillover effects are presented in the first column and the
matched domestic spillover effects are reported in the four columns on the right. Columns 2 and
3 show estimation results when matching is based on OP TFP only, with and without replacement
respectively. Columns 4 and 5 report results for matching based on OP TFP, firm age and firm
size, again for matching with and without replacement. In the Table, we detect positive horizontal
and backward spillover effects and negative forward spillover effects that arise from MNEs. For
the spillovers from matched domestic firms, however, we only find significant effects in one out
of four cases. In particular, a positive backward spillover effect and a negative forward spillover
effect are found in column 5. Although these effects go in the same direction as the FDI spillover
effects, they do not appear to be robust. These results thus only provide limited evidence of the
capacity of domestic firms to have the same impact as the MNEs in the sample. Dropping the
forward spillovers from the estimations does not affect the conclusions on the horizontal and
11Overall, these results are in line with the results based on the non-zero-diagonal definition in terms of the
vertical spillover effects. Horizontal spillover effects turn out to be insignificant and are therefore less robust.
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Table 6.5: Spillover effects from foreign and matched domestic firms for the manufacturing
industries only. OP TFP is used as the productivity measure in the matching procedure.
FDI OP TFP OP TFP age size
with without with without
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HR 0.530*** 0.056 0.152 0.170 0.339
[0.191] [0.172] [0.160] [0.197] [0.240]
BK 0.635* -0.051 -0.029 0.863 1.249**
[0.328] [0.539] [0.573] [0.557] [0.612]
FW -1.186*** -0.149 -0.024 -0.799 -1.578**
[0.422] [0.455] [0.521] [0.632] [0.691]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 96,681 96,681 96,681
R2 0.068 0.060 0.060 0.062 0.066
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees
in the period 1996-2005. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the
industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
Table 6.6: Spillover effects from foreign and matched domestic firms for all industries. WLP
TFP is used as the productivity measure in the matching procedure.
FDI WLP TFP WLP TFP age size
with without with without
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HR 0.226 -0.291* -0.422** -0.573*** 0.131
[0.184] [0.160] [0.164] [0.219] [0.279]
BK 0.913*** 0.871** 0.981** 0.498 0.613
[0.316] [0.426] [0.461] [0.631] [0.629]
FW -0.583 0.751** 1.266** 1.039*** 0.371
[0.422] [0.382] [0.526] [0.394] [0.516]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 96,681 96,681 96,681
R2 0.066 0.065 0.067 0.063 0.061
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees
in the period 1996-2005. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the
industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
backward spillover effects. A bootstrapping exercise of the estimations reported in the Table
confirms our previous conclusions (except for the backward spillover effect in the last column,
which is no longer statistically significant).
Table 6.6 presents empirical results obtained when matching is based on the WLP TFP
6.4 Empirical Results 257
estimator instead of OP TFP. This estimation technique has the advantage that it also yields TFP
estimates for the services industries (also see European Central Bank, 2014). This allows us
to study spillover effects from all industries on Romania manufacturing firms, similarly as in
Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012), and compare the effects found. Table 6.6 has the same structure
as Table 6.5. The results for the FDI spillovers are presented in the first column and the results
for the matched domestic spillovers are reported in columns 2-5. The evidence for matching
performed using WLP TFP only and using WLP TFP, firm age and firm size (with and without
replacement) is compared. In the Table, a positive backward spillover effect emerges from
MNEs, which corresponds to the results of Lenaerts and Merlevede (2012). In the other four
columns of the Table, statistically significant effects show up in many cases. We find negative
horizontal spillovers in three out of four cases, positive backward spillovers in two cases and
positive forward spillovers in three cases as well. These results differ from those reported in
Table 6.5. Most spillover effects are detected when matching is based on WLP TFP only, which
demonstrates the importance of productivity as an indicator of spillover effects and is in line with
the conclusions of Lenaerts and Merlevede (2014). None of the spillover effects are statistically
significant in column 5. This is likely to be due to the fact that finding an unique suitable match
of a comparable age, size and productivity within each industry and year for each MNE is not a
straightforward task. The matched domestic firms have a negative impact on the productivity
of other domestic firms in the industry and a positive impact on their clients. These effects run
in the opposite direction as the FDI spillover effects. A potential explanation for the positive
spillover effects is that domestic firms may be more successful than MNEs in meeting the input
requirements of their clients. When an MNE enters and pushes a supplier out of the market, it
often supplies inputs that are more expensive or technologically too advanced for the domestic
firms to handle. This seems to be less of an issue for the domestic matched firms. Furthermore,
spillover effects appear to be driven by domestic matches in the services industries. We do
detect effects in Table 6.6 -in which matching is performed for the manufacturing and services
industries- but not in Table 6.5 where matches are only available for the manufacturing industries.
Table 6.12 in the Appendix presents the estimation results obtained when the vertical spillovers
are calculated using the zero-diagonal definition. In Table 6.12, the results for the backward
and forward spillover effects are unchanged. In contrast, no statistically significant horizontal
spillover effects are found. These effects thus appear to be less robust. The results reported in
Table 6.6 for the backward spillovers are confirmed when the forward spillover variables are
dropped from the equations, the horizontal effects again appear to be somewhat less robust. Boot-
strapping the estimations shown in Table 6.6 largely confirms our conclusions based on this Table.
In order to rule out that the results in Table 6.6 are driven by the changing the productivity
measure used rather than by also including the services industries, we perform the analysis in
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Table 6.7: Spillover effects from matched domestic firms for manufacturing industries. WLP
TFP is used as the productivity measure in the matching procedure.
WLP TFP WLP TFP age size
with without with without
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HR -0.120 -0.204 -0.194 0.410
[0.171] [0.167] [0.216] [0.263]
BK 0.470 0.514 -0.193 0.094
[0.551] [0.548] [0.659] [0.844]
FW 0.248 0.442 0.230 -0.565
[0.335] [0.531] [0.364] [0.595]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 96,681 96,681
R2 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.061
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least
five employees in the period 1996-2005. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/*
denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
Table 6.5 for the WLP TFP measure. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6.7. From
the Table it is immediately clear that no significant spillover effects are detected. Table 6.7
therefore lends support to the notion that the matched domestic firms in the services industries
are driving the spillover effects.
We then perform two additional robustness tests of the results in Table 6.6. As a first test,
we drop the domestic firms that are selected as matches from the sample when running the
estimations. The results for this test are reported in Table 6.8. Table 6.8 comprises eight columns.
In columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, FDI spillover effects are depicted. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 present
spillover effects from matched domestic firms; columns 2 and 4 cover results for matching on
productivity only whereas columns 6 and 8 show results for matching on productivity, age and
size (with and without replacement). Because the different matching procedures yield a different
number of domestic matches that are omitted from the sample in this test, four sets of FDI
spillover effects are presented. More specifically, one for each restricted sample of domestic
firms. These results are presented in the column on the left of the corresponding column for the
domestic matched spillovers. The FDI spillover effects in all four columns are highly comparable.
In all cases, positive backward spillover effects arise that are statistically significant at the 1%
level. No other FDI spillover effects are detected. These results correspond with those in Table
6.6 and again provide evidence for the importance of the backward linkage channel for FDI
spillover effects. The spillover effects from the matched domestic are in line with the effects
6.4 Empirical Results 259
Table 6.8: Spillover effects from foreign and matched domestic firms for all industries. WLP
TFP is used as the productivity measure in the matching procedure. Domestic firms that match
with an MNE are excluded from the panel in the estimations.
WLP TFP WLP TFP
WLP TFP WLP TFP age size age size
FDI with FDI without FDI with FDI without
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HR 0.312 -0.287* 0.331 -0.460*** 0.312 -0.600*** 0.345 0.146
[0.203] [0.167] [0.211] [0.176] [0.198] [0.230] [0.211] [0.298]
BK 0.952*** 0.865** 0.966*** 1.014** 0.956*** 0.513 0.967*** 0.609
[0.321] [0.437] [0.326] [0.479] [0.319] [0.643] [0.324] [0.669]
FW -0.741 0.743* -0.773 1.273** -0.686 1.106*** -0.753 0.442
[0.476] [0.394] [0.487] [0.545] [0.472] [0.404] [0.485] [0.521]
Obs. 79,184 79,184 74,280 74,280 81,728 81,728 76,949 76,949
R2 0.068 0.066 0.070 0.070 0.068 0.065 0.071 0.065
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employees in the period 1996-2005. Standard errors
in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
described in Table 6.6 as well. Negative horizontal spillover effects and positive forward spillover
effects are found in three out of four cases (i.e. matching on productivity only and matching with
replacement on productivity, age and size). Positive backward spillover effects are statistically
significant when only productivity is considered as a characteristic on which firms are matched.
Productivity therefore appears to be important for spillover effects to domestic suppliers.
The second robustness test involves matching based on WLP TFP and age only. We perform
this test because foreign and domestic firms appear to fairly differ in terms of firm size, even
after the matching is performed (as evidenced by Tables 6.10 and 6.11 in the Appendix). Table
6.9 shows the empirical results of this analysis. The two columns on the left present the spillover
effects on the full sample of domestic firms, the two columns on the right contain spillover
effects on the restricted sample of firms that remains after the domestic firms that are selected as
a match have been removed. In all four columns, statistically significant and negative horizontal
and positive forward spillover effects arise. In two of the four cases, positive backward spillover
effects are also detected. Overall, these results confirm our previous findings.
The empirical evidence on the spillover effects from matched domestic firms seems to
suggest that these firms can contribute to domestic firm total factor productivity growth through
backward and forward linkages. The impact of these firms on other firms in the same industry is
negative, although these effects are less robust (since they are not detected when the zero-diagonal
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Table 6.9: Spillover effects from matched domestic firms for all industries. Matching on the
basis of WLP TFP and firm age. Estimations including the full panel of domestic firms and
excluding the domestic firms that are selected as a match.
WLP TFP age
full sample restricted sample
with without with without
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HR -0.457*** -0.478** -0.484*** -0.542**
[0.169] [0.216] [0.180] [0.235]
BK 0.717 1.349** 0.739 1.447**
[0.466] [0.617] [0.485] [0.669]
FW 1.098** 0.915* 1.184*** 0.970*
[0.429] [0.517] [0.436] [0.537]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 81,534 76,855
R2 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.069
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five em-
ployees in the period 1996-2005. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at
1/5/10 percent.
definition is used.) We further demonstrate that spillover effects are likely to be driven by the
matched domestic firms in the services industries, as no results for manufacturing industries
are found. Backward spillover effects generally only emerge when productivity is the variable
on which firms are matched. The divergence in results found when only the manufacturing
industries are considered and when all industries are considered is potentially related to the
specific characteristics of (firms in) the services industries. Brouthers and Brouthers (2003)
describe the services industries as ‘people-intensive’ sectors in which cultural differences and
geographical distance result in high organisational costs, which explains why many firms opt for a
partially-owned ownership structure.12 Kolstad and Villanger (2008) and Ali et al. (2010) confirm
that institutions and institutional quality are particularly important for the services industries. FDI
in the services industries appears to be market-seeking (which often requires physical presence of
the firm) and is closely linked to FDI in manufacturing (see Kolstad and Villanger (2008) and Ali
et al. (2010)). The latter implies that services firms follow their clients abroad and thus are not
only focused on engaging in relationships with domestic firms but also on these foreign investors.
Wagner (2011) further reports that the services firms that undertake FDI are not necessarily the
most productive companies in their industry. From these studies, one can infer that domestic
services firms may be in a better position than their foreign counterparts to establish linkages
12In case of foreign firms, this may suggest that they bring less advanced technologies (Glass and Saggi, 1998).
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with other domestic companies, especially because they do not face institutional, cultural and
linguistic barriers and are better embedded in the local economy (Castellani and Zanfei, 2007).
6.5 Conclusions
The analysis of foreign direct investment has received considerable attention in the literature. In
many studies, MNEs are considered as ‘special’ firms with firm-specific assets such as superior
technologies that they bring with them when they enter a market. These technologies can be
transferred to domestic firms which can become more productive as a result. However, empirical
evidence demonstrates that not all MNEs are able to transmit spillover effects. Depending on
their characteristics, some firms will not have an impact on domestic firm productivity whereas
other firms even have a negative impact. This raises the question whether domestic firms with
similar characteristics also have the potential to contribute to the productivity of other companies.
To this end, MNEs are matched with domestic firms on the basis of productivity and spillover
variables are constructed for both groups. A comparison of the spillover effects that emerge in
both cases can then shed light on the issue of whether MNEs truly are special or whether these
particular characteristics explain the effects found. In addition, other channels may be important
too. These issues also matter from a policy-perspective. Governments can implement policies
that specifically target MNEs in the expectation of positive spillover effects, but can also focus
on supporting domestic firms when these firms have a positive impact through linkages as well
(or invest in both types of firms, see Castellani and Zanfei, 2007).
The results presented in this paper clearly show that MNEs boost the productivity of their
domestic suppliers. The evidence for the set of matched domestic firms varies depending on
whether only the manufacturing industries or whether all industries are considered. In the first
case, no spillover effects from the matched domestic firms are detected. In the second case,
the matched domestic firms do generate spillover effects. In particular, positive backward and
forward spillover effects are found. These results thus appear to be driven by firms in the services
industries. In services, domestic firms may have an advantage over foreign companies because
institutions, culture, and language can be expected to be particularly important in this sector.
Furthermore, domestic firms may be better embedded in the local economy and therefore more
likely to establish supplier-client relationships. Since backward effects only are statistically
significant when matching is performed on the productivity measure only, productivity appears
to be a driving factor for this channel. These results suggest that both foreign firms and domestic
firms can boost the productivity of other companies in the economy. Whereas the backward
channel clearly is important for FDI spillovers, the forward channel is relevant for spillovers
from domestic firms.
Appendix
The Appendix to this Chapter first presents two Tables that report summary statistics for total
factor productivity, firm age and firm size when matching (with replacement) is performed on the
basis of these variables, for both the sample of MNEs and the domestic firms that are selected as
matches. Table 6.10 show summary statistics where OP TFP is used as the productivity measure
(manufacturing industries only). The Table also comprises WLP TFP but this measure was
not used in the matching procedure. In Table 6.11, these summary statistics are presented for
matching with WLP TFP as the productivity measure (manufacturing and services). In both
Tables, the column on the left depicts for each variable the mean and standard deviation for
the MNEs, the column on the right the mean and standard deviation for the domestic matches.
Overall, the summary statistics for the different variables in Table 6.10 appear to be quite similar.
The largest differences are detected for the firm size variable. We further test whether the average
values of firm age, firm size and log OP TFP are significantly different across the domestic
matches and the MNEs. For OP TFP and firm age, the null hypothesis of equality of means
cannot be rejected at the 5% level (the p-values of the two-sample t-tests are 0.13 and 0.16
respectively). For the firm size variable, the means are statistically different at the 5% level with
MNEs being larger than domestic firms on average. This may result from the matching procedure
used: finding a matching firm with a similar productivity, age and size for each industry in
each year is rather rigid in many cases (especially when the set of potential domestic matches
is small). As indicated above, Table 6.11 presents summary statistics for the WLP TFP case.
The average values for each of the variables again look quite similar, although only for firm age
the null hypothesis of equality of the means cannot be rejected at the 5% level (the p-value is
0.3427). For firm size and log WLP TFP the p-values of the two-sample t-tests are close to 0
and MNEs are found to be larger and more productive. Still, a density plot of the productivity
distributions for the MNEs and the matched domestic firms in Figure 6.2 illustrates that overall
these distributions appear to overlap to a large extent. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 therefore suggest that
matching on productivity only is the more reliable procedure. Note that the summary statistics
for firm size in Table 6.11 differ quite a lot from those in Table 6.10. This can be explained by
the fact that the average firm in manufacturing is larger than the average firm in the services
industries (for OP TFP only manufacturing industries are considered whereas for WLP TFP both
manufacturing and services industries are used). The average firm in manufacturing across all
years employs 148 employees, in services this number drops to 43 employees. As a robustness
test we also perform matching based on productivity and firm age only.
This Appendix further presents estimation results based on the zero-diagonal definition for
the vertical spillovers in Table 6.12 (as the counterpart of Table 6.6). Aside from the results on the
horizontal spillover effects, which are no longer statistically significant, the results correspond
Figure 6.2: Density plot of WLP TFP for the MNEs and the matched domestic firms.
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Table 6.10: Summary statistics for the multinationals (MNEs) that need a match and the domestic
firms (DOM) that are selected as matches (matching on the basis of OP TFP, firm age and firm
size - with replacement - manufacturing) in period 1996-2005 (OP TFP and WLP TFP in logs).
firm age firm size OP TFP WLP TFP #obs
MNEs DOM MNEs DOM MNEs DOM MNEs DOM MNEs DOM
1996 mean 2.96 2.98 171.10 172.79 2.27 2.28 9.74 9.56 1925 1869
sd 1.43 1.40 550.27 775.40 1.15 1.12 1.74 1.64
1997 mean 3.60 3.65 161.83 131.34 2.12 2.15 8.14 7.80 2312 2204
sd 1.67 1.62 530.04 414.96 1.11 1.07 1.50 1.45
1998 mean 4.11 4.17 149.46 121.83 1.98 2.00 8.09 7.81 2720 2590
sd 2.04 1.99 490.83 379.09 0.95 0.92 1.46 1.36
1999 mean 4.52 4.57 146.94 112.04 2.11 2.12 8.29 7.98 3139 2963
sd 2.46 2.44 472.38 354.54 1.00 0.96 1.46 1.40
2000 mean 4.80 4.86 142.92 107.15 2.10 2.11 8.17 7.84 3542 3307
sd 2.87 2.87 451.69 324.77 1.06 1.01 1.37 1.35
2001 mean 5.05 5.11 138.01 109.15 2.11 2.13 7.96 7.70 3996 3728
sd 3.22 3.25 438.35 348.97 1.05 1.01 1.43 1.39
2002 mean 5.48 5.52 137.28 108.30 2.07 2.08 7.56 7.31 4290 4007
sd 3.49 3.52 434.05 347.21 0.99 0.94 1.27 1.24
2003 mean 5.88 5.89 141.84 107.28 2.07 2.07 7.62 7.37 4378 4096
sd 3.75 3.79 479.50 304.87 0.96 0.92 1.23 1.11
2004 mean 6.19 6.22 133.93 103.12 2.04 2.05 7.62 7.35 4518 4243
sd 4.02 4.06 582.70 325.61 0.95 0.92 1.21 1.13
2005 mean 7.07 7.09 140.12 96.24 2.05 2.06 7.61 7.31 4326 4057
sd 4.09 4.13 606.31 292.82 0.98 0.94 1.16 1.05
All mean 5.24 5.28 143.69 112.59 2.08 2.09 7.93 7.66 35146 33064
sd 3.43 3.44 506.56 377.84 1.01 0.97 1.43 1.38
Table 6.11: Summary statistics for the multinationals (MNEs) that need a match and the domestic
firms (DOM) that are selected as matches (matching on the basis of WLP TFP, firm age and firm
size - with replacement - manufacturing and services) in period 1996-2005 (WLP TFP in logs).
firm age firm size WLP TFP #obs
MNEs DOM MNEs DOM MNEs DOM MNEs DOM
1996 mean 2.95 2.96 93.75 91.33 10.12 10.09 3866 3789
sd 1.42 1.40 392.82 544.19 1.75 1.69
1997 mean 3.65 3.66 98.13 79.27 8.39 8.35 4305 4137
sd 1.67 1.64 398.38 321.85 1.44 1.39
1998 mean 4.12 4.15 93.87 76.33 8.22 8.18 4970 4766
sd 2.07 2.04 389.32 306.30 1.47 1.40
1999 mean 4.53 4.57 95.55 75.95 8.35 8.30 5829 5556
sd 2.47 2.45 385.09 301.17 1.49 1.42
2000 mean 4.88 4.91 95.53 71.35 8.32 8.27 6721 6349
sd 2.87 2.87 398.89 273.45 1.42 1.36
2001 mean 5.21 5.24 93.50 68.10 8.22 8.17 7260 6845
sd 3.20 3.22 390.41 258.76 1.43 1.36
2002 mean 5.58 5.60 93.64 69.17 7.72 7.68 7629 7176
sd 3.49 3.50 384.10 242.99 1.29 1.23
2003 mean 5.99 6.00 90.71 70.84 7.68 7.64 8787 8299
sd 3.74 3.75 392.52 406.92 1.28 1.21
2004 mean 6.29 6.30 84.10 62.78 7.73 7.69 9592 9078
sd 4.01 4.02 441.91 229.87 1.25 1.20
2005 mean 7.13 7.14 85.50 61.00 7.80 7.76 9328 8822
sd 4.09 4.10 450.09 212.26 1.21 1.16
All mean 5.36 5.38 91.45 70.53 8.11 8.07 68287 64817
sd 3.47 3.47 407.07 307.09 1.48 1.43
to those in Table 6.6. The overall trend for the zero-diagonal definition results (which are not
further reported here) is that the results on the backward and forward linkages are confirmed
whereas no significant horizontal spillover effects are detected.
Finally, the Appendix also contains an additional analysis that combines the FDI spillover
variables and the ‘domestic matched’ spillover variables into a single regression. Note that this
exercise answers a different question. Rather than investigating the ‘specialness’ of foreign firms,
we simply analyse whether ‘special’ domestic firms generate spillover effects as well. To this
end, the calculation of the domestic matched spillover variables is adjusted. All domestic firms
in our sample are divided into a group of firms that were selected as a match (according to the
different procedures) and a group of firms that were not selected as a match. We construct a
dummy variable Mit that takes the value one when the domestic firm belongs to the first group
Table 6.12: Spillover effects from foreign and matched domestic firms for all industries. WLP
TFP is used as the productivity measure in the matching procedure (zero-diagonal definition).
WLP TFP WLP TFP age size
with without with without
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HR 0.038 0.055 -0.215 0.334
[0.143] [0.142] [0.179] [0.225]
BK 0.964** 0.903* 0.639 0.728
[0.486] [0.534] [0.696] [0.683]
FW 0.723** 1.214** 0.939** 0.445
[0.350] [0.533] [0.375] [0.488]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 96,681 96,681
R2 0.064 0.065 0.063 0.062
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least
five employees in the period 1996-2005. Standard er-
rors in brackets are clustered at the industry-year level.
***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
and a zero when the firm is foreign or the firm is domestic but was not selected as a match. F ′it is
a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is foreign-owned. Total industry output is
then the sum of output of three groups:
∑Yit =∑F ′it ∗Yit +∑Mit ∗Yit +∑(1−F ′it−Mit)∗Yit (6.10)
The horizontal spillover variable for the domestic matched firms is then constructed as
HRdomesticit =
∑
i∈ j
Mit∗Yit
∑
i∈ j
Yit
to capture the share of industry output that is produced by the first group
of firms. The backward and forward spillover variables are obtained by pre-multiplying the
horizontal spillover variable with the appropriate input-output coefficients. We thus no longer
fill out the output values for the multinationals in the sample with the output realised by their
domestic matches. The FDI spillover variables are calculated similarly as before, but now Fit
is no longer the actual share of foreign participation but also a dummy variable that takes the
value one if the firm is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. This approach implies that the sum
of the horizontal spillover variables of the foreign, the matched domestic and the non-matched
domestic firms is equal to one (by industry-year). Both HRit and HRdomesticit and the derived
vertical spillover variables are introduced in the same specification. The estimation results of
this analysis are shown in Table 6.13 (for matching based on the WLP TFP measure). In this
case, no statistically significant spillover effects from domestic matched firms are reported. The
Table 6.13: Spillover effects from foreign and matched domestic firms for all industries. Match-
ing on the basis of WLP TFP and on WLP TFP, firm age and firm size (single regression).
WLP TFP WLP TFP age size
with without with without
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HR foreign -0.104 -0.071 -0.024 -0.083
[0.122] [0.124] [0.125] [0.120]
HR domestic -0.029 -0.140 -0.263 -0.162
[0.114] [0.135] [0.178] [0.242]
BK foreign 0.915*** 0.859*** 0.885*** 0.901***
[0.264] [0.268] [0.270] [0.275]
BK domestic -0.118 0.016 0.066 0.065
[0.372] [0.386] [0.642] [0.695]
FW foreign 0.324 0.212 0.107 0.165
[0.437] [0.406] [0.395] [0.408]
FW domestic 0.479 0.609 0.517 0.303
[0.402] [0.423] [0.355] [0.476]
Obs. 96,681 96,681 96,681 96,681
R2 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.069
Estimates for domestic manufacturing firms with at least five employ-
ees in the period 1996-2005. Standard errors in brackets are clustered
at the industry-year level. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10
percent.
evidence for the FDI spillover effects is similar to that reported previously.
Figures 6.3a to 6.4b in this Appendix further show box plots of the horizontal and backward
spillover variables (based on the non-zero-diagonal definition) in 1996, 2000 and 2005 (FDI
and matched domestic spillover variables). Spillover variables are presented for matching based
on productivity only (TFP) and matching on productivity, age and size (full), with and without
replacement (withrep, norep). In a box plot, the edges of a box represent the first and third
quartile, the horizontal line within a box indicates the median and the whiskers of a box indicate
points that lie within 3/2 times the interquartile range of quartiles one and three (also showing
the maximum and minimum values when outliers are not accounted for). The dots capture data
points that fall outside the range marked by the whiskers. Figures 6.3a and 6.3b present box plots
when OP TFP is used as the productivity measure (manufacturing industries only). In Figure 6.3a,
the FDI spillover variable clearly dominates the domestic spillover variables, and this difference
appears to grow larger in the later years. The matched domestic spillover variables based on TFP,
age and size appear to be somewhat smaller than those based on TFP only in the first years of
Figure 6.3: Box plots of the horizontal spillover variables (top panel) and the backward spillover
variables (bottom panel). Matched domestic spillover variables based on OP TFP (TFP) and on
OP TFP, firm age and firm size (full) (matching with (withrep) and without replacement (norep)).
Only the manufacturing industries are considered.
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(a) Box plots of the horizontal FDI spillover variable and different types of domestic spillover variables.
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(b) Box plots of the backward FDI spillover variable and different types of domestic spillover variables.
the panel, and this trend is reversed towards the end of the sample period. The variables obtained
for matching with and without replacement are quite comparable. Figure 6.3b for the backward
spillover variables show similar patterns for the matched domestic spillover variables as detected
in the horizontal spillover box plots. The matched domestic spillover variables are quite close
together in the last years of the sample period. Figures 6.4a and 6.4b present box plots for the
Figure 6.4: Box plots of the horizontal spillover variables (top panel) and the backward spillover
variables (bottom panel). Matched domestic spillover variables based on WLP TFP (TFP) and
on WLP TFP, firm age and firm size (full) (matching with (withrep) and without replacement
(norep)). Both the manufacturing and services industries are considered.
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(a) Box plots of the horizontal FDI spillover variable and different types of domestic spillover variables.
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(b) Box plots of the backward FDI spillover variable and different types of domestic spillover variables.
WLP TFP productivity measure for all industries. These Figures are in line with Figures 6.3a
and 6.3b, both in terms of values and patterns detected.
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